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A VIEW OF ANTIENT HISTORY;

INCLUDING THE PROGRESS OF

LITERATURE

AND THE

FINE ARTS.

BY
WILLIAM RUTHERFORD, D.D.

IN TWO VOLUMES.
THIRD EDITION, CORRECTED.

VOL. II.

LONDON:
Printed by C. Roworth, Bell Yard, Temple Bar;
FOR LONGMAN, HURST, REES AND ORME; VERNOR, HOOD AND SHARPE; JOHN MURRAY; AND J. HARDING, LONDON; AND BELL AND BRADFUTE, EDINBURGH.

1809.

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A VIEW

A VIEW

OF

ANTIENT HISTORY.

CHAP. XVI.

From the Battle of THERMOPYLÆ, *to the Naval Victory at* SALAMIS.

DURING these memorable operations, the Grecian fleet had anchored in the harbour of Artemisium. That of the Persians lay in the road that reaches from Castanæa to the promontory of Sepias, on the Thessalian coast. The road of Castanæa was open to the north and north-east winds; and so little spacious, that an eighth division only of the Persian fleet could be moored in one line against the shore; the other seven rode at anchor, with the prows of the vessels towards the sea. The second day after their arrival, a tempest blew from the north-east, and the surges swelled to an amazing height. The line of gallies next the shore were drawn upon the beach; of the others many were driven from their anchors; some dashed to pieces on the foreland of Sepias; others on the cliffs of Pelion; while several were wrecked near the town of Meliboea. Four hundred gallies were sunk or destroyed in this storm, be-

sides such a number of transports, that the Persians, dreading a revolt of the Thessalians, erected a temporary fort against any sudden attack, composed of the wreck of their vessels.

They soon quitted this insecure station, and, with eight hundred ships of war, besides transports, sailed into the road of Aphetæ, opposite to the harbour of Artemisium.

When the Grecian sentinels, posted on the Eubœan heights, announced the fate of the enemy's fleet, a grateful sacrifice was offered to "Neptune the Deliverer;" but the approach of an enemy, whose shattered remains were yet formidable, converted their transports of joy into anxiety for their present situation.

The Grecian fleet consisted of two hundred and seventy-one gallies with three tier of oars, besides smaller vessels. Each of these gallies carried a hundred and twenty rowers, besides forty soldiers; but, on emergencies, the whole crew acted with arms. Of this fleet, more than one half was furnished by the Athenians; yet, such was the present influence, owing to the antient pre-eminence of Sparta, that the allies refused to serve under any but a Lacedæmonian commander. Eurybiades was therefore appointed admiral of the fleet. The moderation of the Athenian leaders, who acquiesced in this partial decision, and their superiority to little passions in still prosecuting with zeal the great object of the common confederacy, have merited and obtained the praise of antient and modern historians. But the genius of Themistocles, equally penetrating and provident, gained him an ascendancy which no political arrangement could preclude; and though Eurybiades had the name, he exercised the authority of admiral.

On the arrival of the Persian fleet near the harbour of Artemisium, an alarm spread on all sides, and reached the commanders of the Grecian squadrons. It was proposed in a council of war to retreat to the interior

seas

seas of Greece. The Eubœans, whose coasts must thus have been left open to the invasion of the Persians, were alarmed at this resolution. They implored Eurybiades that the fleet might remain for the protection of their island, at least till they could remove their families and valuable effects to a place of safety. The Spartan admiral refused their request. They then applied to Themistocles. The opinion which he had already adopted coincided with their desire; and he told them, "that though their eloquence could not persuade, their gold might influence the Grecian commanders, and that, for thirty talents,* he would engage that the fleet should remain for the defence of their coasts." The money was delivered into his hands. A distribution of eight talents secured the acquiescence of the other captains to his opinion, the remainder he retained in his hand, to be usefully employed in future contingencies.

The Persians, having recovered from the shock of their late misfortunes, prepared to attack the Grecian fleet; but, confident in the superiority of their numbers, and secure of victory, they delayed the attack till they had sent two hundred gallies round Eubœa to prevent the enemy from escaping through the narrow seas. The Greeks being informed of this stratagem by Scyllias, a deserter from the Persian fleet, resolved to sail at midnight against the detached squadron; and, by attacking it separately, turn the stratagem of the enemy against themselves; but, having received no farther intelligence of it in the evening, they prepared to make an attack upon the Persian fleet. Accordingly, about sunset, they advanced in order of battle. A sharp engagement ensued, and the Greeks took thirty gallies from the enemies, though the victory was not decisive. The approach of night, with a storm, attended by rain and thunder, separated the combatants. The Greeks re-

* About six thousand pounds.

treated to the harbour of Artemisium; the Persians were driven to the coast of Thessaly.

The violence of the storm drove the wrecks of the late engagement, and the dead bodies, against the sides of the ships, and impeded the motion of their oars. Repeated flashes of lightning, amidst the darkness of the night, served only to discover the horrors of the scene, while the reverberation of the thunder among the neighbouring mountains of Pelion, struck the mariners with the dreadful imagination that the gods were in this manner denouncing their vengeance. Nor was it unreasonable that the Greeks in the Persian fleet should be agitated with such superstitious fears, as, according to the creed of their age, they were making war against the divinities of their country. By good fortune rather than conduct the greater part escaped with safety into the Pegasean bay.

The fate of the detachment which was to sail round Eubœa was still more disastrous. Exposed in an unknown sea, and in a dark night, to thunder, lightning, and storm, they abandoned themselves to despair, and met their fate among the dangerous rocks of the Eubœan coast. "Thus it was the will of the Deity," says Herodotus, "to reduce the Persian force more nearly to an equality with the Grecian."

Next day a reinforcement of fifty-three Athenian ships joined the Grecian fleet, and announced the destruction of the Persian squadron on the Eubœan rocks. Encouraged and elated by these advantages, the confederates resolved to attack the enemy in the dusk of the evening, which, from their knowledge of the coast, was particularly favourable to their designs. They accordingly made the attempt, and, having separated the Cilician squadron from the main fleet, totally destroyed it, and in the night resumed their station at Artemisium.

Irritated and disgraced by repeated disasters and insults from such an inferior force, the Persian commanders

ders resolved on the following day, by one vigorous effort, to repair their losses, and regain the honour of which they had been deprived. As the Greeks had gained their advantages by stratagem, and under covert of the night, they advanced to the attack at noon in the form of a semi-circle, with a view to enclose the enemy. The Greeks waited in the advantageous station which they had chosen. The plan of attack formed by the Persians appears to have been ill executed. In making their approach to the enemy, they crossed and fell against one another. The battle, however, was more vigorously maintained than on any former occasion. Five Grecian gallies were taken by the Egyptians, who appear to have signalized themselves in that engagement. More than half the Athenian squadron was disabled. The doubtful victory was claimed by the Greeks, who remained in possession of the wrecks and the dead; but, from the distresses which their fleet had suffered, it was resolved immediately to retreat to the interior seas of Greece. This resolution was confirmed by the arrival of Abronychus, an Athenian, who related the event of the battle of Thermopylæ. They now retreated without delay, and, having passed the Euripus, they coasted along the shore of Attica, and anchored at Salamis.

Before the departure of the fleet, Themistocles, ever fertile in expedients for the good of his country, engraved on the rocks near the watering-place of Artemisium, which he knew would soon be visited by the enemy, the following inscription: "Men of Ionia, your conduct is inexcusable, in warring against your ancestors, and endeavouring to enslave Greece. Repair, therefore, the injury, and come over to our side. But if you are compelled by necessity to remain with the Persian fleet, avoid acting against us when we come to an engagement. Remember that you are descended from the same blood with us, and that our quarrel with the Persians was on your account."

By these means the Grecian commander hoped either to recal the attachment of the Ionians to their ancient friends, or at least to render them suspected to their new masters.*

When the Grecians had quitted the road of Artemisium, Xerxes gave orders that his fleet, after ravaging the coasts of Eubœa, should proceed to the harbour of Athens; while he himself, at the head of his immense army, intended to march, or rather to make a triumphal entry, into the territories of Attica. His route lay through the countries of Phocis and Bœotia, the latter of which had been early attached to the Persian cause. The Phocians remained faithful to the Grecian confederacy, and were farther confirmed in their attachment, after the Thessalians, their ancient enemies, had joined the Asiatic invaders.

A natural jealousy and rivalship subsisted not only between the Thessalians and Phocians, but between all the Grecian states: and that Thebes and Argos appeared on the side of Persia, may in a great measure be attributed to their desire of humbling the power of Athens and of Sparta.

When the host of Xerxes had entered the territory of Phocis, at the instigation of the Thessalians, rather than from the cruelty of the Persians, destruction was begun by fire and sword. While the main body of the army followed the course of the Cephisus, detachments plundered and burned to the ground Charadra, Elatæa, and other flourishing towns. Even the sacred walls of Abé, with its temple dedicated to Apollo, and celebrated for its oracles, did not prevent Thessalian and Persian fury from plundering the holy shrine, and appropriating the donations which superstition had amassed for ages. The people fled to the mountains, or were reduced to slavery.

After these dreadful devastations were committed, the

* Herod. lib. viii. cap. 40, 41.

grand

grand army marched through Bœotia towards Athens; a detachment was sent from Panopeus, to plunder the temple of Apollo at Delphi.* Instructed by the recent and disastrous fate of Abé, that religion was insufficient to protect the persons or the property of its votaries, the Delphians consulted the Oracle, "whether they should bury their treasures, or transport them to another country?" The Pythian prophetess replied, "That Apollo would defend his own shrine." The cares of the Delphians were now confined to their own safety, and that of their families. They sent their wives and children across the Corinthian Gulph into Achaia. The men climbed to the tops of Parnassus, or descended into a vast cavern on the side of that mountain. All left Delphi, except sixty venerable ministers of religion, and the prophet of the God. When the Persian detachment drew near to Delphi, and were in sight of the temple of Minerva, the prophet saw the sacred armour, which it is unlawful for mortals to touch, brought by some invisible power from the innermost recesses of the fane, and laid before the edifice. No sooner had the advanced guard arrived at the chapel, which is in front of the great temple, than the air was darkened; thunder and lightning smote them from heaven; two vast fragments rolled down from the mountain with prodigious violence, overwhelmed the prostrate Persians, while shouts of warlike acclamation echoed from the fane. The impious and hostile bands were struck with a panic; the Delphians, believing from these manifest signs that the divinity defended his favourite mansion, rushed from their caverns and concealments, and slaughtered without resistance these victims of superstitious terror.† The survivors fled with precipitation to Bœotia.

Such is the marvellous tale which the ingenuity of priests has invented, and popular superstition has be-

* Herod. lib. viii. cap. 35. † Ibid. cap. 37, &c.

lieved; but "which, when stript of its preternatural machinery," says an ingenious and learned historian,* leaves an account remaining neither improbable nor defective. The priests, anxious for their treasures, and for the credit of their Oracle, concerted a measure equally bold and prudent. When a response from the unerring Oracle had inspired the citizens with confidence, and their families were carried to a place of safety, the best and bravest men were reserved to defend the place. The uncommon mode of defence was well adapted to the situation and circumstances of Delphi, as well as to its established character for sanctity. Surrounded by the summits of lofty mountains, the city was founded on crags and precipices. No way led to it but through narrow defiles, overhung with mountains, shadowed with wood, and commanded at every step by fastnesses above. Every measure was taken to make the enemy believe that the place was totally abandoned, and to induce them to advance in all the carelessness of security. The surprise accordingly appears to have been complete. A thunder-storm among the mountains was no uncommon phenomenon. The rolling down of the rocky fragments proceeded from the invisible, but not immortal hands of Delphians, who were concealed among the crags, and prepared to put them in motion. Perhaps artificial fires and explosions might imitate thunder and lightning, and increase the horror. Many of the nations too, which composed the Persian host, were believers in the divinity of Apollo, and must have been struck with the impiety of their attempt. In such a state of consternation, the Delphians attacked them with every possible advantage. The few who survived the engagement, and fled to Bœotia, readily adopted and magnified the rumours of superstition, as an apology for their surprise and flight. The fragments of rock thrown down from the summit of the mountain,

* Mr. Mitford.

were

were preserved in the chapel of Minerva, as the proofs and memorials of the miraculous protection afforded by the divinity upon that critical occasion.

The army of Xerxes entered the territories of Attica three months after they had crossed the Hellespont, and proceeding on their march, burned and plundered the cities as they advanced. The people of Peloponnesus, anxious only for their own interest, resolved to bring all their forces within the Isthmus, and fortify themselves by a strong wall from the one sea to the other. After such a base desertion of the general cause, Athens, ready to be crushed under the whole weight of the Persian power, appeared on the eve of destruction; she owed her safety to the genius of Themistocles. This Athenian possessed greater and more various talents than the munificence of nature generally allots to one man. Daring in enterprise, cool in action, of a foresight like prophecy, an apprehension that seemed intuitive, and a memory, as himself confessed, retentive to a degree of pain. In times of danger, men naturally rank in their proper sphere, and great abilities raise to the highest situations. By the ascendency of his extraordinary character, he not only influenced the decisions of the allies, but made the froward passions of the Athenian people submit to his better judgment.

He had formerly persuaded the Athenians to build a fleet; perceiving now that the city could not be defended, and that the sea offered their only asylum, he told them that the time was come, when, for the common safety of Greece, they must forsake Athens, and betake themselves to their ships. This advice presented nothing to the people but the mournful image of a total destruction, and they could not think, without trembling and horror, of abandoning their ancient country, their native city, the temples of their gods, and the tombs of their ancestors. As religion attached them to Athens, it was requisite to disengage them by religion. Greece had already been

filled with Oracles favourable to the designs of Themistocles, the messengers sent to consult the shrine of Apollo, at Delphi, received for answer, "That the city could only be saved by its *wooden walls*." These Themistocles interpreted to be their ships, and added, "that the republic lived not in its edifices, but in its men; and that it was not houses or walls, but the citizens which formed the city." Superstition, the great engine of policy among the antients, was employed in another direction. It was believed that the temple of Minerva, in the citadel, was guarded by a large serpent, and at every new moon cakes were offered to this sacred protector. The chief priest affirmed, that the cakes, which had never failed to be eaten by the hallowed serpent, now remained untouched; a proof that the goddess herself had abandoned the city. This, more than the eloquence of Themistocles, induced the Athenians to forsake their beloved city.*

A decree was then passed, by which it was ordained, "That Athens should be committed to the protection of Minerva, their guardian goddess; that all such inhabitants as were able to bear arms should go on ship-board; and that the citizens should provide for the safety of their wives, children and slaves." The gallant and heroic behaviour of Cimon, the son of Miltiades, on this occasion, deserves to be recorded. Descended from a long line of ancestors, he was one of the principal proprietors of land in the commonwealth, and had he been governed by interested motives, would have been among the last to abandon his country. But when the proclamation was made to depart from Attica, Cimon, with a cheerful countenance, and accompanied by the principal youths of Athens, marched in procession through the most public parts of the city, in order to consecrate their bridles (the ensigns of military service) in the temple of Minerva, conveying to the people by this religious ceremony, that now they

* Herod. lib. viii. cap. 41.

had

had no farther use for land forces, and that they ought to devote themselves to the new service which the critical situation of their country required. Then taking down one of the shields which hung upon the wall, he went with his companions to the margin of the sea, and was the first who by his example inspired his compatriots to venture with confidence on a strange element, and to rush in a new channel to victory and renown.

Having transported their wives, children, and aged parents to the isles of Salamis, Ægina, and the Trœzene, the Athenians began to embark. While they looked back upon the deserted city, the scene drew tears from every eye. The lamentations of the women and children, from whom they had just torn themselves; the howlings of the domestic animals which followed them to their ships, and the last looks of the old men, who, from necessity or choice, remained in the citadel to perish, composed a mournful scene, from which the mind could not be removed, but by attending to the heroic resolution of a whole people going into voluntary banishment and leaving their city for a while, that they might preserve it for ever.

When all the Athenians capable of bearing arms had joined the fleet at Salamis, a council of the commanders was held, to decide on their future motions. The important question was agitated, "Whether they should continue in the straits of Salamis, or advance towards the isthmus of Corinth, where the land-army was posted under the command of Cleombrotus, the brother of Leonidas?" The confederates of Peloponnesus, whose territories lay near the isthmus, adopted the latter motion, from a selfish desire to defend their respective cities. Themistocles, who saw the defects of this narrow policy, opposed it with vigour. He affirmed, that it would be betraying their country to abandon so advantageous a situation as that of Salamis; that in quitting the general rendezvous, the different detachments were likely to for-

sake the common cause; some would retire to their native harbours; some court the friendship, and submit to the tyranny of Persia, and others seek for liberty on a distant and unmolested shore.

Meanwhile the Persian army, advancing from Thebes, burnt the forsaken towns of Thespiæ and Platæa, and entering Attica, ravaged it without resistance. On their arrival at Athens, they found nothing but silence and solitude within the walls. The citadel was still defended by a feeble garrison of priests and old men, who supposing it to be the "wooden walls" of the Oracle, confided in the divine protection. After an obstinate resistance, it was taken by assault; all within it were put to the sword, and the city consumed to ashes.

According to Herodotus,* information of this event was brought to the fleet, while the council of war was deliberating. It struck such an alarm, that some of the commanders hastened to their gallies, and hoisted their sails in order to depart. Themistocles, encouraged and emboldened by his friend Mnesiphilus, prevailed on Eurybiades to summon another council; there, he represented the importance of preserving Salamis, Megara, and Ægina, which upon their departure must fall into the hands of the enemy; the advantage of their present situation in a narrow channel, where the Persians could not avail themselves of their superior numbers; and the certain dangers they run in withdrawing to the Corinthian isthmus, where the army of Xerxes would attend the motions of his fleet, and the whole naval force be employed against them in the open sea. Some of the commanders, particularly Adimantus the Corinthian, had the baseness to object to the Athenian voice in council, as they had no longer a political existence, and had no country or city to defend. Themistocles replied with moderation and magnanimity, "that the Athenians had

* Lib. viii. cap. 58.

indeed

indeed left their native soil and city, and considering their country as comprehended in their liberty, had left themselves nothing to share in with the allies, except the common dangers; but that they had it still in their power to procure for themselves a more happy establishment, they had two hundred ships of war, and that if the confederates persisted in paying so little regard to the Athenians, they would in these ships embark their families, and withdrawing from the confederacy, repair to Siris in Italy, the propitious spot of settlement pointed out to them by the Oracle." This formidable argument convinced or alarmed Eurybiades; and it was determined by the majority to remain in the bay of Salamis.

The Persian fleet, after continuing three days in the road of Artemisium, sailed through the Euripus to Phalerus, the principal port of Athens, which lay to the south of the strait occupied by the Greeks. The fleet and army having again met, a council of war was held to consider the propriety of attacking the Grecian fleet in its present station.

As the inclinations of Xerxes were known, his obsequious commanders, ever ready to flatter the passions of their sovereign, were unanimous for a naval engagement. Artemisia, the queen of Halicarnassus, a woman of a masculine and heroic mind, who had fitted out five ships, which she commanded in person, alone ventured to oppose the decision of the king and his council. She represented the superiority of the Greeks in naval affairs, and the advantages of their present situation; advised Xerxes to avoid offensive measures at sea, and prosecute them by land; stated to him the impossibility that four hundred ships could long be supplied with provisions from the barren territory of Salamis, where they had no magazines; and judiciously remarked, that when necessity drove them to their respective ports, he might without difficulty make himself master of all Greece.

The Persian monarch shut his ears against these salutary

tary councils, as he vainly imagined that the Greeks could make only a feeble and ineffectual resistance. Accordingly it was agreed to attack the enemy next morning.

Themistocles, still apprehensive of the defection of some of his countrymen, sent a confidential messenger to the Persian fleet. Having obtained admission to the presence of Xerxes, he declared that he was sent by the Athenian admiral, who was desirous of revolting to the Persians, to give an account of the dissentions among the Grecian commanders, and of their intended purpose to make their escape during the darkness of the night; adding, "that an opportunity now offered, by intercepting their flight, of destroying at once the whole Grecian fleet." The stratagem was successful; that very night the Persian fleet began to move, and formed a semicircle from the point of Salamis to the port of Munychia, and the little island Psyttalea was filled with Persian infantry, to extirpate the remnant of the Greeks, who, after the defeat of their fleet, might seek that asylum.

The first information of this arrangement was brought by Aristides, who escaping in a small vessel, through the middle of the Persian fleet, arrived at Salamis from Ægina, and forgetting every thing but the good of his country, communicated the important intelligence to Themistocles. Private animosities and political dissensions were now suspended; antient enmity was converted into generous emulation; and these heroic rivals now only vied with each other in promoting the common interest of Greece. Aristides accompanied Themistocles to the council of war, which was then sitting, and delivered his intelligence in person. The truth of his information was soon confirmed by the arrival of a vessel from the Island of Tenos. The confederates, perceiving that they were now surrounded, made a vir-

tue

tue of necessity, and prepared to fight, as it was impracticable to escape.

The Persian fleet, consisting of 1200 triremes, displayed the naval force of more than half the known world; amidst a crowd of uncouth and barbarous names, it contained the most skilful and renowned of maritime nations; and though inferior in the size and structure of the vessels, exceeded in numbers of men any naval armament of antient or modern times.

Since the retreat from Artemisium, the Grecian fleet had been considerably reinforced, and now amounted to three hundred and eighty triremes.

The naval engagements of the antients were very different from our's. Their gallies, always light, however large, and worked by their oars alone, could form in very close order, and move in narrow seas. As their principal engine of offence was a strong beak of iron or brass, projecting from the prow, the sailors always endeavoured to keep the head of the vessel to the enemy. The chief object in naval combats was either to bring the prow of their gallies to bear directly upon the enemies broadside, by which a vessel was often sunk, or by an oblique impulse to dash away some of its oars, by which it became unmanageable. Hence the importance of oars in action, by which alone attacks could be made or avoided in every direction. Various kinds of missile weapons were used, but, except when the attack with the beak succeeded, an engagement seldom terminated without boarding.

At the dawn of day both fleets were arranged in the order of battle. The Athenian line on the right was opposed to the Phœnician squadron; the Lacedæmonians on the left to the Ionian division. When the sun arose, the trumpets sounded, sacred hymns and pæans were sung, and the Grecian commanders endeavoured by all means to rouse that spirit and vigour in their fleet which their timid and fluctuating councils had tended to destroy.

As

As nothing escaped the vigilance of Themistocles, he delayed the attack till the regular breeze began to blow which was adverse to the enemy. Soon as this wind arose the signal was given for battle. The attack was vigorous and formidable on both sides. The Persians, confident in numbers, and conscious that they acted under the eyes of the Great King, fought with more obstinate bravery, and displayed a more spirited resistance than on any former occasion; but the wind was unfavourable to their vast and unwieldy ships; there was not sufficient space to bring their whole fleet into action, and the number of their vessels served only to embarrass them in a narrow sea. On the side of the Grecians the most steady discipline was preserved; every movement was conducted with order and regularity; because all was under the direction of one commander.

But among the various nations which composed the Persian fleet, commanded by different officers, little versed in naval affairs, even their courage and enthusiasm contributed to increase the confusion and disorder. While the Athenians and Æginetans had broke the Persian line, the gallies out of action, which pressed to its support, ran foul of their own fleet, swept off the oars, and damaged the hulls of the Persian ships. A scene of havoc and destruction soon followed; and the sea itself, says the dramatic historian, (who distinguished himself on the day of Salamis, and who united the warrior's wreath with the poet's garland) became almost invisible from the fragments of wrecks and the floating bodies with which it was covered. On the left wing, the Lacedæmonians and Peloponnesians completed the victory. Many of the Asiatic Greeks, attached to the country of their ancestors, and remembering the advice of Themistocles, either declined engaging, or revolted to their countrymen; some of their gallies were taken, the remainder were sunk or put to flight. Among those who perished on this occasion were many persons of high

high rank, who sought by their exploits to court the favour of a monarch who beheld the scene of action. Forty Grecian gallies are said to have been destroyed; but the crews were either taken up by other ships of their fleet, or saved themselves by swimming to the neighbouring shore of Salamis. Aristides, with a detachment of Athenians, landed on the Isle of Psyttalea, where a body of Persian troops had been posted to receive, as they expected, the feeble remains of the Grecian fleet. The Greeks, flushed with success, attacked their astonished foes; and Xerxes beheld from his throne the flower of his infantry cut off, surrounded with an immense army which could afford them no relief.

Among those who escaped in this fatal engagement was Artemisia, the Halicarnassian queen. After displaying a more than masculine courage during the action, and being among the last that fled, she found herself warmly pursued by an Athenian galley, commanded by Amenias, brother to the poet Æschylus. In this extremity, with all the promptitude of female invention, she attacked the nearest Persian vessel, commanded by Damasithymus, a prince of Calynda in Lycia, with whom she was in terms of hostility. The stroke of her galley was so well aimed, and so violent, that the Lycian vessel was instantly buried in the waves. Amenias, deceived by this stratagem, desisted from the pursuit, and the queen of Halicarnassus escaped.

The important and decisive battle of Salamis disconcerted the councils, and deranged the measures of the Persian monarch. No harbour was at hand capable of protecting the shattered and dispirited, but still respectable, remains of the fleet. On the night after the engagement, it was ordered to sail for the Hellespont. The Greeks, who expected a renewal of the action on the following morning, found that they had no enemy to encounter. The Persian army disappeared almost as suddenly as their fleet. In danger of perishing for want

want of provisions, they retreated to the wealthy and hospitable province of Bœotia, and thence marched into Thessaly.

From the moment of defeat, Xerxes meditated to return with all possible expedition into Asia. Perhaps the punishment of the Athenians, by the destruction of their capital, with the subjection of so many Grecian states, might be regarded as a recompence, or held as an apology for such an expensive armament and extraordinary expedition. His courtiers might suggest to him, that he did not come to Greece to combat against the winds and the waves; and might impute his inferiority at sea to an armament composed of his conquered subjects; they might represent to him, that the valour of the Persians had made him master of Athens, and that he had sent its most precious spoils to the provinces of Asia; they might persuade him that, having obtained the great object of his ambition, he might return to an empire, whose affairs required his presence, and leave to his generals the farther execution of his plans, and the completion of his conquests.

Three hundred thousand men were selected from the army, and committed to Mardonius, to effect the conquest of Greece. Of these sixty thousand were appointed to march as a guard to the royal personage, as far as the Hellespont. Proper provision was made for these, as they were necessary to the pomp and safety of Xerxes; but the innumerable multitudes of various nations, which followed the retreat of the monarch, suffered beyond description during their march, which lasted forty-five days. After living by plunder from friends and foes, they were compelled to eat the herbs of the field, and even the bark and leaves of trees. Dysenteries and the pestilence carried off the miserable relics which famine had spared, and when Xerxes reached the Hellespont, scarcely a remnant was left of the myriads who, a few months before, had marched under his

his command. The bridges had been destroyed by a recent tempest, and the violence of the current; but the fleet was arrived. The Great King, whose armies had lately covered the land, and whose fleets had darkened the ocean, embarked with a small retinue in a Phœnician galley, and having crossed the straits, endeavoured to forget his misfortunes by plunging into the most sensual and criminal pleasures at Sardis.*

CHAP. XVII.

From the Battle of SALAMIS *to the Conclusion of the* PERSIAN *War.*

THE victory at Salamis was the most important and decisive which the Greeks had ever obtained over the Persians. In the first moments of triumph, it was proposed to pursue the Persian fleet to the Hellespont, and at one blow to crush the naval power of the empire. This design, chiefly supported by the Athenians, was abandoned, and the maritime force of Greece employed against those islanders who had forsaken the cause of their country, and attached themselves to the Persians. From them it was determined to exact fines to defray in part the expences of the war.

Themistocles, whose great talents as a commander and a statesman were sullied by avarice, raised heavy contributions unknown to the other commanders, and applied them to his own private emolument. The Andrians alone having refused to comply with these exactions, their capital was besieged, but without effect, and the fleet returned to Salamis.

* Herod. lib. viii. cap. 100, 114, 126.

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The approach of winter restored a tranquillity to the Greeks, of which they had been long bereaved. Agreeable to the piety of antient times, the most valuable articles of the spoil were selected, and offered to the gods, their propitious though invisible protectors; the remainder was distributed in the fleet and army. By an antient and established custom, it was then to be decided to whom the first and second honors were due for military and naval merit. On this occasion all assumed the first rank to themselves, but a large majority assigned the second to Themistocles.* This indirect but obvious preference given to the Athenian commander, was confirmed by the general voice of the people and the judgment of Sparta. The Lacedæmonians could not refuse the first honours for courage and conduct to their own admiral, who had been commander in chief; but they invented a new kind of reward for the Athenian commander; adjudging to him the prize of wisdom and maritime skill, and therefore bestowed on each the honourable mark of distinction, the olive crown. Themistocles was also presented with a magnificent chariot; and at his departure from Lacedæmon was escorted to the frontier by three hundred Spartans of the first families; an honour, says Herodotus, never paid to any other stranger.†

After the departure of Xerxes into Asia, the Persian fleet wintered in the ports of Samos and Cumæ. On the approach of spring, the whole assembled at Samos, and remained there to hold the coasts of Asia and Thrace in subjection, as the recent victory at Salamis had removed that awe and terror with which the power of the Great King had formerly impressed the neighbouring realms.

At this time also, Mardonius prepared to take the field with three hundred thousand men; the flower of

* Herod. lib. viii. cap. 23. † Lib. viii. cap. 124.

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that army which Xerxes had conducted into Greece, and which was increased in strength by the diminution of its superfluous numbers. Sensible that the Athenians were the prime movers of the confederacy, and that their maritime power was a principal support of their land forces, he attempted to detach them from the Grecian alliance; wisely judging, that if this could be done, the Persian fleet would obtain a decided superiority, and the Great King remain master both by sea and land. With this view he sent Alexander king of Macedon as his ambassador to the Athenian republic. That prince, a descendant of Hercules, was connected with the Athenians by the sacred ties of hereditary hospitality. Though he was now a Persian tributary, he had shewn himself, as far as his situation would permit, friendly to the Grecian cause. He was therefore well received at Athens, though his commission was unwelcome. But as the news of his arrival quickly spread through Greece, and alarmed the jealousy of the confederated states, particularly of the Lacedæmonians, the Athenians, whose enlightened policy at this period seems to have been equal to their spirit and valour, delayed his public audience before the assembly of the people till ambassadors arrived from Sparta.

Upon their arrival the public assembly was convened, and Alexander addressed them in the simple but energetic stile of antient eloquence. "Athenians, thus saith Mardonius; the commands of the king are come to me in these words: *I forgive the Athenians all their offences against me.* Now therefore, *Mardonius, thus do; restore to them all their territories, and add whatever themselves shall choose, leaving them to be governed by their own laws; and if they will enter into an alliance with me, rebuild all the temples which have been burned.* Such are the commands of the King. From myself I thus address you: What can prompt you, O Athenians, to persist in making war against

against a monarch whom you can never conquer, nor long resist? To you even the army under my command is formidable; should that be defeated, which you have no reason to expect, a greater force will be sent against you. As a friend I entreat you not to expose your country to danger or destruction for a vain contest with the King, but to seize this favourable opportunity of terminating hostilities by an honourable and permanent peace. Enjoy your freedom, and let there be a fair and friendly alliance between us. These things, O Athenians, I have spoke to you by the command of Mardonius. In my own name, and from my sincere friendship for you, which my past conduct uniformly proves, I beseech you to accept of the terms proposed by Mardonius; for I see the impossibility of your long contending against a king, whose arm is of immeasurable length, and whose power is irresistible. Let the situation of your country admonish you, which is first exposed to invasion; nor reckon it an inferior honour, that you alone of all the Greeks are selected by the Great King to be his friends and allies."

When the king of Macedonia had concluded his discourse, the chief of the Spartan ambassadors began: "The Lacedæmonians have sent us to request that you will not lose sight of the interest of Greece, nor listen to any proposal from the barbarian. Such conduct would be unjust and perfidious in any Grecian state, and most of all unbecoming you. This war, which Greece now feels in every part, was originally undertaken on your account. And shall the Athenians, who from ancient times have distinguished themselves from the rest of mankind, by punishing tyrants, and asserting the liberties of others, become the authors of slavery to Greece. We sympathise in your calamities, in the ruin of your city, and the loss of your harvests for two seasons; but we, and the other confederates, are desirous of making you reparation, and will support your families during the con-

continuance of the war. Let not therefore Alexander the Macedonian persuade you by specious words to desert the common interest of Greece. A tyrant himself, he supports the measures of a tyrant. But you know, Athenians, that to tyrants and barbarians truth and justice are unknown."

After a short deliberation, Aristides, who was principal Archon, and presided in the assembly, delivered, in the name of the Athenian people, the following answer to the ambassador of Mardonius; "We are acquainted with the power of the Persian empire, and of its vast superiority to Athens. With these, therefore, it was unnecessary as well as cruel to insult us. Yet to the defenders of liberty and independence no power is superior. Return then, and tell Mardonius, that while that luminary (pointing to the sun) pursues his course through the heavens, there shall neither be alliance nor peace with Xerxes; but that, aided by those gods and heroes whose temples he has burned, and whose images he has destroyed, we trust effectually to resist every effort of his power. For yourself, come no more to the Athenians with such dishonourable proposals, lest we should forget that you are our friend, and united with us by the sacred bonds of antient alliance and hospitality."

The reply to the Lacedæmonians was in the high tone of offended merit. "Your apprehension that we should accept the alliance of the Great King has perhaps too strong a foundation in the general practice of mankind; but after so many and such striking proofs as you have had of Athenian patriotism and magnanimity, such a suspicion becomes as dishonourable as it is unjust. Not all the treasures of the Great King, nor the possession of the finest country upon earth, shall ever seduce us to aid the Persian arms in conquering and enslaving Greece.

"The temples and altars of the gods which have been plundered and profaned; our city which is in ashes, and the tombs of our ancestors which have been violated, call

call upon us for vengeance. We have also to avenge the cause of our allies, who are united to us by the indissoluble ties of descent, religion, language, and manners; and be assured, that the last surviving Athenian will spurn the barbarian alliance. Your kind offers to our families we gratefully acknowledge; but their future provision we now take upon ourselves. All that we require of you is, to rival us in activity and resolution. Your army must march without delay. The barbarian, as soon as he is informed that we have rejected his proposals, will again invade Attica. Let us therefore move with all expedition to Bœotia, and check his progress."

The dignity and magnanimity of the Athenian leaders on this occasion is equal to any thing which history records; but the conduct of the allies, particularly of the Lacedæmonians, by no means corresponded to this enthusiasm of public spirit. In a few weeks Mardonius, according to the conjecture of Aristides, followed the tract of Xerxes, and marched into Bœotia; but the Athenians looked in vain for the promised arrival of their Spartan auxiliaries. No measures were taken by their ungrateful and perfidious allies for the defence of Attica.

Thus deserted by the confederates, the Athenians were compelled a second time to abandon their country. Scarcely had they deposited their valuable effects in Salamis, when Mardonius invaded Attica, and took possession of Athens. This appeared a favourable opportunity to the Persian general for once more attempting to seduce the Athenians to an alliance with Xerxes, while their minds were actuated with resentment against the confederates, who had abandoned and betrayed them. He therefore sent an ambassador to Salamis, offering the same terms which had formerly been proposed by the prince of Macedonia. When the object of his embassy was laid before the council of five hundred, Lycidas alone judged it worthy of attention, and proposed that it should be referred to an assembly of the people.

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This circumstance being divulged to the people, Lycidas, on quitting the council, fell a sacrifice to patriotic enthusiasm: he was stoned to death. The widow and children of this unhappy man were devoted to a like fate, by the momentary phrenzy of the Athenian women.*

But in the midst of this popular ferment and outrage the law of nations was respected, and the ambassador was dismissed without suffering any insult.

Ambassadors had been sent from Athens, with others from Platæa and Megara, to remonstrate with the Lacedæmonians on the shameful neglect of their engagements. Inattentive to the danger of the Athenians, they were entirely engaged in defending the entry of the Peloponnesus, and building a wall cross the Corinthian isthmus, to prevent the enemy from approaching by that quarter. The deputies upbraided them for their base and ungrateful conduct; and contrasted the treachery and pusillanimity of Sparta with the vigour and truly patriotic spirit of the Athenians. Overcome at last by the remonstrances and reproaches of their own allies, the Lacedæmonians determined to take the field. Five thousand Spartans, accompanied by thirty-five thousand Helots, were ordered to march in the silence of the night, under the command of Pausanias, regent during the minority of the young prince of Sparta. Next morning, when the Athenian deputies came to make their final complaint, they were surprised to hear that the Lacedæmonian army was already on its march to meet the Persians.

While Mardonius had any hopes of conciliating the alliance of the Athenians, he carefully spared their city and their territories; but when he found it impossible to detach them from the Grecian confe-

* Herod. lib. ix. cap. 5.

deracy, he again laid waste their country, and set fire to their cities, so that every thing which had escaped the fury of the first invasion was now totally destroyed. Having been secretly informed by the Argives, that the Peloponnesians were in motion, he marched into Bœotia, an open and flat country, commodious for the action of his cavalry, and for drawing up his numerous army in battle array. He extended his camp for many miles along the banks of Æsopus, from the Theban town of Erythræa, to the boundaries of the Platæans. The combined army of the Greeks, commanded by Pausanias and Aristides, followed him thither, and posted themselves at the foot of Mount Cytheron, directly opposite to the Persians, the river Æsopus flowing between the hostile camps.

The Persian army under Mardonius consisted of three hundred thousand men, the bravest and best disciplined of those myriads which had followed Xerxes.

The Grecian heavy armed troops, consisting of free citizens, amounted to about thirty-nine thousand; the light armed troops were the thirty-five thousand Helots, and nearly an equal number of slaves, who attended the other divisions of the army; the whole, including the Thespians, who were irregularly armed, amounted to an hundred and ten thousand. Herodotus makes no mention of cavalry in the Grecian army.

The object of Mardonius was to draw the Grecian troops into the champaign country; where, through the strength of his cavalry, which has always been the chief reliance of Asiatic forces, he promised himself an easy as well as certain victory. But Pausanias would not move from his advantageous position. The Persian commander therefore ordered Masistius, his general of the cavalry, to harass the Grecian army,

army, and, if he could find an opportunity, to attempt an impression. The Megarians were encamped on a plain, and posted on the side the most exposed to the cavalry. Masistius attacked them, and was for a while resisted with vigour. Wearied out at last by repeated attacks, and the continual accession of fresh troops, their leaders sent a messenger to Pausanias, announcing their distress, and intimating their resolution to abandon a post which they could no longer defend. Pausanias was unwilling to issue orders on such an alarming occasion, but expressed a desire that volunteers could be found, who would exchange situations with the Megarians. The army was silent. The Athenians alone, with that magnanimity they had all along displayed, spontaneously offered their services on this critical emergency. Three hundred heavy armed foot, with a large proportion of archers and pikemen, were sent to occupy this important post. Masistius attacked them with his cavalry, but found his detachment unexpectedly harassed by the Athenian archers, and warmly received by the heavy armed foot. During the engagement, the horse of Masistius, being wounded by an arrow, threw him on the ground. His armour, which covered the whole body, like that of the knights in the times of chivalry, long resisted the weapons of the enemy, but he was at last pierced in the eye by a javelin which penetrated to the brain. A dreadful conflict ensued around the body of the dead. The Athenians began to give way, after having so long resisted the whole strength of the Persian cavalry; but being opportunely reinforced from the main army, they at last obtained possession of the body, and put the Persians to flight.

The unwelcome tidings of the defeat of the cavalry, and the death of Masistius, were received by the general and his attendants with tears, and all

the violent emotions of Asiatic sorrow; and the loud lamentations of the whole army deplored the premature fate of one of the bravest of the Persian nobles. To the Greeks however this event was an object of no small exultation. They were now taught by experience how to resist the formidable cavalry of Asia; and the body of Masistius, a personage high in rank and estimation among the Persians, and second in command to Mardonius, carried in triumph through the camp, was an animating spectacle to soldiers who had felt his valour, and dreaded his success.

As the enemy, by their archers and cavalry, commanded both sides of the Æsopus, the difficulty of procuring fresh water compelled the Greeks to abandon a situation which was otherwise advantageous. They marched along the foot of Mount Cytheron, and arrived at a plain within the Platæan territory, near the fountain Gargaphia.

In this situation dissentions were likely to arise between the Athenians and Tegeans, concerning precedency in the line of battle. The Spartans, who had for a length of time been the leading people of Greece, had the command of the right wing as their unquestioned privilege. The Tegeans, who had long been deemed the bravest soldiers in Arcadia, claimed the command of the left, as their post by antient prescription; and though the fame as well as merits of the Athenians were infinitely superior, no custom had established their superiority. The dispute was brought before an assembly of the commanders. The Tegeans enforced their claim in a studied harangue, supporting it by reciting the gallant actions of their ancestors, and appealing to the Lacedæmonians, whose division in their favour they thought themselves entitled to expect. It was answered on the side of the Athenians: "The Greeks are assembled here, not to dispute about the post of honour, but to fight the barbarians.

rians. Were we disposed to boast of the illustrious deeds performed by our ancestors, we could find more honourable vouchers in antiquity than the Arcadians have produced; but while we maintain *their* renown, we have our own to support.

"Let the field of *Marathon* bear witness to Greece, and to the world, that we have not degenerated from the spirit or the glory of our ancestors. There, unassisted and alone, we fought and conquered in the cause of the whole Grecian community, and erected a trophy over the numerous army of the Great King. This victory, had we no others to enumerate, entitles us to a higher rank than the Tegeans. But this is not a time for contests of this kind: place us, O Spartans! where you please, there we will behave like brave men, engaged in the common cause of Greece."

At the conclusion of this address, the Lacedæmonians cried out with one voice, "That the Athenians were more worthy than the Arcadians, and entitled to the post of honour."

After the Greeks had filed off towards Platæa, Mardonius followed them with his army. There were Grecian prophets and diviners in each camp, who for a while retarded the engagement, by predicting victory to the party that acted on the defensive, and threatening with a total overthrow the army that made the first attack.* Ten days accordingly elapsed in a state of inaction; neither army ventured to pass the Æsopus.

But the impetuous disposition of Mardonius, and the prospect of being soon in want of provisions, at length determined him to disregard the presages of Grecian superstition, and to observe no customs but those of the Persians in giving battle. Accordingly, having called a council of the officers, he declared his

* Herod. lib. ix. cap. 37, 38.

intention of attacking the Grecian army on the next day; and gave orders to prepare for the engagement. Alexander, king of Macedonia, who, though a tributary of Persia, was still a friend to the Greeks, mounted his horse at midnight, rode to the Athenian line, and having found access to Aristides, informed him of all that had passed.*

The Athenian general immediately went to Pausanias, and communicated the intelligence he had received. It was then deliberated in what manner they should resist the formidable attack expected next day, and order a battle which was to preserve or extinguish the liberties of Greece. In the arrangement of Mardonius's army, it had been observed, that the native Persians, the bravest and most expert of the Asiatic infantry, held the left of the line in opposition to the Lacedæmonians, and that the Bœotians and other Grecian auxiliaries occupied the right against the Athenians. Pausanias wished to change the order of the Grecian army; and proposed that the Athenians, who alone of all the Greeks had fought and conquered the Persians, should again oppose them in the right wing; and that the Lacedæmonians, who had often defeated the Thebans, and were held superior to all the Greeks, should move to the left. Aristides consented, and the Athenians accepted the change with exultation.

At dawn of day Mardonius observed that the Grecian troops were in motion, and was informed of the change which was made in their arrangement. This induced him to postpone the attack, in order to make corresponding changes in the disposition of his own army. The day was spent in these evolutions, and in some desultory attacks made by the cavalry. A more serious attempt was made upon that part of the Spar-

* Herod. lib. ix, cap. 44, 45.

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tan line which defended the Gargaphian fountain, in which the Persian horse remained masters of the field.

At the approach of night, the Grecian army was without water; provisions also began to fail, as their convoys had been intercepted by an unexpected incursion of the enemy. They were thus again compelled to change their position. The second watch of the night was the time appointed to march for the ground they purposed to occupy, which was a narrow valley near the source of the Æsopus, lying between that river and mount Cytheron. At the same time it was determined to send a detachment of the army to the mountains, to guard and conduct a convoy of provisions to the new camp. But in the pressure of danger, and the alarms of fear, the troops of independent states little regarded the orders of the commander in chief, and instead of halting at the place proposed, dispersed and fled in so many different directions, that the Grecian army presented, on the following morning, the appearance not of a regular march, but of a precipitate retreat.

The fortunate obstinacy of a Spartan officer was the accidental and extraordinary cause of the important and decisive victory at Platæa. Anompharetus, who was second in command to Pausanias, urged the sacred laws of his country (which forbid to retreat from an enemy) against the orders of his general. Incensed at the boldness, but struck with the novelty of this conduct, Pausanias detained the Lacedæmonian troops, while the others were marching. Aristides, ever anxious for the benefit of the confederacy, suspended the motion of his troops, and sent to enquire into the cause of the delay. At the arrival of his messenger, Anompharetus, who had been in high altercation with his general, took up a large stone, and, according to the Grecian mode of voting, by casting a

shell or die into an urn, threw it before the feet of Pausanias, saying, "With this die I give my vote, not to fly from the strangers." Pausanias desired the Athenian to inform his commander of what he had seen, and to intreat of him that the Athenian troops might regulate their motions by those of the Lacedæmonians. At the approach of dawn he gave orders to the Spartans, with three thousand Tegeans who remained with him, to march along the hills to the place of encampment; the Athenians directed their course in the plain below. At last Anompharetus, abating of his obstinacy, ordered his detachment to follow, with a slow pace, the rest of the army.

When Mardonius beheld the unexpected movement of the Grecian army, imputing their retreat to fear, and thinking he should obtain an easy conquest, he ordered his soldiers to pursue the flying enemy. Having sent the Thebans, and other Grecian auxiliaries, to the number of fifty thousand, in pursuit of the Athenians, he advanced with the Persian infantry against the Lacedæmonians, while the whole army followed with the hurry and confusion of a barbarous multitude, eager to share the spoils of certain victory.

The battle was fought in two different places; the Athenians in the middle of the plain were engaged with the Grecian auxiliaries, while the Persians attacked the Spartans at the foot of the mountain. The uneven and rugged ground at the bottom of the hill, with the Æsopus flowing at the bottom, were favourable for defence, and adverse to the operations of cavalry. The Persian infantry was therefore ordered to advance; a fierce engagement began. The Persians, after having discharged their missile weapons, closed upon the Greeks, and shewed themselves,

selves, says Herodotus*, neither inferior in courage nor in strength. Had the excellence of their arms, or their skill in military discipline, corresponded to their valour, the battle of Platæa might have been fatal to the Greeks. But they wanted defensive armour, and their short weapons were unfit to encounter the long spears of the Greeks. They acted too without union or concert. Unacquainted with the advantage of a firm and compact formation, in which the Greeks excelled, they rushed forward in small bodies, and were successively defeated. As their efforts began to relax, notwithstanding the accession of new numbers to supply those who were slain, the Greeks advanced upon them with the impenetrable depth and irresistible force of their phalanx. The Tegeans made the first impression, and the Lacedæmonians, pushing forward, threw the Persian army into confusion.

Mardonius, who had flattered himself with an easy conquest, and had sent his troops not so much in order to fight, as to pursue a flying enemy, was seized with anguish and vexation at this defeat. The impatience and impetuosity of his temper led him to form a fatal resolution. Instead of retreating to the plain, and sheltering his infantry under the protection of his numerous horse, he determined to risk the fortune of Persia upon the present moment. At the head of a chosen body of cavalry, he hastened to rally and support his broken infantry. By a bold and well-conducted charge, he checked the progress of the Lacedæmonian phalanx, but he could not break the order, nor pierce the ranks of that firm and impenetrable body. After the bravest of his officers, and numbers of soldiers, had fallen around him, he received a mortal wound from the

* Lib. ix. cap. 62.

hand of Aieimnestus a Spartan. The death of the general, according to the custom of the east, was followed by the flight of the whole army.

Artabazus, the Parthian, and next in command to Mardonius, had uniformly condemned the measures of the general, with regard to the conduct of the war. As soon as he perceived the rout of the Persians, he made a signal for his troops to quit the field: and with forty thousand men, who were under his immediate orders, retreated towards Phocis.

The remains of the Persian army took refuge in their fortified camp. They were vigorously pursued by the Lacedæmonians, who immediately attempted an assault; but, unacquainted with sieges, and the mode of attacking intrenchments, they were baffled in the attempt, and repulsed with loss. While the Lacedæmonians had obtained an unexpected victory over the Persians on the hills, the Athenians were keenly engaged with the Grecian auxiliaries in the plain below. Of these, amounting to fifty thousand, the greater part, little earnest in the cause, either made a feeble resistance, or fled. The Bœotians alone opposed with ardour the army of Aristides. Athenian valour, however, at last prevailed, and the Thebans were defeated. Here the Athenians, with equal patriotism and wisdom, sacrificed their particular enmity to the general cause; for, instead of pursuing the Bœotians, their inveterate enemies, they marched to the assistance of the Lacedæmonians, and arrived in time to render this glorious victory complete. They attacked with success the fortification, which had hitherto baffled all the attempts of the other confederates; and burst, in spite of all resistance, into the Persian camp. They were soon followed by the Tegeans and Spartans. A panic enervated the courage of the Persians, they could not fight, and the wall prevented their escape; their

their prodigious numbers gave a colour to the apology that it was dangerous for the Greeks to give quarter. The resentment of a free people, who were fighting for their national independence and political existence, sought its gratification in a general slaughter, rather than in a victory; and of two hundred thousand Persians, not three thousand escaped the vengeance of the Grecian army.

When satiated with this scene of blood, the immense riches of the camp drew the attention of the conquerors. Xerxes, when he fled from Greece, had bestowed the treasures which he brought from Asia on Mardonius his brother-in-law, and his other favourites. The opulence thus possessed by the Persian satraps presented a new scene to the frugal citizens of the little Grecian republics, of which they had hitherto entertained no idea. This mass of wealth consisted of tables of gold and silver, embroidered couches, golden cups and goblets, brazen stalls and mangers, collars, bracelets, and scymitars ornamented with gold and gems, female slaves, horses and camels, together with many chests of Persian money, which from that period continued long to be current in Greece.

A tenth part of this booty, according to the rites of antient piety, was consecrated to the gods; the general was presented with a tenth of the remainder; and the rest of the spoil was divided among the conquerors. Offerings of great value were dedicated at the shrines of Olympian Jove, Isthmian Neptune, Delphian Apollo, and of Minerva the protectress of Athens.

After the battle, a principal citizen of Ægina proposed to Pausanias to avenge the indignity offered by Xerxes to the body of Leonidas, which he hung on a cross, by using the corpse of Mardonius in a similar manner. The Grecian general nobly replied,

"They are little acquainted with true glory, who think that it consists in imitating the cruelty of barbarians. If the esteem of the Æginetans is to be purchased by such actions, I shall be content with that of the Spartans, whose character consists in moderation, and in shewing clemency to enemies who are humbled or fallen. The manes of my countrymen who fell at Thermopylæ are sufficiently avenged* by the many thousand Persians that cover the fields of Platæa."

Another anecdote concerning Pausanias deserves to be recorded. The furniture of the royal household was found in the tent of Mardonius almost entire, and most of the domestic slaves had escaped the massacre. Pausanias ordered the Persian cooks to prepare a magnificent entertainment, as if intended for Mardonius himself. His orders were carefully executed, splendid preparations were made, the sideboard displayed a profusion of gold and silver plate, the table was adorned with exquisite elegance, and covered with all the luxuries of Asia. As a striking contrast to the scene, he ordered the plain and frugal supper of a Spartan to be placed by the side of the Persian banquet. Having then assembled the principal officers of the Grecian army, "Behold," says the general, "the egregious folly of Xerxes and Mardonius; living in such luxury at home, they came thus far to wrest from us our simple fare; and, accustomed to such delicious repasts, ventured to attack men who despise superfluities, and have no wants but those of nature."—We shall find, however, in the sequel, that Pausanias himself was not proof against the corrupting influence of wealth and luxury.

* Herod. lib. ix. cap. 77, 78.

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The burial of the dead was considered by the Greeks as an act of piety as well as humanity. Accordingly, those who had fallen in the battle of Platæa were interred with the utmost pomp and solemnity, and monuments were erected in the field of battle to record their renown to succeeding ages.

The emulation which subsisted between the Grecian states always bordered on jealousy, and sometimes broke out into hostilities. After the engagement, the Athenians and Spartans contended for the prize of valour with a zeal and animosity that might have had the most serious consequences, had it not been prevented by the influence of the Corinthian leaders. In a public assembly of the Greeks, to which the question was referred, they proposed, in order to prevent a dangerous and, perhaps, a fatal contention, that the first honours for military merit should be assigned to the Platæans, whose zeal and valour had been equally conspicuous both by sea and land. Their commonwealth was too small to excite jealousy; their country had acquired a name by being the scene of a victory so glorious and decisive; accordingly the other Greeks approved the determination: Aristides assented on the part of the Athenians, and Pausanias on that of the Lacedæmonians.

As the battle of Platæa was fought in the latter end of September, the season was not too far advanced for taking vengeance on those perfidious Greeks who had appeared against their country, under the banners of the Persians. It was determined to march into Bœotia, and to demand of the Thebans the leaders of the faction which supported the interest of the Medes. They were given up by their countrymen, and carried to Corinth; there they were condemned without trial, or the forms of law, and executed as traitors to Greece.

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In the next general assembly, Aristides proposed the following decree: that all the states of Greece should annually send their deputies to Platæa, in order to offer sacrifices to Jove the deliverer, and the tutelary gods of the city; that every fifth year games should be celebrated there, which should be called *the games of liberty*; and that the several Grecian states should raise a body of troops consisting of ten thousand foot and a thousand horse, and should equip a fleet of a hundred ships, which should be constantly maintained for making war against the barbarians. The propositions having been approved and passed into a law, the Platæans were appointed to celebrate an anniversary festival in honour of those who had fallen in battle. This ceremony was performed with much pomp and splendor, and continued to the time of Plutarch.

On the day that the Greeks gained the memorable battle of Platæa, their naval forces obtained a victory in Asia, no less decisive and important, over the remainder of the Persian fleet, which had escaped from the engagement at Salamis. The Grecian fleet had wintered in the harbours of Ægina, under the command of Leotychides, one of the Spartan kings, and Xantippus the Athenian. Early in the spring ambassadors arrived from the Ionians, inviting them into Asia, to deliver the Grecian cities from the tyranny of the barbarians. The Greeks, overjoyed at this invitation, sailed directly for the coast of Delos, where they received intelligence from the Samians that the Persian fleet, which had wintered at Cumæ, was now lying at Samos, and might be destroyed without difficulty or hazard. They immediately set sail for Samos; but the Persians, alarmed with the intelligence of their approach, retired to the neighbouring promontory of Mycalé, on the Ionian coast, where an army of sixty thousand men was encamped,

encamped, under the command of Tigranes the Persian. Here they drew their gallies upon the beach, according to the custom of the antients, and surrounded them with a strong rampart.

The Greeks followed them to Mycalé, and landed their forces without opposition at some distance from the Persian camp. To encourage his troops, Leotychides is said to have spread a report, that their countrymen under Pausanias had totally defeated the Persians at Platæa; a report, which soon circulated through the army, and by kindling the enthusiasm, contributed to the success of the Greeks. The confederated forces marched in two columns; one under the command of Xantippus, composed of the Athenian, Corinthian, and Træzenian troops, held their course along the shore; the other, consisting of the Lacedæmonians, with the remaining allies, went by the more inland and hilly road. The former division arrived first, and, eager to monopolize the glory of the day, proceeded immediately to attack the camp; and conducted the assault with such celerity and vigour, that they had already entered the Persian rampart before the approach of the Lacedæmonians. Their fortunate temerity was justified by the zeal and alacrity of the Asiatic Greeks. The native Persians fought with determined bravery, and supported that military character which they had acquired under Cyrus the Great. None of the other Asiatic troops seem to have merited the name of soldiers, accordingly they shrunk in confusion before the impetuosity of the Athenians; but the Persians still remained unconquered, when the Lacedæmonians arrived: they were then overpowered, and almost entirely cut off. In this battle the Greeks sufferced more than in any other during the war; and Perilaus, commander of the Sicyonians, was in the number of the slain.

From

From the field of battle there was no retreat by land, but by narrow defiles over a mountain. To provide for his security in the event of a defeat, the Persian general had detached the Milesians to guard the passes. But this precaution, instead of preserving, operated to the destruction of their army. While the Spartans pursued the fugitives in that direction, the Milesians, instead of protecting, intercepted their flight, and few of them escaped from the general slaughter. Tigranes, general of the land forces, and two of the principal naval commanders, were slain. Forty thousand Persians remained on the field, besides those who were slain in the pursuit; a small remnant fled in confusion and dismay, nor dared to trust to any nearer asylum than the walls of Sardis, at that time the residence of the Great King; who might then reflect on "the prophetic tears he shed when he numbered his millions at the Hellespont."

The victorious Greeks took possession of the Persian camp, set fire to their fleet, and returned to Samos with plunder and glory.

When Xerxes heard of this double overthrow, and beheld in the fugitives from Mycalé the poor remains of his former greatness, he left Sardis with as great precipitation as he had formerly fled from Salamis; retreated to his distant capital of Susa; and to obliterate the remembrance of his past disasters, gave himself up to alternate excesses of voluptuousness and cruelty. Before his departure, he ordered all the Grecian temples in Asia to be pillaged and burned; an order which was so faithfully executed, that not one escaped, except the temple of Diana at Ephesus. This mandate was not the dictate of impiety, but of religion, as the Magian theology prohibited the use of temples and images. This pious conflagration would procure

him

him a character for sanctity among the subjects of his empire; and perhaps, too, the desire of repairing his treasury, exhausted in the Grecian expedition, by the spoil of these temples, might be an additional inducement to accelerate their destruction; for he found in these sacred edifices, and appropriated to his own use, immense riches, which the superstition of kings and people had accumulated during a long series of ages.

The battle of Platæa was fought in the morning, and that of Mycalé on the evening of the same day; a day which humbled the ambition of the Asiatic monarch, and contracted the dimensions of the Persian empire; which delivered Greece from the terrors of tyranny and oppression, and restored the Ionian colonies to liberty and independence; which, by rescuing Europe from the dominion of Asia, and marking the decided superiority of the former to the latter, becomes interesting and important to all succeeding ages.

In the league between the monarch of Persia and the Carthaginian republic, it was agreed, that while Xerxes in person invaded Greece with all the forces of Asia, the Carthaginians should attack the Grecian colonies in Italy and Sicily. The foundation of Carthage, and its rise and progress to commercial greatness and naval power have been already explained. The ambition of the Carthaginians, like that of all mercantile states, was distinguished by a spirit of monopoly, and a suspicious jealousy that other nations might become their rivals in commerce or in power. Twenty-eight years before the invasion of Xerxes, they entered into a treaty with Rome, which had recently shaken off the regal yoke, where the strongest solicitude is expressed to prevent that rising republic from cultivating any correspondence with the dependencies of Carthage.*

* Polyb. lib. iii. cap. 22.

The

The Grecian colonies in Sicily and Italy, which, in a few years, had acquired such wealth and power as to merit the appellation of Great Greece, with better reason alarmed the jealousy of the Carthaginian commonwealth. No wonder then that it beheld with pleasure, the mutual spirit of hostility in the Greeks and Persians. The Carthaginians saw with a malignant joy the long and formidable preparations of the Great King, to punish and subdue the Greeks; and hoping, by the assistance of Xerxes, to crush for ever the objects of their hatred and their fear, entered with eagerness into an alliance which he condescended to solicit. Their preparations were in proportion to their animosity; they collected an army of three hundred thousand men, and a fleet of two thousand ships, besides three thousand transports.* Hamilcar, the bravest of the Carthaginian generals, commanded this expedition. Both parties adhered scrupulously to the conditions of the treaty, and poured their combined force into Magna Grecia. But the success did not correspond to these mighty preparations.

The Grecian colonies in Italy and Sicily were at this time flourishing in arts and arms, and not only equalled, but exceeded the mother country in wealth, population, and power. Many causes naturally contribute to the rapid progress of colonies recently established in a favourable situation. Almost all these causes combined in favour of the Achæans and Dorians, the principal emigrants to Italy and Sicily. They brought to a happy climate, and a soil of the utmost fertility, a knowledge of agriculture, habits of industry, simplicity of manners, and an acquaintance with the theory of government, which led to an establishment equally remote from anarchy and despotism; which, while it fostered a spirit of independency, shewed at the same time the

* Herod. lib. vii. Diod. lib. xi.

advantages

advantages of union and mutual support. Under these combined advantages, the Grecian colonists soon became populous and powerful. At this period their minds were not corrupted, nor their bodies enervated, by the vices attendant on riches and luxury; they were, therefore, the better able to repel the united attacks of Persia and Carthage.

If the warlike character and flourishing situation of Magna Grecia facilitated its defence against a foreign enemy, the wisdom and vigour of the Sicilian monarch, at that time, enabled him to avail himself of all advantages that offered. Eleven years before the invasion of Sicily, Gelon had ascended the throne of Syracuse. He had risen from a private station to sovereign power; but exercised his authority with so much wisdom and beneficence, that he was universally styled the Father of his country, and his reign was said to have restored the happiness of the golden age. He was ignorant of the treaty which Xerxes had made with the Carthaginians; for the Sicilian writers, according to Herodotus, relate, that he was determined to assist the Greeks, if in that moment of time the Carthaginians had not made Sicily the seat of war.

They were invited to this island by Tyrillus, the tyrant of Himera, who had been deprived of his sovereignty by the renowned Theron, king of Agrigentum. This last monarch had given his daughter in marriage to Gelon, and had espoused his niece. The alliance of the two principal Sicilian states seemed to promise happiness to the whole island, when the appearance of the Carthaginian armament threatened its destruction. When Hamilcar set sail from Carthage, with an army of three hundred thousand men, and two thousand gallies, no ideas were entertained but those of conquest. When they reached

reached the land, they said the war was finished, as they dreaded no enemy but the sea.

Hamilcar landed his forces without opposition in the ample bay of Panormus, now Palermo, the capital of modern Sicily. The first care of this brave and experienced leader was to fortify two camps. One was to enclose his ships of war, which, as was then the custom, he had ordered to be drawn on shore, and to be guarded by his marine forces; the other was intended for his land army. He had surrounded both with entrenchments and ramparts: but no fortifications can resist valour, when wisdom directs its course, and presence of mind seizes the moment of action.

Theron employed proper measures to defend Himera, which the Carthaginians were preparing to besiege, while Gelon was advancing to his assistance with an army of fifty thousand foot, and five thousand horse. On its march towards Himera, this army encountered a detachment of the enemy, and took ten thousand prisoners. Among these was a courier from Selinus, a city near Agrigentum, which had secretly revolted to the Carthaginians. This messenger carried a letter to Hamilcar, informing him, that the cavalry he demanded would be sent on a certain day. Gelon, who excelled in policy as well as courage, formed a stratagem on this discovery, which was equally bold and fortunate. He ordered a chosen body of his own troops to advance, during the night, to the camp of the Carthaginians, and to present themselves to Hamilcar in the morning, as his auxiliaries from Selinus.

On the appointed day, Hamilcar was offering a solemn sacrifice to the stern divinity of Tyre and Carthage, who delighted in human blood; his soldiers, attentive only to the horrid act, stood by silent

and

and unarmed. The cavalry of Gelon were admitted without suspicion. While Hamilcar was immolating a noble youth to the sanguinary demon of superstition, they stabbed him with a dagger, and instantly set fire to the fleet. Sentinels, posted on the adjacent hills, notified to Gelon the success of his cavalry, who availed himself of this favourable conjuncture to lead his army against the second camp, which at first made a gallant resistance; but when they heard that Hamilcar was slain, and beheld the conflagration of their fleet, they no longer thought of resistance, but of flight. A dreadful carnage ensued. A hundred and fifty thousand men are said to have fallen in the field, or in the pursuit. The remainder retired to an eminence; but provisions failing, they surrendered at discretion. Twenty ships of war escaped the flames, and attempted to regain the Carthaginian harbours; but they were overtaken by a storm, and all the crews perished, except a few individuals, who saving themselves in a small boat, conveyed the melancholy tidings to Carthage.

The spoils taken on this occasion were of immense value. Gelon employed the greater part of them in adorning the temples in Syracuse. A prodigious number of prisoners was also taken, who were distributed among the cities in Sicily, in proportion to the number of troops they had respectively raised on this memorable occasion. According to the custom of ancient war, after putting irons on their feet, they employed them in cultivating the lands, and in building magnificent edifices for the utility and embellishment of Syracuse and Agrigentum.*

All the tyrants of Sicily now courted the friendship of Gelon; and the Carthaginians, who trembled

* Cicero Orat. 4th in Verrum.

within

within their walls, sent ambassadors to sue for peace. Not elated by success, Gelon received them with no marks of exultation, and offered them peace on the following conditions: "That they should pay two thousand talents of silver, to be divided among the cities which had contributed to the expenses of the war; that they should erect two temples, one in Carthage, another in Syracuse, where this treaty should be deposited; and that henceforth they should abstain from the horrid and detestable practice of profaning their altars by offering human sacrifices to the gods."

Such a shining instance of philanthropy was more honourable than victory; the splendor of conquest disappears amidst the triumph of virtue, and we forget the hero when we behold the friend of mankind.

Returning to Syracuse after so glorious a victory, he convened the assembly of the people, and ordered all the citizens to appear in arms. He himself entered the assembly unarmed, and without attendants, to render an account of his conduct. He represented to them the various measures of his government; the uses to which he applied the public money with which he was entrusted; and the manner in which he had exercised the sovereign authority to which he was raised; adding, that if they had any just reasons to criminate his conduct, his person and life were at their disposal. The profound silence with which they listened to his recital was succeeded by public acclamations from all quarters; and the names of Saviour, Benefactor, and Father of his Country, were loudly repeated by a grateful and happy people. The Syracusans, though jealous of their liberty, perpetuated his power as their king, and passed a decree, conveying the crown to his brother after his decease. When the object of kings is

to

to promote the happiness of their kingdoms, they acquire absolute power over the hearts of their people.

The unlimited authority with which the Syracusans invested Gelon, enabled him to render them more important services. He is one of the few characters recorded in history, who, after acquiring the sceptre of a sovereign, and the laurel of a conqueror, became a greater and a better man. Having no more enemies to fear, he relinquished the projects of ambition, and studied to make his kingdom flourish by the labours of industry, and the works of peace. He conferred the rights of citizens on ten thousand foreigners, who had served under his standard with valour and fidelity; and by incorporating them with the community, added to the population of the capital, and augmented the power of the state. The encouragement of agriculture was to him an object of government. Accustomed to walk in the fields, he frequently honoured the husbandmen by his presence, and animated them by his conversation; appearing at their head with less pomp, but with more real dignity, than when, on other occasions, he marched at the head of armies. He encouraged the cultivation of the fine arts as well as the necessary. Under his patronage and direction, the capital was adorned with Carthaginian spoils; and those works of ingenuity were produced, which, in the age of Cicero, were esteemed among the most precious monuments of antiquity.*

The golden medals of Gelon, which are still preserved, and of the finest workmanship, justify the panegyric of the Roman orator.

He considered the possession of sovereignty as an obligation to defend the state; and thought himself

* Cicero in Verr.

a king

a king only for the good of his people. Dismissing the pomp, parade, and licentiousness of royalty, he assumed its cares and its toils; but found his zeal for the public welfare amply compensated by the supreme delight of conferring happiness on millions. Unfortunately for Syracuse, he died after a short reign of seven years, two years after the victories which he obtained over the Carthaginians. He was but just shewn to Sicily, to exhibit the pattern of a wise and a good king. He was interred without pomp, according to his own desire; and what pomp could equal the procession of a whole people in tears, following his corse twenty miles to the tomb?

A splendid mausoleum was erected by the people to his memory, surrounded with nine towers of surprising height and magnificence, and he was honoured with that religious veneration which was paid to demi-gods and heroes. The Carthaginians afterwards demolished the mausoleum, and Agathocles the towers; but neither violence, envy, nor time, could extinguish the glory of his name, or abolish the memory of his heroic virtues and beneficent actions, which reverence and gratitude had engraven on the hearts of the Sicilians.

In a statue raised to perpetuate his fame, the monarch was forgot in the virtues of the man. They represented him in the habit of a simple citizen, such as he had appeared in the assembly of the people, when he gave an account of his administration. A singular fate attended this statue, and worthy of the motives for which it was erected. A hundred and thirty years after this period, Timoleon restored the Syracusans to their liberty; and in order to erase all traces of their former tyrannical government, he sold publicly the statues of those princes by whom they had been oppressed; but he first brought them to trial as so many criminals, and they were all unanimously

nimously condemned, the statue of Gelon excepted, which found an eloquent advocate in the grateful admiration which the citizens entertained for that great man, whose virtues they revered as if he had been still alive.

CHAP. XVIII.

From the Conclusion of the PERSIAN *to the Commencement of the* PELOPONNESIAN *War.*

THE period which elapsed from the conclusion of the Persian to the commencement of the Peloponnesian war, forms the most illustrious æra in the history of Greece. While the republics of the mother country triumphed over the fallen myriads of Asia, their prosperous settlements on the Adriatic and the Hellespont intimidated the barbarians of Europe; the southern colony of Cyrene checked the ferocity of the Libyans; and their flourishing descendants in Sicily obtained a complete victory over the Carthaginians, at that time the most powerful people in the western world. While the north, south, east, and west, bowed to the commanding genius of Greece, one republic, whose whole territory was scarcely equal to a French province, or an English county, rising to a sudden superiority over the rest, stood opposed to the whole weight of the Persian empire, conducted the war with extraordinary success; and at last imposed conditions of peace, as glorious and beneficial to the republic as they were humiliating and ignominious to the Great King. Athens, which now rose to the command of Greece, erected, in a short period of time, an exten-

sive, though a divided and discontiguous empire. This small, but ambitious state, had settlements on the shores of Thrace and Macedonia, had supreme dominion in the Euxine and Ægean seas, and extended her sway from Cyprus to the Thracian Bosphorus.

During this eventful and splendid period, the genius and taste of the Greeks were as conspicuous as their valour and patriotism; and Athens flourished in arts, while she triumphed in arms. A history of the events that contributed to this age of glory, which has enlightened and refined all succeeding ages, must be given, not by general description, but in particular detail.

When the victories at Platæa and Mycalé had put an end to the Median war, the first care of the Athenians was to bring home their families and effects from the isles of Salamis and Ægina. Returning to their native soil, they now began to raise their city from its ruins, and to rebuild it on a larger scale. Works of public utility were preferred to those of private convenience. In order to defend Athens from future attacks, it was proposed to surround it with walls of an extraordinary height.* The partial confederacy of the Greeks, which was cemented only by their fears, was dissolved by the happy conclusion of the Persian war; and the jealousy of Sparta, at the growing power and reputation of Athens, now began to appear. This imperious and domineering state, little disposed to bear a rival, had always watched the movements, and checked the rising greatness, of Athens. Jealous even of the liberty of the Athenians, after the banishment of the Pisistratidæ, the Spartans attempted to re-establish Hippias on the throne. It was not to be expected that they could forgive them the victory at

* Thucyd. lib. i. sect. 90. Corn. Nep. Themist. vit.

Salamis,

Salamis, and the glory of having delivered Greece from the Persian yoke. Jealous with regard to the future, as well as envious of the past, they dreaded the consequences of their new-acquired maritime power; and were afraid that they might assume on land the same superiority which they had displayed at sea, and finally deprive Sparta of that authority and pre-eminence which hitherto it had enjoyed over the rest of Greece. Hence, when Athens began to rise from its ruins, they remonstrated against its walls and fortifications, under the pretence that the Peloponnesus should be the only place of refuge to all the Grecian states against a foreign invader; and that a city so fortified might, in the event of another invasion, become a fortress to the Persians. Themistocles (concerning whom history observes a profound silence during the last year of the war) easily penetrated the true design of the Lacedæmonians, though concealed under the specious mask of public good, and persuaded his countrymen to elude the Spartan artifice by similar policy. The senate of the five hundred declared to the Spartan ambassadors, that Athens would take no step which was not consistent with the good of the whole, and promised soon to give a satisfactory account of their measures by an embassay to Sparta. The Spartan deputies having returned, Themistocles was appointed ambassador to Lacedæmon, and according to a previous arrangement, was to be followed at a proper time by Aristides, whose character was equally respected in both commonwealths, and by Lysicles, an orator of distinguished abilities. The Athenian fortifications were now carried on with the utmost expedition. The rich and poor, freemen and slaves, senators and artificers, women and children, all contributed their efforts to the patriotic work with unceasing perseverance, by night as well as day. The

ruins of their edifices, temples, and even tombs, were employed as materials on this pressing occasion; and near a hundred years afterwards, the heterogeneous appearance of the wall plainly spoke the manner in which it had been erected.*

Themistocles, under the pretence that he waited for the arrival of his colleagues, had delayed to declare his commission. At this time some persons from Athens brought information of what was carrying on in that rival city. Not disconcerted with this intelligence, nor with the consequent reproaches of the Lacedæmonians, Themistocles affirmed, with his usual address, "That it was below the dignity of Sparta to listen to the tales of unknown persons; that the fidelity of Athens ought not to be suspected; and that the truth should be investigated on the spot." This being seconded by the Ephori, (whom Themistocles had gained by seasonable presents) the Spartans consented to send a second embassy to Athens, and some of their most respectable citizens in the number.

When these deputies arrived at Athens, they were detained as hostages for the safe return of Themistocles and his colleagues, who now had brought him the long-expected tidings that the fortifications were finished. Dissimulation was no longer necessary to the Athenian ambassadors: Themistocles therefore, in the name of the rest, boldly declared to the Spartan assembly, that the Athenians, in fortifying their city with strong walls, had only exercised the common rights of nature in providing for their own security; that after having performed such signal and effectual services to all Greece, it was an insult to suspect them of any intentions that were not honourable to themselves and beneficial to the common

* Thucydid. lib. 1, cap. 89.

cause;

cause; that they were now in a condition to defend their city against enemies, whether foreign or domestic; and that it was not much to the honour of the Lacedæmonians, that they should desire to establish their superiority, not on their own strength, but the weakness of their allies.*

The Lacedæmonians dissembled their resentment, and the ambassadors on both sides returned to their respective cities.

Themistocles, ever intent to increase the power of the republic, and to raise Athens to the command of Greece, urged his countrymen to finish the new harbour at the Piræus, as the antient harbour of Phalerium was too inconsiderable to answer the purposes of a commercial nation. The Piræus, from its natural advantages, which could easily be improved by art, was capable of forming a more commodious station for the Athenian navy; and, possessing three spacious havens, could contain above four hundred vessels. From the time he first entered on office, he projected this great undertaking, and was carrying it on with vigour, when the progress was interrupted by the Persian invasion. Notwithstanding the opposition of Sparta, the work now advanced with rapidity, and by the joint efforts of the citizens, was brought to a fortunate conclusion in the course of a year. The walls were formed of stones of a prodigious size, firmly joined by iron bars, and so thick as to admit two chariots a-breast on the summit. The Piræus gradually became a populous town, and was afterwards connected with the city by what were termed the *long walls*, begun by Cimon and finished by Pericles.

The whole circumference of the Athenian fortifications, including these walls, and the circuit of the

* Diodor. lib. xi. p. 437. Justin. lib. ii. cap. 15.

ancient city, amounted to about eighteen English miles.

Themistocles likewise procured a decree of the people to augment the fleet annually by the addition of twenty ships; and obtained particular privileges and immunities to be granted to artisans and sailors, in order to encourage their resort to Athens. The object of this able politician was to direct the efforts of his countrymen to encrease their maritime power, and to obtain the empire of the sea. Elated with the extraordinary success which had attended their arms when acting in their own defence, the Greeks now began to wage offensive war against the Persians, and to meditate victories in the very heart of Asia. Though many of the Grecian colonies had recovered their freedom during the contest, Persian garrisons still kept possession of some of their seaports in the Hellespont, the Propontis, and the Ægean isles. Fifty Peloponnesian ships commanded by Pausanias, and thirty Athenian, led by Aristides and Cimon, being joined by various squadrons from the Greek cities of Asia, swept the eastern shores of the Mediterranean, and delivered the island of Cyprus from the Persian yoke; then returning near two hundred leagues towards the west, and proceeding northward to the Bosphorus of Thrace, they attacked Byzantium. That city, so celebrated in following ages, had been founded by a colony of Megareans, had become populous and flourishing, but was now oppressed and enslaved by the Persians. It seems to have been considered by them as a place of great importance, and was therefore defended with unusual vigour. The siege was long and obstinate; it fell at last by storm into the hands of the Greeks. Many Persians of the highest distinction were taken prisoners, and the conquerors were enriched by the spoils of that opulent city.

Hitherto

Hitherto the Spartans had kept the lead in the confederacy. Pausanias their king was still vested with the supreme command: the allies collectively still submitted to their jurisdiction; but now these powers were to pass over to the Athenians.

As long as the Grecians states contended only with one another, and waged petty wars upon the continent, Sparta, whose form of government had been first established, held the ascendancy in Greece; but when the necessity appeared of equipping a great fleet to defend their coasts from invasion, and the bolder project was formed of carrying the war into Asia, the Athenians began to open their eyes to their situation; the idea of maritime power, suggested and enforced by Themistocles, was pursued by the people; and the poverty of Sparta prevented her from contending with Athens for the empire of the sea. A revolution then took place in Greece, and from that period the republic of Solon has the advantage over that of Lycurgus.

The power of a kingdom or commonwealth depends not only on its own constitution and strength, but on the changes which take place in the neighbouring states. As innovations, and even improvements, were prohibited by the laws of Lycurgus, Sparta could not keep pace with the other republics, and had no other method of preserving her antient influence but by endeavouring to depress her neighbours.

This natural progress of things was accelerated by the corruption of the Lacedæmonian commander, and the distinguished merits of the two Athenian leaders. The institutions of Lycurgus, or rather the original customs of the Dorians, which he endeavoured to render perpetual in his commonwealth, were so adverse to the manners of nations who were refined, or running the career of refinement, that in-

tercourse with strangers, either abroad or at home, was strictly prohibited by law. The singularity of Spartan manners could only be preserved by their insulated situation. The long continuance of the Persian war, and the familiar acquaintance with Asiatic luxury introduced by that event, tended to relax the severity of Spartan discipline, and to open an entrance to ambition without principle, and dissipation without taste. The fame of Pausanias, which hitherto had shone so bright, now suffered a total eclipse. The large division of the Persian spoils allotted to him after the battle of Platæa raised him above the rank of a Spartan citizen, above that equality which the rigid laws of Lycurgus demanded. The disorders arising from a sudden flow of prosperity, incident to the best minds, were increased in Pausanias by its continuance, and in particular by his recent victory at Byzantium. Tired of being the subject, though the ruler of Sparta, he aspired to become the tyrant of Greece, through the assistance of Xerxes. For this purpose he set at liberty the Persian nobles taken in the siege of Byzantium, and committed them to the care of Gongylus the Eretrian, with a letter to Xerxes, in which he promised to deliver Sparta, and all Greece, into his hands, on condition of receiving his daughter in marriage, and being appointed to govern this new province in the Persian empire. Xerxes gave a favourable answer to these proposals, remitted large sums of money to gain over the Grecian leaders, and appointed Artabazus to assist in accomplishing the revolution.

Intoxicated with the dreams of ambition, and dazzled with the prospect of future greatness, Pausanias on a sudden assumed a new character, and affected a different behaviour. Ambitious without policy, he could not conceal his designs till the moment of execution; but exchanged at once the simplicity

plicity and frugality of the Spartan life for the magnificent manners and superb luxuries of Persia. He was surrounded by a guard of Persians, became difficult of access to the other commanders, and displayed the equipage and state of an eastern despot; he required extraordinary honours to be paid to his person, treated the allies with insufferable insolence, and by the tenor of his whole conduct rendered the Spartan dominion odious to all the confederates.

The Ionians in particular complained, that they had been no sooner delivered from the fetters of Persian tyranny, than they had been subjected to the more severe and oppressive domination of Sparta. The secret comparison which they formed between this haughty, imperious, and tyrannical conduct, and the justice, moderation, and affability of Aristides and Cimon, induced the allies, with one consent, to abjure the despotic authority of Sparta, and range themselves under the generous protection, and gentle dominion of Athens. To the honour of the Spartans, they had the moderation, or magnanimity, or policy, to renounce their claim to the superiority which they had hitherto exercised over the rest of the Greeks. The Ephori, who saw that their institutions were in danger, waved for a while all other considerations, and sullenly acquiesced in the supremacy of Athens.*

Accused of having carried on a treasonable correspondence with the enemy, Pausanias was recalled by the senate of Sparta to give an account of his conduct. Sufficient evidence of malversation was found, though not enough to convict him of treason; and by distributing a portion of his prodigious wealth among his judges, he was only fined, and dismissed from his office. The Spartans, to remove the odium

* Isocrat. Panathen.

which the insolence of a single tyrant had excited among the allies, substituted in his place several commanders with divided authority. Pausanias returned in a private capacity with these officers to Byzantium, and again resumed the pomp of Persian manners, and renewed his secret practices with Artabazus. His increasing arrogance and violence rendering him obnoxious to the Athenians, he was obliged to retire to Colonnæ, a city of Troas. There he received an order from the Ephori, bearing the solemn form of the Scytalè,* to return to Sparta, under the penalty of being declared a public enemy, and traitor to his country. He complied with the summons, and on his return was brought to trial before the judges. He was a second time acquitted, and set at liberty, partly by the influence of his enormous wealth, and partly through the deficiency of legal evidence, it being the established custom of the Ephori never to condemn a Spartan to death without a full and direct proof of the crime laid to his charge. This was at last furnished by the conduct of Pausanias. One of his slaves, entrusted with a letter from his master to Artabazus, having observed that none of the couriers employed in this intercourse ever returned, broke open the letter, and there found the usual hint to dispatch the bearer. This writing he carried to the Ephori, who advised him to take refuge in the temple of Neptune; thither he was soon followed by Pausanias, to interrogate him concerning his conduct; while the Ephori, who who were concealed in a corner of the temple, over-

* The Scytalè was a small slip of parchment, rolled on wood, and then stamped with the decree of the commonwealth. Every Spartan in authority had a tally, which corresponded with this roller, and upon receiving any commands from the senate, purporting to be in form of the scytalè, he rolled the parchment on his tally, and if the writing kept its proper arrangement, he was certain that the command was authentic.

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heard their mutual confessions, and found sufficient grounds of conviction from the testimony of the traitor himself. The hallowed edifice prevented him from being immediately seized; he was permitted to retire in safety; and having private notice that his life was in danger, he took refuge in the temple of Minerva. It was held unlawful to take him by violence from this asylum; but the entrance to the fane was blocked up by stones; the walls were surrounded by guards, and Pausanias perished by famine.

The death of this traitor did not restore his country to her antient pre-eminence in Greece. A few of the Peloponnesian states acknowledged the dominion of Sparta, and submitted to the authority of the commanders who succeeded Pausanias: all the other members of the confederacy unanimously ranged themselves under the standard of Athens, and entrusted the command of the confederated fleet to the calm wisdom and confirmed virtue of Aristides. The management of the national treasury of Greece was committed to the same uncorrupted and benevolent hands. Hitherto the contributions of money necessary for carrying on the war against the Persians had been imposed by the Spartans; but in proportions so inadequate to the respective ability and opulence of the several cities as occasioned frequent animosities and contentions. The virtuous Aristides exercised this difficult and delicate office with no less prudence than equity. The whole annual tax amounted to four hundred and sixty talents,* and it was proportioned with such accuracy and impartiality, that all the states acquiesced without a murmur.

* About ninety thousand pounds.

While Aristides was advancing the interest, and enjoying the confidence of his country abroad, Themistocles was doomed to feel its ingratitude and capriciousness at home. His unbounded passion for power, and his too frequently reminding the Athenians of the signal services he had rendered to the republic, provoked the resentment of a giddy multitude, and he was banished by the ostracism.

This temporary ingratitude of the Athenians would not probably been of long duration, and Themistocles would have soon regained his consequence at Athens, had not the Spartans, at this critical period, accused him of having been an accomplice with Pausanias, and demanded his perpetual banishment or death as the only adequate punishment for his crimes.

Themistocles was at this time an unpopular character at Athens; the insolent demand was therefore too easily complied with, although the accusation was unsupported by proof. It is true that Pausanias had disclosed his designs to Themistocles after he was expelled his country; and painting the injustice and ingratitude of the Athenians in the strongest colours, had pressed him to join in the conspiracy; but Themistocles rejected the proposal with indignation, and refused to join in the plot, though he concealed what had been entrusted to him as a secret. He answered by letter to the calumnies with which he had been charged, and represented to the Athenians "That, as he had ever been passionately fond of ruling, and would suffer no man to lord it over him, they might judge of the probability of his forming a design to deliver up himself and all Greece to the tyranny of enemies and barbarians."

Having been informed that the Athenian people, convinced of his guilt, had ordered him to be seized, that he might be tried by the Amphictyonic assembly, he retired to the island of Corcyra, and from thence

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to Epirus. Finding himself still pursued by the Athenians and Lacedæmonians, he took refuge at the court of Admetus, king of the Molossi, who had retained the deepest resentment against him, because the Athenians had refused him their aid, while Themistocles was in the plenitude of his power. Struck however at seeing the greatest man of Greece, and the conqueror of Asia, in his power, that prince received him with generosity, and resolved to protect him. But Sparta and Athens having threatened Admetus with war, Themistocles was compelled to seek another asylum, and ventured to retire to Persia, where a reward of two hundred talents had been offered to any one who would deliver him up. His character, the revolutions in his fortune, the versatility of his genius, and his facility in learning the language, and adopting the manners of the Persians, recommended him to the new king Artaxerxes, who gave him a palace to live in, married him to a noble lady, and loaded him with favours and honours.

Although there be no sufficient reason to charge him with treason, he had been remarkably attentive to increase his private fortune, looking upon wealth as a step to power. His friends had secured, and remitted to him his most valuable effects; yet it is said he left property in Athens to the amount of a hundred talents.*

From the eagerness and rapacity with which this was seized by the Athenians, we may fairly conclude that to his riches he in a great measure owed his condemnation.

While Pausanias was punished for his crimes, and Themistocles was banished on account of his celebrity, his power, and his opulence, Aristides died of old age, to the universal regret of his coun-

* About twenty thousand pounds.

trymen.

trymen. He remained in honourable poverty while he superintended the public treasury, and had all the wealth of Greece at his disposal. The republic at his death bore the expenses of his funeral. His son Lysimachus was educated, and his daughters were married and portioned at the public expense. Plato delineates his character in a single expression, "Themistocles, Cimon, and Pericles, adorned the city with splendid edifices, porticoes, and statues; Aristides studied to fill Athens with virtue."

By the banishment of Themistocles and the death of Aristides, the conduct of the Persian war devolved on Cimon, the son of Miltiades. His filial affection in discharging the fine imposed on his father, in order to obtain the privilege of burying his dead body, early introduced him to the public esteem. In the two memorable engagements at Salamis and Platæa, he signalized his valour, and attracted the admiration of his country. Aristides conceived an affectionate regard for this young hero, and discerned in his early efforts a capacity for the most important offices of the state. To the talents requisite for public affairs, he added the softer qualities of private life; and, while his courage and conduct, directed by justice and moderation, conciliated the jarring interests of the confederated forces, his amiable disposition, and indulgent humanity, endeared him to his fellow citizens. The first operations of the fleet under his command were directed against the towns of Eion and Amphipolis, situated on the coast of Thrace, near the river Strymon. Amphipolis was taken, and, as the country was fruitful, he established there a colony, consisting of ten thousand Athenians. Eion made an obstinate resistance, and its singular fate deserves to be recorded. It was in the power of Boges, the Persian governor, to have capitulated, and to have retired to Asia with his family and all his effects;

effects; but this he reckoned inconsistent with the zeal and fidelity he owed to his sovereign, and determined to perish rather than surrender. The city was assaulted with fury, and defended with the most persevering bravery. Driven to despair at last by famine, he with his companions mounted the walls, and threw all their gold and silver into the Strymon; then descending, they set fire to a funeral pile, into which they threw their wives and children, after they had slain them with their own hands, and then desperately rushed themselves into the burning pile.*

The whole coast of Europe, which had been subject to the Persians, now yielded to the Grecian arms. Cimon, with the Athenian reinforcements, with those of the various islands, and the maritime towns of the Ionian coast, found his fleet augmented to the number of three hundred gallies, and therefore in a condition to pursue the enemy into Asia.

He sailed directly towards the coast of Caria, and, assisted by the natives, reduced, in a short time, all the Persian fortresses in that province. Lycia soon afterwards yielded to the conqueror. Plaselis alone, secretly aided by the Chians, who served in the fleet of Cimon, made an obstinate resistance; but they were at last obliged to capitulate, to pay a contribution of ten talents, and join their whole naval force to the Grecian armament.

After the assassination of Xerxes, by Artabanus, captain of his guards, his third son Artaxerxes, known by the appellation of Longimanus, was raised to the throne. The dangers which threatened a sceptre, acquired by intrigue and assassination, occupied the beginning of his reign, and prevented him from turning his attention to the Grecian conquests and invasion. But after he was firmly seated on the

* Diod. Sic. lib. ii. Plat. in Cimon.

throne,

throne, he began to think of stopping the progress of the Greeks in the lesser Asia. Having recovered the island of Cyprus, he meditated the defence of Pamphylia, which lay open to the attacks of the enemy. For this purpose he collected a numerous army on the banks of the Eurymedon, while his fleet, of four hundred sail, was ordered to approach the mouth of that river, to co-operate with the land army.

The enterprise which Artaxerxes had foreseen, was now undertaken by Cimon. The Grecian fleet, consisting of two hundred and fifty gallies, engaged the Persian near the coast of Cyprus. The engagement was obstinate and bloody. The barbarian fleet was at last defeated, and, being vigorously pursued to the coast of Cyprus, the vessels were abandoned by their crews, and fell into the hands of the conquerors.*

Cimon had now on board his fleet above twenty thousand Persians. The army, which was encamped on the banks of the Eurymedon, were still ignorant of the battle, and its consequences. From these circumstances the intuitive discernment of Cimon conceived a stratagem for surprising the Persian camp, which was carried into execution on the evening of the same day. A chosen body of Greeks dressed themselves in the Persian habit, and embarking in the Persian vessels, sailed up the river Eurymedon. They were received without suspicion into the camp, as countrymen and friends. Having thus gained admission, on a Grecian signal, they attacked with every advantage an astonished and unprepared enemy. When Cimon had penetrated to the general's tent, the whole army was seized with an universal consternation and panic; a few saved themselves

* Thucyd. lib. i. cap. 137.

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by flight, the rest fell without resistance by the hands of an enemy, the more formidable from being unexpected and unknown.

Having gained two celebrated victories in one day, Cimon returned in triumph to Athens, with a prodigious number of prisoners, and the immense spoils of the Persian camp. After a tenth had been dedicated to Apollo, a considerable part of the remainder was employed in strengthening the harbour and the fortifications of Athens. Cimon received a valuable share as general, which he bestowed on the public. He erected various structures for the ornament of the city; planted the academy with groves, laid it out in delightful walks, and introduced into it a stream of water. He ordered his delightful gardens and orchards to be at all times open to his fellow citizens. He kept an abundant, but plain table, to which he invited all persons: rich and poor, citizens and strangers were made welcome; and he assisted with his liberality, not only particular friends, but the greater part of the Athenians. When he walked through the city, the servants who attended him, had orders to put money privately into the hands of the poorer citizens; and to give clothes to such as were in want of them. This magnificent liberality of Cimon was practised without ostentation, or interested motives; for he acted spontaneously not politically, and with regard to party was inviolably attached to the side of the nobility.

In the following year Cimon sailed towards the Hellespont, and, having expelled the Persians from the Thracian Chersonesus, of which they had lately taken possession, he laid siege to Thasus, whose inhabitants had revolted against the Athenians. This siege is remarkable for having continued three years, and for the obstinate resistance of the besieged, by which they exposed themselves to the severest calamities

ties of war. It was declared a capital offence for any person to talk of surrendering the city; and the women, no less inflexible, cut off their hair to make ropes for the military engines. The city accordingly withstood the besiegers, till famine had carried off most of its inhabitants.

Cimon next set sail to the shore opposite to Thrace, and landing his troops seized on all the gold mines on those coasts, and subdued the country as far as Macedonia.

The Greeks were meditating an expedition against the Persian garrisons in Cyprus, in order to possess themselves of that fertile and delightful island, when the troubles of Egypt opened a new career to their arms. The Egyptians, disgusted with a foreign yoke, revolted from Artaxerxes, and chose Inarus, an adventurous Libyan chief, for their king. Neither deficient in valour nor in policy, this prince dispatched an embassy to Athens, requesting the assistance of that victorious commonwealth to deliver them from the odious yoke of Persian bondage, which they had long felt and lamented.*

The Athenians, equally desirous to humble the pride and to share the spoils of Persia, accepted the invitation with pleasure, and ordered their fleet of two hundred ships, which was destined against Cyprus, to sail for Egypt. Soon after their arrival in that kingdom, an army of three hundred thousand men, under the command of Achæmenes, one of the brothers of Artaxerxes, appeared on the banks of the Nile. A great battle was fought, in which the Persian general and a hundred thousand of his soldiers were slain. Those who escaped fled to Memphis, the capital of the kingdom; the victors immediately pursued them, and soon became masters of two divi-

* Thucydid. lib. i.

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sions of the city; but the Persians having fortified themselves in the third, which, from the colour of its works, had obtained the name of the white wall, a vigorous siege commenced, which was sustained with perseverance and obstinacy on the part of the besieged.

To make a diversion of the Athenian forces, Artaxerxes sent ambassadors to the Lacedæmonians, with the most profuse offers, to engage them to make war against the Athenians. This offer being rejected, he raised another and more formidable army than the former, and gave the command of it to Megabazus, a man equally renowned for his conduct and bravery. Exhausted by the fatigues of a severe service, and enfeebled by the diseases of a torrid climate, Inarus was compelled to raise the siege; and, being defeated in an engagement, retreated with the remains of the allied army to Biblos, a city in the island of Prosopis, which is surrounded by two arms of the Nile. In besieging Prosopis, the Persians had recourse to an extraordinary expedient; by diverting that arm of the Nile in which the Athenian fleet lay, they opened a passage for the whole army to enter the island. Inarus capitulated, and the Egyptians laid down their arms. The Greeks, with their usual intrepidity, set fire to the fleet, and resolved to die sword in hand, like the Spartan band at the battle of Thermopylæ. Struck, perhaps alarmed with their heroic resolution, Megabazus thought it prudent to allow them to retire in safety. They attempted to reach the Grecian settlements in Cyrenaica; but few of them ever revisited their native country, the greater part perished in the burning sands of Libya. In addition to this series of calamities, a reinforcement of sixty ships, which the Athenians had sent to the aid of their countrymen in Egypt, was defeated and destroyed

stroyed in that very arm of the Nile which had already proved so disastrous to the Greeks.

Thus ended the fatal war carried on by the Athenians during six years in Egypt; that kingdom now submitted to the conqueror, and was reunited to the empire of Artaxerxes.

These calamities abroad, together with troubles at home, which shall be mentioned in the sequel, prevented the Athenians from their long-projected expedition against Cyprus. They however at last equipped a fleet of two hundred vessels, which sailed for Cyprus under the command of Cimon. Having notice that the Phœnician and Cicilian fleets were at sea, Cimon determined to bring them to an engagement before they could land their succours upon the island. His attack was successful, above a hundred ships were taken; the remainder took refuge on the coast of Cicilia; whither being pursued by the Greeks, they were totally defeated, and the Persian detachments who marched to support them involved in their destruction. The Grecian fleet returned in triumph to Cyprus. The siege of Salamis, the next object of Cimon, proved unsuccessful, from the consequences of a wound he had received in the attack of Citium, which prevented his wonted exertion.

Tired with a war, in which he had sustained so many disasters and defeats, Artaxerxes sent orders to his generals to conclude a peace with the Athenians. Plenipotentiaries were chosen on both sides, and the terms of the treaty were as honourable and advantageous to Athens and its allies as they were humiliating to the Persians. The conditions of peace were the following:—"That all the Grecian colonies and cities in lesser Asia should be declared free and independent; that no Persian ship of war was to appear on the seas between the Cyanean and Chelidonian islands, that is, from the Euxine sea to the coast

coast of Pamphilia; that the armies of the Great King were not to approach within three days journey of the sea on the Asiatic coast; and that the Athenians and their allies should withdraw their forces from Cyprus, and abstain from invading the dominions of the Persian king."

Such was the termination of a war, which, from the burning of Sardis, had continued with little interruption during the space of fifty-one years, a war no less remarkable for its striking events than its important consequences, and glorious conclusion. A small but magnanimous republic, which first refused to acknowledge the usurped authority of the Great King, defended its liberty against the whole force of the Persian empire, brandished in its turn the hostile sword, and, making Asia not only the seat of war but of victory, dictated to its haughty invader the most humiliating conditions of peace.

While the treaty was negociating, Cimon died of the wounds he had received at the siege of Citium. He was the last of the Grecian generals who performed any memorable achievement against the Persians, and was long remembered and regretted by his countrymen for all the qualities which ennoble the hero, or adorn the man.

The sudden rise and extraordinary progress of the Athenian empire was not beheld without emotion and envy by the Grecian states. The Spartans, in particular, were deeply affected with the rapid prosperity of their antient rival. Their fall from their former pre-eminence in Greece, the command of the confederated allies conferred on the Athenians, the valuable conquests and celebrated victories of Cimon, who daily added to the wealth and splendor of his country, were seriously felt by the jealous aristocracy of Sparta, who had determined to make war on the Athenians, twenty years before the conclusion of

of the peace with Persia. But the immediate burst of their lurking animosity was suspended by a calamity sudden, dreadful, and unexpected. A tremendous earthquake laid Sparta in ruins, and twenty thousand Lacedæmonians perished in this devastation. To heighten the calamity, the slaves or helots, considering this as a favourable occasion to recover their liberty, assembled in crowds from the villages, and attempted to massacre such as had escaped the earthquake; but finding them assembled, and drawn up in order of battle, by the prudent foresight of Archidamus, they retired from the capital, and strengthened by the Messenians, took possession of the strong fortress Ithomé, from which they continued to infest for many years the territories of Laconia. The Spartans, who were not skilful in sieges, could not expel this intestine enemy; accordingly, in the third year of the war, they applied for assistance to the Athenians, who had acquired distinguished reputation in this branch of military service. Ephialtes the orator, who belonged to the party of Pericles, maintained, that, so far from assisting an ambitious rival, they ought to congratulate themselves upon her disgrace, and suffer Sparta to be buried under her own ruins. The generous soul of Cimon adopting better maxims of policy, exposed the dangerous ambition that would thus injure the general cause of Greece, and leave Athens without a counterpoise. The required assistance was therefore sent under his command; but the Spartans, suspicious that the Athenians favoured the Helots and Messenians, soon dismissed them, on pretence they were no longer wanted; and, as the other auxiliaries were retained, the Athenians easily penetrated their true motives, and conceived a just resentment for this instance of jealousy and distrust.

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By the assistance of the Pisans, and other states hostile to Sparta, the fortress of Ithomé held out ten years. The Lacedæmonians were so much exhausted by this war, that the Helots and Messenians, though at last obliged to surrender, obtained terms which plainly indicated the enfeebled state of Sparta: they were permitted to retire in peace from the Peloponnesus with their families and effects. The Athenians, to punish the Spartans for their unjust suspicions, received these wandering exiles with kindness, and assigned Naupactus, a sea-port on the Crissean gulph, for a place of settlement.

Argos, the next powerful republic of the Peloponnesus, at this time weakened by internal commotions, could make no opposition to the increasing power of Athens. From various motives, the Argives had not joined the Grecian confederacy during the Persian war. Mycenæ, with the other principal cities in the Argive territory, either really moved with indignation at this dereliction of the common cause, or glad of so fair a pretence for revolt, loudly exclaimed that traitors to Greece were unworthy to rule over them, and, supported by foreign alliance, assumed and maintained independence. Similar causes contributed to enfeeble and lower the consideration of the Theban republic. The conduct of this state during the Persian invasion was held in detestation by the smaller communities in Bœotia, and they unanimously determined to shake off the Theban yoke. The Thebans, unable to assert their superiority, gave way for a time to the combination; but when they beheld the Spartans, after the recovery of Ithomé, in a condition to assist them, they endeavoured, by promising their most cordial efforts against the Athenians, to obtain the aid of Sparta to reinstate them in their former dominion over Bœotia. The proposal was accepted by the Spartan senate, whose

whose passions and policy were equally interested in raising a rival to Athens beyond the isthmus. During their preparations for this important purpose, Myronides the Athenian general was sent with fifteen thousand men to support the Bœotian confederacy. A decisive victory which he obtained near the walls of Tanagra, which Diodorus compares to those of Marathon and Platæa, established for a time the independency of the Bœotian cities, and the humiliation of Thebes. Pericles, who had now assumed the government of Athens, placed Athenian garrisons in several of the Bœotian fortresses, and, having sent Tolmidas to scour the coast of the enemy, he next year appeared there in person, a terror and scourge to the Lacedæmonians and their allies; but soon after the rash and precipitate Tolmidas was totally defeated and slain in an attack upon Thebes; and this important check given to their career induced the Athenians to listen to terms of accommodation. They agreed, on condition that their citizens, who had been made prisoners in the late engagement, were restored, to abandon their conquests in Bœotia, and to relinquish all pretensions to Megara and Corinth.

Such was the truce of thirty years, concluded by Chares for Athens, and Charondas for the allies, in the fourteenth year preceding the Peloponnesian war.

This treaty, although it circumscribed the ambition of the Athenians in one direction, left them at liberty to pursue it in another. It threw no obstacle in the way of their long-projected scheme of distant domination.

This design, equally daring and magnificent, was finally accomplished by Pericles, whose extraordinary character merits a particular delineation.

He was descended from the most illustrious families in Athens. His father Xantippus commanded

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at the celebrated battle of Mycalé, and his mother Agarista was niece to Clisthenes, who expelled the Pisistratidæ. His education was entrusted to the first philosophers of the age, particularly Anaxagoras of Clazomené, denominated the *Intelligence*, from his being among the first who taught that all human affairs were under the direction of a wise and benevolent Mind, who presided over the universe. From the study of philosophy, which was then confined to a few, he derived an elevation of mind and a dignity of character, which prepared him to act a superior part in public life: but, though attached to this science, he did not lose the statesman in the philosopher; but selecting what was useful to his future purposes, gave his chief application to the study of eloquence, the great engine of influence and power in a popular government. He possessed a natural elocution, which he cultivated and refined with all the graces of art. A striking dignity of manner and deportment, an uncommon elevation of sentiment, an animated elegance of stile, accompanied with the graces of a melodious voice, operated like enchantment on the Athenian assembly; and raised him to a kind of absolute power in the hearts of the people. The cotemporary poets asserted that he lightned, thundered, and agitated all Greece.

The dawn of such superior talents, instead of contributing to his sudden elevation, rendered him the object of suspicion to jealous republicans, who fancied they remarked in his vigorous and decisive character, something which might bear the commonwealth from its proper bias. His person, countenance, and voice, were said to resemble those of Pisistratus, who, by popular virtues and specious arts, had overturned the free government of his country. As Pericles had carefully studied the genius and character of the Athenians, he knew that

an aversion to tyranny, an unbounded love of liberty, and a jealousy of such citizens as were distinguished by their birth or great talents, were the predominant passions of that people. To remove their jealousies, and elude their apprehensions, he withdrew from the scene of public affairs; and leaving the city for the camp, seemed only solicitous for military honours. His abilities, which qualified him to excel in every direction, soon raised him to distinction in arms; and he was held inferior only to Cimon in military merit.

When Aristides was dead, Themistocles banished, and Cimon engaged in foreign expeditions, he judged it a proper season to appear on the public scene, and assume the character of a statesman. In his absence, he had formed a strong party in his favour by his agents Charinus, Epialtes, and Menippus, before his opponents were aware, and taken a strong hold in the affections of the people, which their united powers and policy could not loose. To shake the credit and authority of his rival, Cimon, who admired the Spartan constitution, and supported the power of the nobles, he devoted himself entirely to the party of the people. He not only defended the interests of the multitude against the rich and noble, but appeared to adopt their foibles; he flattered their vanity, indulged their taste for pleasure and profusion, and carefully kept alive their antient antipathy to the Spartans, who, as the haughty lords of Greece, were particularly obnoxious to the Athenian populace. As his fortune did not permit him to equal the magnificent entertainments and profuse donations of Cimon, he made it his first care to insinuate himself into that branch of the administration which held the management of the public funds. He could then oppose profusion to profusion;

profusion; and, in the absence of private wealth, squandered the treasures of the state.

The situation of the times, and some changes which had gradually taken place in the Athenian government, favoured the views and measures of Pericles, to alter the balance of the commonwealth, and raise the consequence of the people.

When the Athenians, in consequence of the Spartan incapacity, and the treachery of Pausanias, were raised to the command of the fleet, they were also appointed to the management of the national treasury of Greece. A system of conquests by sea, of maritime empire, and at last, dominion over her allies, was the natural consequence of the particular situation of Athens at that period.

The annual subsidy entrusted to the administration of the Athenians, amounted to four hundred and sixty talents; from this, and other resources, ten thousand talents had been gradually amassed. This common treasure was deposited at Delos, but was entirely at the command of the Athenians; nor was their disposal of these public funds accounted for to the other states of the league. Their sovereignty over the persons of the allies was as firmly established as over their fortunes; while the military authority of Cimon was strengthened by the affection and gratitude of the Asiatic and other Greeks, whom he rescued from danger, or delivered from oppression.

Besides the subsidies in money with which the allies were taxed, they were obliged to furnish their complement of ships and of men. Many of the scattered islands and petty states, grew weary of perpetual hostilities, when there were no enemies to invade, and no dangers to alarm; and were desirous of repairing the ravages of war, by an assiduous attention to the arts of peace. The Athenians took advantage

vantage of this disposition, which began to prevail among the allies, and allowed such states as were averse to the toils and the dangers of war, to compound for military service, by furnishing a certain number of ships, and an annual contribution of money. Two important consequences followed from this event; an increase of their revenue, and an extension of their empire. This contribution, at first voluntary, soon amounted to a hundred thousand pound. It was gradually augmented and raised by Pericles, to three times the original sum.* A prodigious income, considering that the proportional value of money to labour, was then ten times higher than at present.

The power and empire of the Athenians were extended by the same means. The allies, from being warlike in the field, began insensibly to lose their martial spirit; and applying to husbandry, or menial trades, acquired the mean and degrading spirit of these professions. The Athenians, on the other hand, being continually engaged in maritime or military expeditions, acquired courage, ambition, a spirit of enterprize, and all the qualities which lead to superiority and dominion. Thus the people purchased masters to themselves at their own expence; and they who had formerly been confederates and allies, became now, in some measure, the subjects and tributaries of the Athenians.

Other states, who penetrated the policy, and wished to prevent the designs of the ruling republic, withdrew from its command; but this proved only fatal to themselves; for these refractory states being subdued, became an accession to the dominion of the Athenians. Thus their superiority at sea was strengthened by the conquests of Ægina and Eubœa;

* Thucydid. lib. 1.

and

and thus the contumacy of the Thasians afforded a pretence for the seizure of their gold mines, and served to increase the funds of the republic.

The contributions to the general deposit, which were at first voluntary, were soon converted into a permanent revenue; from which period, the Athenians adopted a fixed scheme of conquest, and a concerted system of command. As republics are the most despotic of all governments, imperious exactions were often made, and tyrannical decrees enacted by the assembly of the people, that affected the independency of the inferior states in alliance; till the sovereignty of Athens became so firmly established on precedents and habit, that many of the petty republics deemed it expedient to negociate terms of submission. Not satisfied with this natural current of dominion, they embroiled themselves in the quarrels of their neighbours to extend their own power; and holding out protection to every free city, found, in its intestine commotions, new means of usurpation, and, in its foreign wars, new subjects of conquest. The Megareans applied for their aid against Corinth; and the consequence was, the stationing of an Athenian garrison in the citadel of Megara: the Milesians required their assistance against Samos; and the result of the alliance with Miletus was the possession of Samos. Whenever they were called to the assistance of a state or city against its enemies it was their constant policy to send some of their superfluous numbers to inhabit part of the conquered or ceded territory; and such a colony was always found to be an encroaching neighbour, and in times of trouble an imperious garrison.* So attached were the Athenians to this mode of colonization, that Pericles sent out a num-

* Thucydid. lib. 1. Diod. Sic. lib. 13.

ber of emigrants, who seized the country of the Sybarites, and under the name of Thusis, established a settlement in Italy, which continued to acknowledge the Athenian name and authority.

I have already mentioned the attempts of Sparta, Thebes, and Argos, to reduce the power, and circumscribe the dominions of Athens. On one occasion only they were successful. The army of Tolmidas was entirely defeated at Coronea by the Bœotian forces; but this was only a check to the ambition, not to the greatness of Athens. The power of that republic was not destined to usurp the sovereignty of inland provinces, it was rather adapted to diffuse itself on coasts and on islands. They had, indeed, captured some cities, and colonized some territories in Thrace, in Thessaly, and Upper Greece; but their dominion spread with greater facility, as well as security, on the maritime countries of Chersonese, of the Hellespont, and of Asia Minor, and prevailed in the islands of Ægina, Eubœa, Lemnos, Samos, and Zacynthus.

Considering the commonwealth, as instituted by Solon, and re-established by Clisthenes, the great body of the people, though in possession of freedom, had little influence in the government. Superior opulence, and hereditary dignities, separated the Patrician families from the Plebeian, and the legislature had entrusted the higher functions of the state exclusively to the former, from whose rank in life responsibility was to be expected. But various causes had contributed, in the times I am now reviewing, to raise the plebeian scale, and give consequence to the people. The Persian war had raised every name to reputation that was inscribed on the trophy at Marathon; while the rich spoils of Platæa and Mycalé, Byzantium and Eurymedon, devolved

volved hereditary opulence to the family of almost every combatant in these memorable engagements. The riches of the conquerors flowed from the three-fold source of plunder, territory, and captives taken in war; the first procured competence and independence to the citizens; the last, employed in the menial arts, gave them leisure to mingle in the councils of their country, with the elevation and consequence of men who had fought her battles, and conduced to her victories.

From this influx of wealth among the inferior ranks, the Census was increased, more citizens crowded into public life, and the state of Athens became more democratic.

Even the virtuous, but sometimes impolitic Aristides, in order to conciliate the people to his designs, weakened the basis of the constitution; and by favouring the plebeian scale, disconcerted the balance of Solon, while he annulled the exclusive pretensions of the aristocracy to the archonship, and procured a law, by which the Athenian magistrates should be promiscuously chosen from the four classes of citizens. This innovation prepared the way for the still greater changes, introduced twenty years afterwards, and gradually completed by Pericles; a revolution which gave a new form to the commonwealth, and finally terminated in the ruin of Athens.

As he had devoted himself to the party of the people, to secure their attachment, he supplied the defect of his own fortune at the expence of his country. He divided the conquered lands, and distributed the public revenues among the citizens. He annexed pensions to all public employments, and appointed salaries to those who assisted at the public tribunals, and the assemblies of the people. The new situation in which the Athenians were

placed, with regard to their distant allies and colonies, rendered it necessary to make some alterations in their constitution. Pay was properly introduced into the Athenian army, when distant expeditions, and the defence of foreign communities, rendered it requisite to hire soldiers wherever they could be found, and when the Athenians had not only to arm in their own defence, but for the protection of their allies. But no such necessity existed for appointing salaries to the whole people of Athens, for the natural exercise of their political functions, which they were called upon to perform, not only from a sense of duty, but a sentiment of dignity. As the progress of corruption is always slow, a small sum, but which was gradually augmented, was regularly divided among the citizens, for every deliberation which they held, and every cause which they determined.

This introduced another change, still more injurious to the dignity and the morals of Athens. The desire of reaping these emoluments of justice, made the people desirous of bringing all causes and deliberations before their own assemblies and tribunals. This design was artfully accomplished by Ephialtes, a bold and unprincipled demagogue, whom Pericles employed as a proper engine to effect such measures as were obnoxious to the better party in the commonwealth, and so odious that he durst not support them by his own personal authority. While Pericles was engaged in foreign wars, his obsequious and zealous partizan promoted his ruinous politics. With the assistance of a powerful faction, he subverted the fundamental laws, and antient customs of his country; drew from the senate and the tribunal of the Areopagus the cognizance of the most important causes, and thus destroyed the firmest bulwarks of the Athenian constitution. Ephialtes was at last assassinated,

assassinated, but not till the evil had taken root; and henceforth we shall find, that all important matters of deliberation were brought, in the first instance, before the popular assembly.

Having contrived to gratify the avarice and the ambition of the Athenian citizens, Pericles studied also to indulge their passion for pleasure. The people of Athens were extremely addicted to dramatic entertainments; and to gratify their propensity to this favourite amusement, Pericles ordered theatres to be erected of marble, and embellished with the most elegant ornaments of art. He opened the treasury to furnish the superb decorations of the stage, and appropriated a part of the public revenue, to enable the poorer citizens to gratify, without expence, their reigning propensity. By these and similar arts, Pericles had gained such an ascendant over the minds of the people, that he possessed and exercised absolute power under a republican form of government. There was no difference, says a Roman historian,* between Pisistratus and Pericles, except this, that the one exercised a tyrannical authority by the force of arms, and the other by the vigour of his eloquence.

The revolution which immediately took place in the character, manners, and conduct of the Athenians, was the natural consequence of these changes in the government, and of the influence which great and sudden prosperity generally operates on the minds of men. Under the administration of Aristides, Cimon, and Pericles, the revenues of the republic had been augmented three-fold, and its dominions extended in a far greater proportion. The fertile soil, and happy climate of Attica, its silver mines, and quarries of marble, had greatly contributed to enrich the industry of the inhabitants; but

* Valer. Max. lib. viii. cap. ix.

its central situation, in respect to Greece, to the islands of the Egean, to Asia, to the Hellespont, and to Egypt, and its commodious havens, open to every wind, were advantages which far transcended those of natural produce, or local wealth. Athens was the resort of the traders of every country, and the common emporium of the known world. The Athenian gallies commanded the eastern shores of the Mediterranean; their merchantmen possessed the traffic of the adjacent countries. Their magazines in the capital abounded with metals, ebony, ivory, and all the materials of the arts, that conduce to utility or ornament; and, according to Xenophon,* "all that was delicious in Sicily, Italy, Cyprus, Egypt, Lydia, or in Pontus, was in greater excellence at Athens, and to be purchased with more certainty than in the respective countries." A people who had enriched themselves by commerce and war, thought they were entitled to reap the fruits of their labours and their victories.

Magnificence and elegance in public edifices, in temples, theatres, statues, and pictures, generally precede the introduction of luxury into private life. As a patron of the elegant arts, Pericles merited not only the praises of his own age, but of all posterity. As Themistocles had fortified, Pericles embellished, his native city with beautiful edifices, that soon rendered it the ornament of Greece. With a taste for the liberal arts and sciences, he enjoyed the most ample means of encouraging genius, and rewarding merit. He had removed the treasury of Greece from Delos to Athens; and, as no immediate exigency required the application of these funds to the common cause, they were liberally bestowed in encouraging every species of ingenious industry, and elegant taste. Phidias, the celebrated

* De Repub. Athenian.

statuary,

statuary, was appointed superintendant of the public works, who assembled the first artists of Greece, and, without envy, gave encouragement to them all. Unless we had the concurring testimony of antiquity, as well as the admired remains which still appear, it would be difficult to believe, that in the course of a few years, there should have arisen so many temples, altars, theatres, statues, baths, gymnasia, and porticoes, whose exquisite elegance gave foreigners a high idea of Athenian genius and power, and attracted the admiration of subsequent ages. Athens assumed a new form from the hand of Pericles. Pomp and magnificence, elegance and taste, supplied the place of its original simplicity and rudeness. But private luxury began to accompany this public profusion; and the best citizens discerned an approaching corruption of manners.

Meanwhile the allies, and the opponents of Pericles, loudly complained of his lavishing the public funds, which ought to remain appropriated to the exigencies of war, to deck Athens with superfluous ornaments at the expence of plundered provinces. Pericles replied, "that the Athenians were by no means responsible for their conduct in this respect to the allies, who ought to remain satisfied with the powerful protection they received from the invasion of the barbarians; that ample provision having been made for the necessities of war, it was just and proper that a portion of their wealth should be bestowed in diffusing plenty among the industrious citizens, and giving immortal renown to the city of Athens.

The orators too, of the opposite party, attacked him with great vehemence, particularly Thucydides, the brother-in-law of Cimon. He was patronized by the Athenian aristocracy, and set up by them to oppose the unjust pretensions, and circumscribe the illegal authority of Pericles. He did not possess the

military talents by which Pericles was distinguished in an eminent degree, but by his wisdom and candor he had acquired an ascendancy over the people. The contention between these candidates for popular favour rose to such a height that it became necessary that the one or the other should be expelled the city. The artifice and address of Pericles prevailed, and Thucydides was banished by the Ostracism. Having now become sole master of Athens, he administered the affairs of the republic at his pleasure, and reigned over it with absolute power in its most flourishing period.

The splendid fortune and continual success of the Athenians; the presumption inspired by their victories over the Persians, of which they ascribed the whole merit to themselves; the affected display of their superiority to the Spartans, and their insolent behaviour to their allies in excluding them from all deliberations that concerned the general welfare, had deeply offended some of the neighbouring states, and raised a powerful confederacy against them, of which the Lacedæmonians were the head. Various incidents had contributed to this war; various pretences were employed by the Lacedæmonians to justify the commencement of hostilities; but the true cause is assigned by the judicious Thucydides:*—"The dominion of Athens had become too extensive and absolute to be any longer regarded with passive envy by the neighbouring states; they saw their fame eclipsed, their liberties endangered, and, if they did not find, were ready to make some pretext for hostilities, and league together to pluck the eagle's wing before she gained a pitch above the flight of vengeance."

The immediate occasion of this war was a quarrel between the republic of Corinth and its flourishing colony Corcyra. Suddenly elated with commercial

* Lib. i. sect. 23.

and

and naval greatness, the Corcyreans had long withheld those marks of deference and respect which Grecian colonies were accustomed to pay to the parent state. In this state of things the citizens of Epidamnus, a colony of Corcyra, implored the assistance of Corinth against the Taulantii, an Illyrian tribe, who, joined with a large body of their own exiles, had become not only troublesome, but formidable, and even threatened to attack the town. They had first sought protection from Corcyra, who refused their request, partly restrained by the secret practices of the Epidamnian exiles, consisting of the principal families of that maritime republic. The Corinthians, more from hatred to Corcyra than affection for the Epidamnians, readily supplied the latter with a considerable body of troops.

When the Corcyreans were informed that the Corinthians had interfered in the affairs of their colony, fired with indignation, they instantly appeared with a fleet of forty sail before Epidamnus, and peremptorily demanded the readmission of the exiles, and the expulsion of the foreign auxiliaries. The demand was rejected with contempt, and hostilities immediately commenced. The Corinthians, eager to defend the place, and to protect their own citizens now enclosed within the walls of Epidamnus, increased their armament to seventy-five sail. The Corcyreans, with a fleet superior in numbers, hastened to meet them, and, as they surpassed them in naval skill as well as courage, gave them a total defeat. Fifteen Corinthian vessels were sunk or destroyed, and Epidamnus surrendered to the victors.

The Corcyreans erected a trophy on the promontory Leucimnè, and their victorious fleet for two years kept possession of the neighbouring seas. In taking vengeance on the confederates of Corinth, they set fire to the ships of the Elians in the harbour of

of Cyllene. This attack on a people venerated for their sanctity, provoked the southern states of Greece, who were likewise excited by the Corinthians, who, since their defeat, had been using every exertion at home and abroad to repair their disgrace, and to chastise what they deemed the rebellion of their colony.

The rulers of Corcyra, in the mean time, were were not idle, and, knowing the enmity that subsisted between the Athenians and Corinthians, they sent ambassadors to Athens to implore the assistance of that republic; at the same time an embassy was sent from Corinth to counteract the views of Corcyra. The claims of each were stated at large before the assembly of the people; but the eloquence of the Corcyreans was best adapted to convince an ambitious republic, and its daring leader; who considered that Corcyra was a powerful maritime state, and conveniently situated for invading the lower coasts of the Peloponnesus, of Sicily, and of the whole borders of the Mediterranean. The Athenians, however, had a respect for appearances, and, to avoid the idea of violating the peace, concluded merely a defensive treaty with the Corcyreans, which, in case of an attack, stipulated that they should afford to each other mutual assistance.

After this agreement was confirmed, ten Athenian ships were ordered to reinforce the fleet of the Corcyreans. An engagement soon took place between the two armaments, in the narrow sea that separates Epirus from Corcyra. The Corinthians gained a complete victory, destroyed seventy ships of the enemy, and were pursuing the feeble remains of their fleet, when they were stopped in their career by the Athenian squadron, which, according to its instructions, had taken no part in the engagement, and now only interposed to prevent the utter destruction of their Corcyrean allies.

Though

Though the Corinthians had been thus successful against Corcyra, yet, dreading the vengeance of its new auxiliary, they laboured to call off the attention of the Athenians to the defence of their own distant colonies. Many of them, they knew, bore the yoke of Athens with regret; among these they fomented the spirit of revolt, and prevailed on some openly to rebel. Among the rest, Potidæa, which, though a Corinthian colony, was yet a tributary of Athens, yielded to the suggestions of the Corinthians. A supply of two thousand men was secretly dispatched from Corinth; but the Athenians having received information of this event, sent out a fleet of forty sail and besieged the city.

The Corinthians and their confederates of Peloponnesus now made their last appeal to the Spartans, whose jealousy of Athens gave them every hope of success in their appeal. The representatives of the different states vied with each other in the severity of their complaints against the injustice and oppression of that power which had so long tyrannised over Greece; and the haughty replies of some Athenians, who had desired to be heard in defence of their republic, did not contribute to conciliate the minds of the Spartan senate. King Archidamus alone seems to have advised moderation and pacific measures; but a popular assembly, inflamed by the speeches they had heard, and spurred on by their jealousy of Athens, were more disposed to listen to Sthenelaides, one of the Ephori, who exclaimed with violence, "Men of Sparta! what room is there for deliberation? while we deliberate, our enemies are in the field. Let us instantly march and combat like Spartans." Sthenelaides prevailed, and the fatal war was determined.

But a numerous, and in some measure divided confederacy, could not act with the promptitude of a single

a single power; and it was not till almost a year after this warlike determination, that they were prepared to invade the territories of Athens. In the meanwhile they endeavoured to amuse the Athenians with pacific overtures, where their demands were purposely so extravagant as to excite indignation, rather than to produce conciliatory measures.

These demands were indeed received at Athens with indignation, but at the same time with a timidity which marked the capricious and fluctuating character of an Athenian multitude. While they had nothing to fear, they admired the bold and ardent measures of Pericles; but when danger approached, they seemed willing to consider him as a headstrong leader, whose schemes were more perilous than advantageous. His opponents took this opportunity of impeaching the character of the man, and finding fault with the administration of the politician. But before they openly attacked himself, they vented their resentment against his friends, and framed accusations against Anaxagoras, Phidias, and Aspasia.

The first was accused of impiety, and of explaining the phenomena of nature in a manner inconsistent with the popular religion. He maintained that the order and beauty of the universe shewed it to be the work of one Supreme Being, possessed of wisdom and benevolence. The philosopher, aware of the prejudices of the people, secured his safety by flight; and the first undoubted theist of antiquity was obliged to fly his country on the accusation of atheism.

Phidias was condemned for having engraved representations both of Pericles and himself on the shield of his celebrated statue of Minerva. For this imaginary crime, the inimitable artist was expelled from a city which might almost have been called the work of his own hands.

A disorderly life, and attempts to seduce the virtue of

of the Athenian matrons, were the charges brought against Aspasia. This lady was a native of Ionia; to personal beauty she added attractions of a higher kind, and was celebrated for her knowledge, wit, eloquence, and extraordinary abilities. The most distinguished men of Athens took pleasure in her conversation, and Socrates was wont to say that from her he learned rhetoric. She inspired the most tender sentiments into the breast of Pericles, who is even believed to have married her. He pleaded her cause with so much force of argument and warmth of passion, that the judges, convinced by his reasoning, and affected by his tears, pronounced her innocent. The impeachment of Pericles himself soon followed the attack upon his chief friends. But after the most strict and minute enquiry it appeared that he had administered the finances of his country with equal probity and judgment, that his expences had never exceeded the income of his private fortune, and that he was on the day of his trial no richer than when first intrusted with the public money. He was honourably acquitted, and he now beheld himself a greater favourite with the people than before his trial. In this crisis of popular affection he pronounced with irresistible effect that celebrated speech, which brought on the Peloponnesian war, and decided the fate of Greece.

"I continue stedfast, Athenians, to my former declarations, that we ought not to comply with the demands of an unjust and overbearing foe. In the present moment, the glory, the existence of the republic depend upon our steady adherence to this salutary maxim.

"It is not to the decree against Megara that we are to attribute the late conduct of the Lacedæmonians. Their jealousy and envy have been long apparent, and they are now meditating our humiliation

or destruction. We steadily refused to repeal the decree complained of, and yet they have every day risen higher in their insolent requisitions; what an exorbitancy would they have reached had we pusillanimously complied with their first demand? What then are we to expect from negociation, when the appeal ought already to have been to the sword? From this appeal we have every thing to expect: our adversaries every thing to fear.

"The natural strength, the ample revenue, and the various resources of the republic, promise the most favourable event to our arms. Above six thousand talents are now in the treasury; we receive six hundred annually in tribute; the temples are rich in ornaments of gold, and the massy spoils of the Persian camp are ready to be melted down in a case of exigency. By land we are strongly fortified, and three hundred ships of war are ready to defend our coasts. We can instantly march against the enemy with thirteen thousand heavy-armed troops, while our foreign garrisons are complete, and a body of sixteen thousand men is left for the defence of Attica. We can besides muster two thousand archers, and light-armed troops, and twelve hundred cavalry. The vast extent of our dominions, from Corcyra and Zacynthus on one side, and from Ægina and Eubœa on the other, seems to embrace the whole circuit of the Grecian seas. We possess the great cluster of the Cyclades, and to these and other islands of the Ægean, have lately added the capital acquisition of Samos. Many of the insular and maritime states, which are not subject to our government, will associate their fleets to our naval power, from their commercial habits or their fears. Thus Chios and Lesbos are ready to join us. Our possessions on the continent are so happily scattered, that they may be called chosen garrisons of Greece. We have Platæa on the Bœotian,

Bœotian, Naupactos and part of Acarnania on the confines of the Ætolian territory; northward, Eion, Amphipolis, and many cities of Thessaly and Thrace, belong to our republic; thence eastward, the entire Chersonese, Bysantium, Sestos, and other towns on the Hellespont, submit to our authority; many likewise of Ionia, Caria, Lycia, and Pamphilia are subordinate to our sovereignty. In short, a thousand tributary cities* own the sway of Athens. Our influence too is in many quarters extended or strengthened by our colonies. The interests and the feelings of the Athenians now prevail in our settlements in the Chersonese; in the districts of the Besaltæ in Thrace; among the Histriæi in Eubœa, in Naxos, the isles of Andros, Scyros, Samos, Amphipolis, and the countries of the Haliartii and the Chalcidenses. Looking round to the wide-extended sovereignty and to the stations of the enemy, Athens seems to be situated in the very center of the field of war, ready to dispatch succour and annoyance to every point of the circle.†

"What, on the other hand, is the situation of our enemies? United by a principle of animosity, their attack may be violent, but its duration must be short. To you, Athenians, the Lacedæmonians cannot be formidable, as they are without money, the sinews of war, and without a fleet, which alone can render them respectable in Greece. The Peloponnesians, with their superior numbers, may invade Attica, and solicit you to an engagement, which it is your business to decline. To you, whose fleets bring supplies from every quarter of your empire, the devastation of your country is of small importance; but if the Peloponnesus

* Aristoph. vesp.

† Thucyd. lib. ii. Strabo, lib. viii. Diodor. Sic. lib. xi. and xii. Pausan. Plutarch in Pericles.

nesus is laid waste, your enemies must starve or submit. Your soundest policy then consists in defending your city, and preserving the empire of the sea, which will ultimately give you the superiority, and maintain your ascendancy in Greece. But, to shew our moderation, and to evince to every unprejudiced Grecian that Athens does not aim at tyranny, or court hostilities, let us dismiss the ambassadors with this answer: 'That we will revoke our prohibitory edicts respecting the Megareans, if the Spartans and other states of Greece will abolish similar laws which they have enacted; that we will restore freedom to such cities as were independent at the last peace, if the Spartans will do the same with regard to their dependants; that we are ready to submit all matters in dispute to a peaceable decision; and that, whatever reception these equitable propositions may meet with, we will not be the assailants, but are fully prepared for a vigorous defensive war.'"

This speech was received by the assembly with universal applause; the ambassadors were dismissed with the answer proposed by Pericles, and communicated it to their respective states. From this time all negociation ceased, and soon after the Peloponnesian war began.

CHAP. XIX.

Of the Rise and Progress of Literature, and the Fine Arts, in GREECE.

THE rise of literature forms one of the most curious and interesting articles in the history of man. No distinction is more striking than that which obtains between the necessary arts and those which are called

called beautiful or fine. Superadded to the senses, and powers which operate to self-preservation, there are others of a different kind, which tend only to pleasure. What at first view may appear surprising, the latter are the most important as well as brilliant; the improvement, embellishment, and pleasure of society, chiefly flow from them, and the character of men and of nations is rested upon the degree of perfection to which they are advanced.

The origin of the fine arts is to be traced back to the origin of society. The God of nature directs the use of all the faculties he hath given; the understanding and the fancy court their peculiar pleasures, as well as the external senses; and in every favourable situation man displays the finer powers of his frame.

Men were eloquent before the invention of letters, and discovered a taste for the fine arts, when they had made little progress in the necessary. The habitations of barbarians are rude in their construction, but in their poetry there is a sublimity and enthusiasm which can scarcely be imitated in refined ages.

As the arts arose in the most antient times, the cultivation of them has been universal. It is to no purpose that authors have singled out a few countries, as the seat of the arts, and appropriated the productions of genius to particular tracts of the earth. Wherever men have beheld the beauties of nature they have imitated or described them; wherever they have had passions or feelings they have expressed them; there have been poets, painters, and musicians, in every quarter of the globe.

But although the rudiments of the arts and sciences are to be found every where, it has been reserved to a few nations to carry them to perfection.

The Egyptians are entitled to the praise of invention. The arts as well as the sciences originated in Egypt; but, the art of written language excepted, they

they still remained in their infancy. The oriental nations have cultivated the arts and sciences from time immemorial, but they never attained to refinement in the one, nor perfection in the other. At a very early period they made a certain progress, beyond which they have never advanced.

It was reserved to Greece to strike out elegant forms, and introduce refinement and taste. From this native country of the muses, the strain of literature both in antient and in modern times is derived. The Greeks set the first example of perfection in the arts; the specimens of genius which they exhibited fixed the standard of elegant nature; and their early productions still continue models to mankind. Sublime and pathetic eloquence, refined poetry, beautiful painting, perfect sculpture, fine architecture, impassioned music, genuine history, arose in these celebrated republics; from them they were introduced among foreign nations, and handed down to succeeding ages. The statues and buildings in Egypt, which discover good taste, were executed by Grecian hands. Antient Balbec in Syria, antient Palmyra in Arabia, had not those regular magnificent palaces and temples till the sovereigns of these countries called in artists from Greece. In the ruins of Persepolis, built by the Persians, we find nothing but a rude magnificence, and the remains of barbarism, while the monuments of Balbec and Palmyra are still, under their ruins, master-pieces of architecture.

Literature and the arts among the Romans were derived from the fountain of Greece. The conquest of Asia introduced opulence into Rome, and the conquest of Greece afforded the means of gratifying the taste for elegance, which arises from the possession of wealth. The Grecian statues and paintings were purchased by the Romans; the Grecian philosophers and orators enlightened and refined their barbarous

barous conquerors. For a long period of time the Greeks were the only persons at Rome who cultivated the liberal arts with any degree of success. Grecian artists adorned the walls of Roman palaces with paintings, built the temples, the porticoes, and the triumphal arches of these masters of the world. The Romans adopted the Grecian philosophy. Their best poets, Virgil, Horace, and Terence, imitated or translated the Grecian authors.

The introduction of fashions and modes from one country to another hath generally taken place in a different situation of affairs. A nation in the height of prosperity and grandeur hath often attracted the study and imitation of its neighbours. The taste for French literature, and the diffusion of the French language, prevailed among the neighbouring nations in consequence of the greatness and celebrity of Lewis the XIVth. The arts of England too followed the progress of their arms, and after the glories of the last German war our language and literature were studied on the continent. But Greece, when stript of her political power, when a province of Rome, preserved her sovereignty in the sciences and in the arts, exercised a nobler empire than that of arms, civilized her conquerors, and gave law to the human mind. Athens still continued the nursery of learning, and the academy of the Roman empire. All who aspired to speak with eloquence, or to cultivate good taste, frequented Athens, and studied under the great masters of oratory. The Grecian learning continued a requisite branch of education; the Grecian tongue was the language of politeness, and, what will appear surprizing, survived the Roman in its purity, remaining without any considerable variation from the time of Homer to the taking of Constantinople by the Turks, that is during the space of three thousand years.

After

After the taking of Constantinople in the fifteenth century, the Greeks, who fled for refuge into Italy, introduced the study of their language; letters began to revive, and genius to awake. The antients were studied and imitated. Their poetry, painting, sculpture, and architecture, were models to the moderns, and Greece became again the school of the arts and sciences. Besides, therefore, their claim as a nation, the Greeks have a further title to our attention, as in some measure the parents of literature and the ancestors of the human mind.

It is a curious but well authenticated fact in the history of all nations, that poetical composition has been antecedent to prose, and that the first authors were the bards or rhapsodists. Among the species at large, as well as among individuals, imagination and sensibility, the true sources of poetical inspiration, precede the improvement and expansion of the reasoning faculty. Lively and impressible minds are led by an instinct of nature to express their feelings, whether of pleasure or pain, to celebrate the gods whom they worship, the heroes they admire, and the events which they wish to deliver down to posterity. Every ear is sensible to the charms of harmony; and poetical numbers, especially when recommended and enforced by the accompaniments of music, must have given universal pleasure.

Poetical composition, thus introduced by nature, was continued by necessity. Before the invention of letters, and in the absence of written records, the ear was called to the aid of memory, and verse was ennobled, as being the sole vehicle of religion, learning, and history. Hence memory was deified, and the muses considered as her immediate offspring.* Compositions of every kind assumed a poetical form.

* Hesiod. Theogon. v. 52.

History

History was delivered, philosophy was taught, laws were promulgated, in verse; the historian, the moralist, and the legislator, all who applied their genius or their reason to the purposes of instruction or entertainment, communicated to the public the fruits of their study through the medium of metrical numbers. Hence an opinion of something elevated and even sacred became annexed to the character of bard; a poetical genius was esteemed an effect of divine inspiration, and a token of celestial favour; and the poet who carried with him the chronicle of past and of present times, enjoyed the rights of universal hospitality, and was admitted to distinguished honours. Persons in the highest stations of life were ambitious to excel in this literary career. Achilles, as we are informed by Homer, sung to his lyre the praises of departed heroes; Amphion, to whose poetical and musical powers such amazing effects are ascribed, reigned in Thebes; Melampus obtained the royal dignity in Argos; and Chiron, the wise centaur, though entitled by his birth to rank among the princes of Thessaly, preferred the cultivation of his poetical talents to ambition, and, retiring to a cavern in Mount Pelion, conveyed instruction in verse to the celebrated heroes of the Trojan war.

Among the antient Greeks, as among the rude inhabitants of modern Europe, the character of musician was joined to that of poet. Verse seems to have been alwas sung, and musical accompaniment was deemed essential to its perfection.

The early music of Greece was probably neither artificial nor intricate. But it is difficult to suppose that the elegant perceptions and fine organs which gave form to a most harmonious language, and to a structure of verse, which, under the disadvantages of a modern pronunciation, is still universally captivating, could have produced or tolerated a vicious

and inelegant stile of melody. Simplicity in music as well as in poetry is perfectly consistent with elegance, and what is most affecting in both is generally the most simple.

The early poets, of whom any memorials remain, were not natives of Greece, but of Thrace, or of Asia Minor. Homer mentions Thamyris the Thracian contending in song with the muses themselves in Peloponnesus.* Olen the Lycian was the inventor of the Grecian hexameter verse; and his hymns, which were sung at the festival of Apollo at Delos, in the time of Herodotus, were the most antient known to the Greeks. The hymns of Thamyris and Orpheus were admired for their singular sweetness even in the time of Plato; and the Thracians, Thamyris, Orpheus, Musæus, Eumolpus, with Olen the Lycian, were the acknowledged fathers of Grecian poetry, and the first who attempted to reclaim their countrymen from barbarity, and to introduce that refinement of manners, taste, and language, which in subsequent ages distinguished a Greek from a barbarian.† Olympus, the father of Grecian music, whose compositions Plato calls divine,‡ was a Phrygian. The Thracian Greeks were probably destroyed in early times by the hostile incursions of their northern neighbours; many of the Asiatic Greeks too were compelled to leave their original seats in consequence of the Ionic and Æolic migrations; but letters did not suffer by the change. Ionia was probably the birth place, and certainly the residence, of Homer. In his geography of countries he speaks of them as more or less distant in proportion to their bearing from the Ionian territory. He describes zephyrus as a rude and boisterous wind.

* Iliad, lib. ii. ver. 595. † Aristoph. Ranæ.

‡ Plato Minor, p. 318.

This

This circumstance appears so inconsistent with the soft and gentle quality of the zephyr celebrated by the poets of all times, that it has been urged against Homer as an error in description. But an ingenious and modern traveller* has vindicated the poet, by informing us that the cold wind which blows from the Thracian mountains upon the Ægean must of course be a west wind with regard to Ionia. Hesiod, next to Homer in fame, was born at Cumæ; and the remaining masters of epic poetry as they are generally stiled, Antimachus the Colophonian, Panyosis of Halicarnassus, and Pisander of Camirus, were all natives of the Asiatic coast.

It is no less remarkable, that the nine lyric poets, except Pindar the Theban, and Stesichorus the Sicilian, was born in Lesser Asia, or the islands of the Ægean sea. The most antient prose writers too, Cadmus of Miletus, and Pherecydes of Syros, boasted the same origin; and in a subsequent age, Halicarnassus gave birth to Herodotus, the father of legitimate history.

Not only poetry and history, but painting, sculpture, and architecture, first rose to eminence in this enchanting climate, and derived their first improvements from the ingenuity of the Ionians. They imitated and surpassed the arts which they found practised among the cultivated and refined nations of Phrygia and Lydia; they blended their music with their own, and by that means improved both; they first rivalled and then excelled them in all the arts of design, in painting, sculpture, and architecture. This country also gave birth to Aristagoras, who was the instructor of Pericles, and the philosopher of *mind*, who first announced to antiquity the existence

* Mr. Wood. See his Essay on the Original Genius and Writings of Homer.

of a Supreme and All-perfect Being, the Creator of the world.

Literature, taste, and science having originated in Lesser Asia, were gradually diffused from that country over Greece, Italy, and Sicily.

It is a subject not unworthy of investigation, to enquire into the causes that contributed to the rise and progress of literature and the arts in Ionia.

A lively sensibility to the works of nature is the first ingredient in the character of the poet or the painter. The various regions of the earth are distinguished by nature by a particular complexion, a boldness of feature, or a gentleness of expression. The western coast of the Asiatic continent is universally acknowledged to be one of the most delicious countries in the world, remarkable for the fertility of its soil, and excelling Greece in the felicity of its fine climate, which was no less pleasing to the senses than enlivening to the imagination. The gay and smiling aspect of a picturesque region under an unclouded sky, diversified by hills and vallies, intersected by rivers, broken by bays and promontories, and adorned with natural beauties and noble prospects, excites those emotions which gave birth to poetry. Alone with nature in her favoured haunts and delightful recesses, men feel with vivacity, and give vent to their feelings in animated language, which is believed to flow from inspiration.

The profession of a bard, which is so important in every barbarous period, attracted uncommon attention and reverence about the time of the Trojan war, and after that event. In those ages religion was one of the great principles of government, and valour was the first virtue held up to admiration. But the bards chiefly contributed to support the system of religion by their theogonies or genealogies and histories of the gods, and powerfully recommended

mended the practice by the beautiful hymns with which they adorned the sacred ceremonies. While they incited men to piety by singing the praises of the gods, they animated them to valour by celebrating the glory of departed heroes. Both were singularly adapted to affect that superstitious temper and romantic fancy which were the prevailing characteristics of the Grecian tribes in the early ages.

Before the invention of letters and multiplication of books, men gained their knowledge like Ulysses, *by visiting many cities and conversing with many men.* The respect and veneration annexed to the character of bard secured to that class of men a welcome reception at all religious festivals and public solemnities. The characters and events of a rude unpolished age, in which human nature shoots wild and free, and history has often the air of romance, is highly favourable to heroic poetry. The Trojan war, in which all Greece was united against Asia, the fate of Priam's family, and the fall of his antient kingdom, the wanderings and adventures of the Trojan and Grecian heroes after the taking of Troy, opened a wide field for poetical narration and description, and presented subjects suitable to the dignity of the epic muse. Homer was not the first, though certainly the most successful bard who attempted this theme. The admiration of his countrymen who heard him recite, in sublime and animated strains, the heroic atchievements of antiquity, has been seconded and confirmed by the approbation of all succeeding times. When poetry is transmitted by oral communication, succeeding poets learn to repeat the verses of their predecessors. Traditionary poetry, like traditionary knowledge, receives alterations and improvements from age to age. After frequent repetition the ear rejects what is discordant, the taste what is disgusting, congenial fancy suggests addi-

tional embellishments, and the early poems of nations receive the last polish. In this manner the Iliad and Odyssey gradually assumed the form in which they now appear.

Homer lived before the return of the Heraclidæ into Greece.* After that event, the great Æolic and Ionic migrations operated a complete revolution in the state of Lower Asia, and filled it almost entirely with new inhabitants.

The ÆOLIC MIGRATION immediately followed the conquest of Peloponnesus by the descendants of Hercules. Penthilus, one of the sons of Orestes, accompanied by multitudes of his countrymen, formed a settlement in Eubœa. Malaus and Clenes, sprung from Agamemnon, assembled a number of Peloponnesian fugitives in Locris, and passing thence to Asia Minor, founded the town of Gima. Thus the whole sea coast, from Cynicus on the propontis to the river Hermus, together with the island of Lesbos, was settled by emigrants from Bœotia and Peloponnesus, and received the name of Æolia.

The great IONIC MIGRATION took place at a later period, and was conducted by Neleus and Androclus, the younger sons of Codrus, upon the succession of Medon to the archonship. It consisted of a vast multitude of adventurers, many Athenians, and almost all the Ionian and Messenian families which had taken refuge at Athens from the Dorian invasion. They took possession of Lower Asia, from the river Hermus southward to the promontory of Posideion, together with the rich islands of Chios and Samos; and, associating with all the Greek inhabitants, founded twelve cities, which rose to opulence and power. These were Miletus, Ephesus, Myus, Lebedos, Priene, Colophon, Teos, Ery-

* Mitford, p. 160.

thræ,

threa, Phocæa, Clazomenæ, Chios, and Samos; to which was afterwards added Smyrna, obtained from the Æolians. These cities, though separately governed by their own magistrates, maintained a bond of political connection with each other, and held occasionally a general council, in which they deliberated concerning the interests of the confederacy. The territory thus acquired on the continent of Asia scarcely reached any where forty miles from the sea coast, but extended near four hundred in length from the north of Æolis to the south of Ionia.

Southward of this tract, and in that corner of Asia which retained the name of Caria, the Trœzenians founded Halicarnassus, which soon excelled the parent city. The neighbouring island of Rhodes was early peopled by a Grecian tribe, and is celebrated by Homer for its prosperity and power. By a happy form of government, and successful application to commerce, the Rhodians flourished early in arts and arms and extended their authority over a considerable portion of the neighbouring continent. Halicarnassus and Rhodes were the two principal Grecian states in Asia, whose people took the appellation of Dorians.

The colonies which migrated to Ionia from Athens, after the death of Codrus and the abolition of the royalty, carried along with them the principles of liberty, which at that time distinguished the Athenians, and became general in Greece. While they retained the same ingenuity, the same enthusiasm, and the same poetical and pleasing system of superstition which they derived from their European ancestors, they possessed advantages peculiar to themselves. Harassed by internal dissentions, and torn by the struggle of contending factions for power, Athens continued in poverty and barbarity till the time of Solon; but its colonies in the east enjoyed profound

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peace, and acquired sudden prosperity. From their vicinity to Phrygia and Lydia, the best cultivated and most opulent regions of Lower Asia, they learned the arts of industry and ingenuity; to dye wool, to work mines of gold, to mould figures in bronze, and to cultivate the fine arts. Availing themselves of their situation, they turned their attention to foreign commerce, which had been neglected by the Phrygians and Lydians. Commanding the mouths of great rivers, and possessing convenient harbours, they soon made such progress in maritime and inland trade as raised several of their cities, particularly Miletus, Colophon, and Phocæa, to wealth and power.* In the eighth century before Christ, they had an intercourse with Egypt, and for a length of time monopolized the trade of that country. Thus blessed by the advantages of nature, and enriched by the acquisitions of art, they felt a desire, or found a demand for new and more refined pleasures, and began to cultivate the elegant arts and amusements which spring from leisure, and minister to luxury. Elegance, gaiety, tenderness, and sometimes dignity, characterise the Ionian muse. The passionate and tender Sappho breathed the sensibility and ardour of love; while her lover Alcæus, though he chiefly indulged the gay and sportive strains of the muse, possessed a genius fitted for subjects of greater dignity.* Voluptuous gaiety, the pleasures of love and of wine, are the sole themes of Anacreon, as they were the chief pursuit of his life. The character of an elegant voluptuary is uniformly preserved in his works; and his style is distinguished by an original simplicity, purity, and sweetness. The tender Simonides indulged the plaintive tones of elegy, and melted the heart to sorrow. Stesichorus attempted higher strains, and sung of battles

* Strabo, p. 582. † Quintil. lib. x. cap. 1.

and

and heroes. But of these poets, celebrated by the Greeks, and imitated by the Romans, a few fragments only remain, sufficient to make us regret the injury that we have sustained by the ravages of time.

Painting and sculpture, as well as poetry, arose in the delightful and inspiring climate of Ionia. The Grecian religion, which was so favourable to the cultivation of poetry, was no less propitious to the progress of the other imitative arts. When wealth and refinement are introduced among a people, they aspire to have temples worthy of their divinities, and statues that represent and seem to realise their perfections. The popular superstition was happily adapted to the art of the painter and the statuary. Abstract essences and metaphysical powers were unknown to the Grecian theology. As the divinities of Greece were believed to possess the human form, though infinitely more perfect and sublime, the artist, by comparing and selecting the elegant forms of nature, and exalting his conceptions to ideal excellence, could, without shocking probability, give a supernatural dignity to his work. The happy climate of Ionia too, producing the human figure in its most exquisite proportions, exhibited that living and real beauty which in less favoured regions is the work of fancy or abstraction.

In the seventh century before our era, the elegant arts and productions of the Ionians embellished the wealthy capital of the Lydian kings, and were diffused over the dominions of the European Greeks. Alarmed by the incursions of a Cimmerian horde, many of the Ionian artists emigrated to the wealthy cities of Sicyon and Corinth, where they found protection and encouragement. Bathycles, a native of Magnesia, celebrated for its painters, fixed his residence at Sparta. By order of the senate, he made the throne of the Amyclean Apollo, the statues of

Diana Leucophryne, of the Graces and the Hours, and all the other ornaments within the consecrated precincts of the temple. The following century, Scillis and Dipenus, natives of Crete, enriched many cities in Europe, as well as in Asia, by their productions; and soon afterward Anthermus and Bupalus gave to the world those works which were the admiration of the most enlightened ages of Greece and Rome. The ring of Polycrates, the tyrant of Samos, made by Polydorus, and mentioned with such applause by Pliny,* was likewise the work of this age.

But Athens gradually surpassed the fame of her colonies, and became the seat not only of empire but of literature, the fine arts, and philosophy.

The conquest of Lydia, by Cyrus the Great, contributed to this event. Crœsus, the magnificent monarch of that wealthy kingdom, had assembled the Ionian sages and men of letters at his court. When the Lydian monarchy was annexed to the Persian empire, literature took refuge at Athens, to which Pisistratus and his son Hipparchus invited the learned and ingenious, to embellish their court, and polish the Athenians. I have mentioned that Pisistratus collected the Iliad and Odyssey of Homer, and instituted a public library for the benefit of men of science. His son Hipparchus augmented the collection of books begun by his father, and extended the same patronage and protection to the learned. He gave a pension to the poet Simonides to reside at his court, and sent a fifty-oared galley to bring Anacreon to Athens.

After the expulsion of the Pisistratidæ literature and refinement declined among the Athenians. An unsettled government, torn by the factions of Clis-

* Lib. xxxvii. Sect. 4.

thenes

thenes and Isagoras, and subject to rapid revolutions was little adapted to the cultivation of letters or an intercourse of the muses. A high-spirited people were more intent on action than speculation, and had to run their career in arms before they began their progress in arts. A rude kind of drama had been introduced, and was exhibited in the villages of Attica in the cart of Thespis; Ionia had sent philosophers to preside over the education, and form the minds of the illustrious youth; but no art or science flourished at Athens till after the Persian war.

The singular and splendid events of that war heightened the spirit and ardour of the Greeks, and gave a new elevation and enthusiasm to the Athenian character. The spoils of Asia enriched the conquerors of Mardonius and Tigranes. The profusion of gold and silver found in the Persian camp after the battles of Platæa and Mycalé; the inundation of wealth poured into the country from the succeeding victories of Cimon, when Greece waged offensive war against Asia for plunder as well as victory, enriched individuals as well as the state, and was diffused among the body of the people. Cimon, whose original patrimony was insufficient to discharge his father's debt to the public, suddenly became possessed of such immense wealth, that feasting the Athenian people was to him an ordinary expence.

The redemption of prisoners taken in battle produced a new accession of wealth to the conquerors; while the former, employed in menial arts and handicraft trades, gave leisure and competence to the latter to enjoy a higher rank, and pursue more elevated occupations. The companions and fellow-soldiers of Miltiades, Themistocles, Aristides, and Cimon, appeared in the public assembly with the consequence of those who had fought the battles, contributed to the victories, and shared in the glories of

their country. Persons so elevated by national pride and personal importance, disdained to practise the mechanical professions; to find them more congenial and elegant employment, a decree passed prohibiting slaves from the exercise of painting and sculpture. Thus the mechanical and liberal arts were separated at Athens; and the latter being appropriated to free citizens, received additional dignity. From that period the most ambitious mind disdained not the pencil or the chisel; the labour as well as the design enobled genius and led to fame. Hence grandeur of conception was combined with the most elegant execution; nor was the time employed on the work any consideration to the artist who laboured for immortality. The celebrated statue of Laocoon employed the lives of a father and his two sons.*

Another circumstance which contributed to the progress of refinement and the arts at Athens, was the administration of Pericles, who, besides an elegant taste derived from nature and improved by education, possessed a liberal spirit and unbounded power. Pericles comes not at present to our view as the minister, or rather dictator of the republic, but as a patron of letters; enlightened by the philosophy of Anaxagoras, and polished by his intercourse with the accomplished Aspasia, he saw and felt the value of those arts which adorn society and refine manners. With a taste for the liberal arts and sciences, Pericles enjoyed the most ample means of rewarding them. The bank of the general contributions had been removed from Delos, and no immediate exigency demanding the application of these treasures to the common cause, he converted them to the purposes of embellishing the city, with a zeal and assiduity that soon rendered Athens the orna-

* Plin. Lib. xxxiv. cap. 7.

ment

ment of Greece, and gave it the empire in arts as well as in arms; nor did Pericles find it difficult to procure the consent of his countrymen to this use of the public funds, and to employ in adorning the city the treasures which had been given for its defence. Dramatic poetry, philosophy, architecture, sculpture, and painting were now cultivated with success, and attained to distinguished honours.

DRAMATIC POETRY.

Theatrical entertainments form, in all countries, a curious and useful subject of speculation, as they not only mark the national feelings and character, but give additional strength to those feelings, and that character, from which they are derived. But in Greece the theatre was an object of capital importance and dignity; dramatic representations formed a striking part of religious worship, and the expence of supporting them exceeded that of the army and navy together. No people were ever so passionately attached to these entertainments as the Athenians. Their chief employment and delight was to amuse themselves with works of genius and taste, and to judge of the dramatic performances that were represented by public authority several times in the year, particularly at the feasts of Bacchus, when the tragic and comic poets disputed for the prize. So widely diffused was this taste, that the common people committed to memory the fine passages of this poet, and learned to repeat the philosophical sentiments and poetical numbers of Euripides.

The drama, in antient as in modern Europe, arose from the ceremonies of religion. The names of Tragedy* and Comedy† sufficiently point out their origin. Amidst the festivity and joy of the vintage,

* Τραγωδια, the song of the Goat.

† Κωμωδια, the song of the Village.

the

the Greeks had been early accustomed to sing the praises of Bacchus in extemporary strains. At these festivals they had been accustomed not only to chaunt Dithyrambic hymns to the bountiful god of wine, but also to represent by action the exploits and atchievements ascribed to him by the poets, and transmitted by antient tradition. Dramatic imitation being established in the sacred ceremonies, was gradually extended; and the poets, instead of reciting, represented the striking events or agreeable fictions of antiquity. As the more serious parts of the Dionysian festival gave rise to tragedy, so the gayer and more ludicrous introduced comedy. The Athenians were extremely addicted to raillery and invective, and at the vintage festival gave a loose to the wildest and most licentious extravagance. The women masked, and disguised with lees of wine, and the men dressed in rude grotesque habits like satyrs, vented such irregular sallies as their inebriated imaginations furnished on the instant. The satire and scurrility they indulged in these village amusements, their masks and disguises in the hairy habits of satyrs, their wanton songs and dances at the phallic ceremonies, form a complete outline of the first drama. When dialogue and repartee were added, it became a masque, and in this state it is discovered in very early times in the villages. Having assumed the shape of the drama, it attracted the curiosity of the villagers; who, in return for their amusements, decreed to the performer a prize, which consisted of a cask of wine. The first form of these dramatic exhibitions was very different from their subsequent improvements; yet, to shew the attachment of the Greeks to their antient customs, they always retained the song of the chorus as a principal part of the performance, the custom of concealing the faces of the actors with a mask, and the distribution of prizes to the most successful competitor.

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Even the dark bombast of the Dithyrambic hymn continued till the time of Æschylus, and marks some of his tragedies; and the licentiousness and obscenity of the vintage songs distinguished and disgraced Athenian comedy till the age of Menander.

Rewarded with the praise of the villages, the rural poets were led by a natural ambition to exhibit their dramatic entertainments at the capital. Accordingly, in the fifty-fourth Olympiad, Susarion, a native of Icarius, presented a comedy at Athens on a moveable stage or scaffold. This was the first drama exhibited in that city; the author on these occasions was the actor of his own piece; and the rude interludes of Bacchus and the satyrs were introduced occasionally by the Sileni and Tityri, whose songs and dances were episodical to the drama. Comedy at that time appears not to have been committed to writing. The first author of written comedy, was Epicharmus the Sicilian, who being entertained in an elegant court at Syracuse, rejected the mummeries of the satyrs, and composed his drama on a more regular and refined plan.

Tragedy was of a later invention and owed its rude beginnings to Thespis, who introduced one actor to the relief of the chorus, whose songs and dances formerly constituted the whole drama. From Thespis, tragedy descended through Pratinas, Carcynus, and Phrynichus, to Æschylus, the first tragic poet whose works have been transmitted to posterity.

When this new species of composition was introduced, many ingenious competitors began to enter the career of fame, and to contend for theatrical honours. Thespis was succeeded by Pratinas, a native of Peloponnesus, who wrote fifty tragedies. He entered the lists with Chærilus and Æschylus, before the battle of Marathon, and gained the prize by one of his compositions.

Phrynicus

Phrynichus was the disciple of Thespis. He first introduced the measure of tetrameters, as the trochaic foot is most proper for dancing, and the drama of that age was accompanied with dances characteristic and explanatory of the fable. Dancing was so essential a part of the early drama, and the people were so much attached to the old Bacchanalian customs, that the early reformers of tragedy found it a difficult task to make the dance accord to the subject of the scene. This part of the spectacle was generally under the direction of the poet, who was often a principal performer; but when he was incompetent to this part of his duty, he called in the assistance of a professed ballet-master, who formed dances upon the incidents of the play, and instructed the chorus how to perform them. The tragedy of Phrynichus, on the siege of Miletus, the capital of Ionia, which had been lately sacked by the Persian troops, made a most wonderful impression on the audience. The deplorable fate of a city, founded by one of their colonies, and whose mournful story was recent in their remembrance, dissolved the whole audience into tears, and operated so powerfully on the patriotic feelings of the Athenians, that the magistrates prohibited, by a public edict, any poet in future to recall that melancholy subject. This author bore away the prize by his tragedy the Phenissæ, which Themistocles was at the charge of representing. From this drama Æschylus took the design of his celebrated tragedy the Persæ. Literary excellence of every kind does not rise from sudden and single efforts, but from gradual and progressive attempts. There were heroic poets before Homer, and dramatic authors of reputation before Æschylus.

The theatre had now assumed a new form. Instead of scaffolds or booths, which contained both the spectators and the actors, a building of more solid materials

materials and of a more regular form was constructed. The actors wore masks adapted to the characters which they represented, were adorned with long robes and flowing trains, and trod the stage in buskins.

Æschylus was the son of Euphroion an Athenian, and born in the last year of the sixty-third Olympiad. He had attained the flower of manhood at the battle of Marathon, in which he acquired distinguished renown. His three brothers, Aminias, Euphorion, and Cynegyrus, signalized their valour in the same action, and shared the honours of the victory. Though Æschylus had reasons, which all posterity have approved, to set a high value on his poetical talents, yet, like Alcæus, he preferred his military character to his literary one, and, in the inscription which he composed for his tombstone, he appeals to *the field of Marathon and the long-haired Mede.* The brave and gallant spirit which glowed in his family gives a strong and manly colouring to his compositions. His genius, like his valour, is keen and daring, and his pen, like his sword, is a weapon of terror. The spectacle which his drama exhibits, is that of one sublime though simple scene of awful magnificence. His sentiments and his diction accord with his subject; and though he is accused of having written his tragedies in a state of ebriety, yet they do not discover the traces of a disordered fancy, though often of an inflated imagination.

Attentive to every subsidiary art which could give success to his dramas, he instructed the chorus in the dances introduced into the piece, and taught the performers to dress with elegance and propriety. His taste in these decorations was so dignified and correct, that they were imitated by the priests and ministers of religion in their sacred vestments. The dances which he composed for his tragedy of the seven Chiefs were peculiarly adapted to the scene, and performed

performed with extraordinary applause. He sometimes exceeded the just bounds of dramatic effect. In his tragedy of the *Eumenides*, Orestes is represented at the bottom of the theatre, surrounded by the furies, laid asleep by Apollo. Upon their awaking with wildness and despair in their looks, gestures and accents, the whole theatre was petrified with horror; pregnant women brought forth the untimely fruit of their womb, and children died of the fright. So dreadful was the scene, that the magistrates interposed to prevent such spectacles in future, and reduced the number of the dancers from fifty to twelve.

The candour of this poet is apparent from his well-known declaration, "That his tragedies were but fragments from the magnificent repasts of Homer." The elevation and dignity of his mind are equally conspicuous from the remarkable appeal which he made when the dramatic prize was voted to one of his competitors from prejudice and envy—"I appeal to posterity," said Æschylus, "and to posterity I consecrate my works, in the assurance that they will receive that reward from time, which the partiality of my cotemporaries refuses to bestow."

This prophetic appeal was soon verified, for after his decease the Athenians held his name in the highest veneration, and enacted a decree for defraying the expence of representing his tragedies out of the public treasury. Eight of his tragedies received the prize during his life, and more after his death. A statue was erected to his memory at Athens, and a painting was publicly exhibited representing his valour in the battle of Marathon.

In the latter part of his life he retired to the court of Hiero in Sicily, where he was received with the honours due to his genius; and after residing there about three years, died in the sixty-ninth year of his age.

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When Æschylus was in the sole possession of the theatre, and applauded by the public voice, a young rival started up to dispute with him the palm of dramatic poetry. This was Sophocles. He was born at Colonna, a considerable village in Attica, in the second year of the seventy-first Olympiad. He studied in his compositions to attain a regular, supported dignity, and avoiding the sounding, swelling, gigantic diction of Æschylus, which resembles the tumultuous shouts of battle, rather than the nobler harmony and silver sound of the trumpet. His first production gained him distinguished applause. When the bones of Theseus were brought to Athens by Cimon, a dispute was appointed between the tragic poets: Sophocles had the boldness to enter the lists with Æschylus, and the felicity to carry the prize. An union of dignity and ease, of strength and softness, characterise the Sophoclean buskin. From the peculiar sweetness of his diction, he was stiled the Attic Bee. He retained the vivacity and vigour of his genius to extreme old age. His ungrateful and impious children summoned him before the judges, on the pretence of lunacy, that they might obtain a decree to take possession of the estate. He made no other defence than by reading the tragedy of Oedipus at Colonna, which he was then composing. The judges were delighted with the performance, and he carried his cause unanimously. He was twenty times crowned victor in the dramatic contests, and is said to have expired in a rapture of joy, on being declared victor contrary to his expectation. He died in his ninetieth year, and the figure of a hive was placed upon his tomb, to perpetuate the appellation which had been ascribed to him from the sweetness of his verses.

Euripides was born in the first year of the seventy-fifth

fifth Olympiad* at Salamis, whither his father Menesarchus and his mother Clito had retired, when the Athenians left their city at the approach of Xerxes. He applied himself at first to the study of philosophy, and had the celebrated Anaxagoras for his master; but the dangers which threatened that illustrious sage, who had nearly fallen a victim to his philosophical tenets, inclined him to the study of dramatic poetry, which had risen to high reputation. He was the scholar of Socrates, and his works discover his profound application to philosophy.

Euripides is the most tender and pathetic of all the Grecian dramatic authors. Alexander of Pheræ, a cruel tyrant, burst into tears at the representation of the Troades, (written by this poet) and left the theatre before the conclusion of the play, professing that he was ashamed to weep for the distress of Hector and Andromache, when he had not felt the least compassion for his own citizens, whom he had put to the sword. The beautiful and sublime of moral sentiment which run through his works have, by the consent of ages, established his title to the appellation of the philosophic tragedian.

It was reserved to this poet to perfect the chorus in the Grecian tragedy, the chief distinction between the antient and modern drama. The office of the chorus was to give useful counsels and salutary instructions, to espouse the side of innocence and virtue, to be the faithful depositary of secrets, and to supplicate the gods to raise the humble and depress the haughty. In the music of the chorus there was more variety, and in the poetry more animation than what could with propriety be admitted into the mere

* 420 years before Christ.

dialogue

dialogue part of the drama: this, together with the splendour of the dresses, and the various dances of this numerous groupe, at once highly entertained the eye, and affected the heart. To recommend and enforce moral instruction, by the power of a happy imagination and harmonious numbers, was frequently attempted in the choruses of Æschylus and Sophocles, but seems to be the constant object which Euripides had in view.

Comedy.

While tragedy rose and flourished in this manner at Athens, comedy, which had been less cultivated, began to attract attention. This species of composition assumed three different forms at Athens, partly from the genius of the poets, and partly from the influence of the government.

The antient comedy retained the remains of its original rudeness, and the licentiousness which distinguished the cart of Thespis. Though it had become regular in its plan, it had not learned to be modest and reserved. Aristophanes and his contemporaries represented real transactions, with the names, habits, gestures, and the likeness painted on the masks of whatever person they thought proper to sacrifice to public derision. They assumed the privilege to direct the public measures, to reform the commonwealth, and to advise the people on the most important occasions. Nothing was spared in a city so licentious as Athens. Generals, magistrates, the government, nay, the gods themselves, were attacked by the satirical pen of the poets; and all was well received by the people; provided the comedy was entertaining, and the attic salt not deficient.

Cratinus, Eupolis, and *Aristophanes,** the prin-

* Eupolis, atque Cratinus, Aristophanesque Poetæ, &c. Horace.

cipal

cipal authors of the Old Comedy were preceded by Epicharmus and Phormis, natives of Sicily, Chronides and Magnes, Athenians, and Dinvilochus of Agrigentum. Cratinus and Eupolis obtained the applauses of the people, by the keenness and boldness of their satire against the magistrates and nobility, whom they exposed to public scorn. Of the former nothing remains; of the latter a few fragments only are to be found. It is sufficient to mark their character to mention, that they exceeded Aristophanes in licentiousness, obscenity, and abuse.

This latter poet was an adopted, not a native citizen of Athens. He was distinguished by his vivacity and wit in conversation, and his company was coveted by the greatest characters of the age. Plato shared many festive and social hours with him, and Socrates sat up whole nights in his company. He attained an ascendancy in Athens, which, at this distance of time, appears extraordinary. All the honours that a poet could receive were publicly bestowed upon Aristophanes by the Athenians, nor did they confine their rewards to honorary prizes only, but decreed him fines and pecuniary confiscations, from those who attacked him with suits and prosecutions. In vain Dionysius, the Syracusan, invited him to his court, though Plato had frequently solicited the attention and patronage of that tyrant. The king of Persia considered him as the most conspicuous personage in Athens. In giving audience to the Greek ambassadors, his first enquiry was after the comic poet, who put all Greece in motion, and directed its force against Persia. He acted the same splendid part on the theatre, which Demosthenes afterwards performed in the public assembly. He made his most distinguished figure during the Peloponnesian war; the mal-administration of government, and the misconduct

misconduct of generals at that time, afforded ample subject for his wit and satire.

His works have been generally esteemed the standard of Attic writing in its elegance and purity; and if any person wishes to know the Athenian language, as it was spoken by Pericles and his cotemporaries, he must seek for it in the scenes of this poet. The antient critics, both Greek and Roman, who had the comic theatre of Athens before them, give him a decided preference to his cotemporaries and successors.

He is celebrated for a poignancy and felicity of colloquial expression, an attic salt and spirit, which the Roman language could never attain. His chief excellence consists in raillery and ridicule. The versatility of his genius led him to describe every rank and condition of life; and none ever touched the ridicule in characters with better success, or knew how to convey it with more keenness and force. But to relish his works, one must have been his cotemporary. The subtile salt and spirit of the Athenian raillery is evaporated through length of time; and what remains has become flat, insipid, and disgusting.

The low buffoonery, and gross indecency which often disgrace his works, arose from the character of his audience, the bulk of which was composed of an unrefined and illiberal mob. The remarkable depravity of taste among the inferior people, appears from their having banished Cratinus and his company, because his comic scenes were deficient in grossness and obscenity.

The antient comedy subsisted till the time of Lysander, who, having made himself master of Athens, changed the form of the government, and committed the administration to thirty of the principal citizens. The satirical liberty of the theatre was restrained by these

these tyrants, to whom it was offensive. The people had no longer any share in the government, nor dared they personally, or by means of the poets, presume to censure the conduct of their masters. It was prohibited to call living characters by their names upon the stage; but the ingenuity of the poets soon contrived means to elude the intention of the law. By drawing well-known characters under feigned names, the malice of the audience was gratified in a more refined manner. This was called the Middle Comedy, of which there are some instances in Aristophanes.

When Alexander the Great had defeated the Thebans, and secured to himself the empire of Greece, he gave a farther check to the licentiousness of the drama. Hence the New Comedy took its rise, which, without personal or political allusions, held the mirror up to nature, and exposed a general, but faithful picture of private life.

In this refined comedy Menander bore away the palm; and though Philemon was preferred to him in his lifetime, succeeding ages made him ample compensation. The elegance and delicacy of this poet may be judged of by the imitations of Terence.

Philosophy.

At this period the Grecian philosophy was divided into two sects, the Italian and the Ionic; both of which were subdivided into several others. Pythagoras was the founder of the first; and Thales, the Milesian, was at the head of the second. Pythagoras was born at Samos, when it was the most opulent and flourishing of all the Grecian isles. He was instructed in the learning known in that age, which consisted chiefly in music, poetry, and the gymnastic exercises. He studied eloquence under Pherecydes of

of Siros, the first Greek author who wrote in prose. The fame of Thales of Miletus, Pittacus of Lesbos, and Bias of Priene, and the other wise men who flourished in the Ionian islands, excited the kindred ambition of Pythagoras, who seems to have been early animated with the desire of acquiring renown, and diffusing instruction. According to the practice of the age, he travelled in quest of wisdom, and resided several years in the antient kingdom of Egypt, which was then resorted to by all the sages of antiquity. By the favour of Amasis the king, who opened his ports to the Greeks, he was instructed in the wisdom, and initiated in the mysteries of the Egyptian priests. In the colleges of these learned men he studied geometry, and probably became acquainted with all they knew concerning the nature of the Divinity, the human soul, and the system of the universe. Neither did he neglect the study of the symbolic writing of the sacerdotal order, which, with their artful policy, had placed them at the head of the state. When he revisited his native country, he found it under the domination of the artful and fortunate tyrant Polycrates. Having opened a school in Samos without success, he travelled to the continent of Greece, where he met with all that admiration and regard which were due to his virtues and superior knowledge.

After visiting Sparta, and studying the laws of Lycurgus, he took up his residence in the capital of Magna Grecia, about the fortieth year of his age. He soon distinguished himself in the public places, and displayed his dexterity in those exercises which were deemed fashionable, as well as manly accomplishments. He was no less admired for his skill in music and medicine, and for his mathematical and physical knowledge.

All the vices attendant on luxury were predomi-

nant in Crotona, and its inhabitants were at the same time extremely superstitious. Pythagoras, who himself seems to have had the same failing, artfully employed superstition as his great engine of reform. He assumed the most striking peculiarity of dress and manners, his reverence for the gods, and scrupulous attention to religious ceremonies, were ostentatiously displayed, and a veil of secret mysticism overshadowed all his words and actions. By these means he attracted the veneration of the public, and his instructions were listened to as the unerring dictates of the Divinity. Some exaggeration is to be suspected in this account. But it appears certain that Pythagoras, by selecting his disciples from persons of influence in the state, by the intimate and secret ties with which they were united, by the noted characteristics which distinguished them from their fellow-citizens, and which procured esteem and reverence, became, in a few years, all-powerful in Crotona. The power of this new order of men soon extended over Italy and Sicily, as well as over the states of antient Greece; and the Samian sage, without ostensible office or power, seems to have governed not only the philosophical, but the political world. The revolution effected at Crotona, in the morals and manners of the inhabitants, if the concurring testimony of antiquity is to be credited, was equally rapid and extraordinary. The women became modest and reserved. The young men preferred philosophical studies to juvenile pleasures. Ambition learned to be humble, and avarice to be generous.

Pythagoras, like the wisest and greatest men of antiquity, preferred an aristocratical government to every other, an opinion founded on experience; since, under that form, Sparta, Rome, and Carthage, rose to their highest prosperity and grandeur. The rules which he laid down for regulating the conduct

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of his disciples, and his system of morality, very much resemble those of the Bramins, as they have been unfolded to us since our intercourse with India.

Magna Græcia had, for forty years, reaped the advantages arising from the institutions of Pythagoras, when a war broke out between the citizens of Crotona and Sybaris. The city of Sybaris, by the fertility of its soil, and its resources in navigation, manufactures, and commerce, had attained to great prosperity and population. But opulence and luxury had corrupted the minds, and debilitated the bodies of the inhabitants, whose proverbial effeminacy has been handed down to modern times. They were totally defeated by the army of Crotona, under the command of Milo, the Olympic conqueror.

But the ruin of Sybaris involved in it the fate of Crotona. Intoxicated with success, the lower ranks, by the instigation of the artful Cylon, whose ferocious manners had excluded him from the order of Pythagoras, contended with animosity for an equal division of the conquest; a refusal produced a conspiracy, which ended in the slaughter or expulsion of the magistrates. Pythagoras did not long survive the misfortunes of his favourite city: he died at Metapontum, in Lucania, at a very advanced period of life. His disciples were dispersed over Italy, Sicily, Greece, and some of them sought refuge in the deserts of Egypt.

Of the Ionic Sect.

The Ionic Sect was founded by Thales the Milesian, who was born in the first year of the thirty-fifth Olympiad, or six hundred and forty years before the birth of Christ. Like the other sages of antiquity, he applied himself first to the study of legislation, and, on particular emergencies, gave seasonable coun-

sels to his countrymen; but afterwards retiring from the tumult of public affairs, he devoted himself to philosophy, and travelled into Egypt, from which he is said to have returned with great intellectual improvement.

He was the first who instructed the Greeks in geometry. Many of the elementary propositions which now appear under the name of Euclid, were invented by Thales, or introduced by him from Egypt. He directed his studies to astronomy with equal success; he traced some of the circles of the sphere; and taught his countrymen that eclipses could be predicted.

He placed the earth in the centre of the solar system, and believed it to be spherical. He knew that the moon shone by the reflection of the sun's rays, and represented the movements of the celestial orbs in a sphere, of which he was the inventor.

He taught that water was the first principle of things; and that, susceptible of an endless variety of forms, it became the matter of bodies the most opposite. He seemed to recognize no other first cause; and the same doctrine had been already taught by some Indian sages. He probably collected many of his doctrines in Egypt; but, from all that can be gathered concerning a person who lived in so remote a period, he appears to have been a man possessed of high intellectual powers, who, from his own fund, added much to the store of human knowledge.

He was succeeded in the Ionic school by Anaximander, one of his disciples. He taught that infinity is the origin and the termination of all things; that innumerable worlds spring from it to be destroyed and re-produced; and that, while every thing changes, infinity itself is eternal and unchangeable. He was the first of the Greeks who traced geographical

phical maps, and brought sun-dials into use; but these had been long known in Asia.

Anaximenes, his fellow-citizen, friend and disciple, appears to have been little more than the interpreter of his opinions.

The philosophical speculations of Thales were pursued by other ingenious men beside his immediate successors, particularly by Xenophanes of Colophon, Leucippus, Parmenides of Elea, and Heraclitus of Ephesus. The system of Leucippus was rendered famous by what some have called the improvements of Democritus of Abdera,* and afterwards adopted by Epicurus, whose false and impious tenets Lucretius has illustrated and adorned with all the graces of poetry.

Anaxagoras of Clazomenè transported the school of Anaximenes to Athens, where he taught thirty years. It was he, as I have already mentioned, who first announced to the Greeks the existence of a Supreme and All-perfect Being, the Creator of the world. The disciples of Thales and Pythagoras had admitted spirit as a principle of nature; but they do not appear to have had a distinct idea of it, or properly to have discriminated it from matter. According to the juster and nobler system of Anaxagoras, the Almighty Creator was altogether separate and distinct from his works; and he considered the soul of the world as a metaphorical expression, to denote the laws which the Deity had impressed upon matter.

He taught, that the sun was larger than Peloponnesus; that the moon was inhabited; that the comets were irregular planets, and that the rainbow was produced by the refraction of the sun's rays. These two last opinions, however, were only the fortunate con-

* Div. Laert. lib. ix.

jectures of a man of genius, and not founded on a series of observation.

Instead of being rewarded by the grateful admiration of his countrymen for his sublime discoveries in theology, he was accused of impiety. Pericles, his scholar and his friend, could not protect him; on the contrary, one great object of the accusation was to render Pericles suspected of holding the same sentiments. To avoid a trial, Anaxagoras withdrew to Lampsacus, where he died.

He was succeeded by Diogenes of Apollonia, and Archelaus of Miletus, the instructor of Socrates, and the last teacher of the Ionic school. This philosophy, thus tending to the improvement of intellect, and the refinement of morals, was unhappily arrested in its progress by the rise of the Sophists.

These pretended sages, but real impostors, had lately risen to distinction, and spread themselves over Greece. Instead of studying to attain the character, and to follow the maxims of calm contemplative wisdom, they were governed by ambition and avarice, entered into the intrigues and business of the world, and made a trade of their pretended knowledge. They wandered from city to city to exhibit their talents, and to vend their eloquence. They were attended by crouds of novices, whom they made philosophers at a fixed price. They pretended to possess universal knowledge, and taught all the arts and all the sciences, though metaphysics and oratory were the chief subjects of their speculations. By adapting the tone of their discourse to the taste of their audience; by throwing a veil over the vices, and gilding the follies of the opulent and the great, they gained admission into the best company, and were enabled to live with elegance and splendor. They suggested the materials and planted the seeds of the libertine

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and sceptical systems of philosophy, which were afterwards introduced into Greece.

While in several of the Grecian commonwealths they were allowed full liberty to display their abilities, and practise their artifices, the son of Sophroniscus made it his chief object at Athens to detect their false reasoning, expose their impious frauds, and unveil the hypocrisy of their character. This illustrious sage, and virtuous man, was born in the fourth year of the seventy-seventh Olympiad, forty years before the Peloponnesian war. His father was a sculptor, and his mother a midwife. He followed, for some time, the profession of a statuary with success; for in the time of Pausanias, a Mercury, and the graces of his workmanship, were to be seen at Athens. But whatever benefit or reputation he might have acquired by cultivating an art which was admired at that period, and encouraged by the magnificent patronage of Pericles, he chearfully sacrificed them to the natural bias of his mind, which led him to cultivate science, and recommend virtue. In his youth, he was the disciple of Archelaus, who delivered the doctrines of Anaxagoras, his master. The natural philosophy of that age, which delivered theories concerning the origin, destruction, and renovation of worlds, and the inexplicable movement of the heavens, stars, and planets, gave little satisfaction to a mind, that preferred to shadowy and uncertain speculations, studies that lie within the compass, and conduce to the benefit of mankind. He was the first who conceived the idea of bringing philosophy down from heaven to earth, to place it in cities, and introduce it into private life. He acknowledged, with Anaxagoras, the Supreme Intelligence, who regulates the operations of nature, and the affairs of the world. From the wisdom and justice of the Deity, he inferred his moral administration of the universe. He

taught the immortality of the soul, and a state of rewards and punishments in another life. He studied to discover the laws of divine providence, and inculcated a compliance with those laws. Wherever he could be of use, there he was to be found, conveying the precepts of his philosophy with all the address of manly insinuation; grave, didactic, or witty, as best suited his audience; he was always eloquent, always persuasive.

The example of this practical philosopher illustrated and recommended his doctrines. He bore arms in many campaigns, was present in many actions, and always distinguished himself by his valour and conduct. We shall find him, towards the close of his life, acquiring the highest honour in the senate, and giving the most illustrious proofs of his ardent zeal for justice, without being intimidated by the greatest dangers.

To confirm the probity of his disciples, it was requisite to expose the fallacy and artifices of the Sophists, who employed their time in corrupting the morals of youth. As the sole aim of these harangues was to dazzle their audience with the glitter of eloquence, and by their ingenuity in speaking on each side of a question, he did not attack them in a direct manner by a continued discourse. He employed the more artful address of irony, a weapon which he knew how to use with much dexterity and delicacy. Whenever he met with the Sophists, assuming the appearance of simplicity, he proposed his doubts with a diffident and modest air, and asked simple questions in a plain manner. These pretended masters of wisdom heard him with a scornful attention, and, instead of giving him a direct answer, entered upon their common places, and delivered a vague harangue without coming to the point. Socrates, after extolling their ingenuity and eloquence, entreated

treated them to adapt themselves to his capacity; and as he was incapable of comprehending or retaining so many fine and exalted notions, begged that they would answer his queries in a few words. When he had once obliged them to move from their entrenchments, and brought them to give a precise answer to his questions, he led them on from one to another, till he involved them in the most absurd consequences; and after having reduced them to a mortifying silence, or still more mortifying contradictions, complained that the *learned men* would not condedescend to instruct him. The youth began to perceive the incapacity of their teachers; their admiration was changed into contempt; and the name of Sophist became odious and ridiculous.

A powerful party, who had been long celebrated for their wit and eloquence, and were in high reputation among the great, would not be attacked without endeavouring to retaliate; especially as they had been wounded in their two most sensible parts, their fame and their interest. It will appear from the subsequent part of this history, that Socrates experienced from these haughty impostors, whom he had unmasked, all that could be feared or apprehended from the most malignant envy, and the most envenomed resentment.

CHAP. XX.

Containing the History of the PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

THE Peloponnesian war was of twenty-seven years duration, and, while it depopulated the country, at the same time exhausted the finances of

Greece. In the course of its continuance, both parties experienced the most cruel calamities, and displayed a courage that might have procured them the greatest advantages over their common enemies.

I have already observed, that the jealousy entertained by Sparta, and other Grecian states, at the recent and rapid progress of Athens to greatness and dominion, was the real, though concealed cause of this war. All the states within the Peloponnesus, except the Argives, joined the Lacedæmonians, who were further aided by the Megarians, Locrians, and Bœotians. The Athenians counted, among their allies, the inhabitants of Chios, Lesbos, and the citizens of Platæa; and received the support of their tributary countries, Ionia, the Hellespont, and the territory of Thrace.

Hostilities were first committed by the Thebans, who attacked Platæa, an independent city of Bœotia, in alliance with Athens. They were admitted into the city by the treachery of the Aristocratical faction; but the Platæans, perceiving the small number of the enemy, attacked them with fury during the night, above a hundred fell, two hundred were taken prisoners, and afterwards put to the sword. The Athenians, on receiving news of this attack, sent succours and provisions to Platæa.

The sword being now drawn, both parties prepared openly for war: all Greece was in motion, and ambassadors were sent to distant countries to solicit the assistance of Greeks and barbarians. The majority espoused the side of the Lacedæmonians, esteeming them the deliverers of Greece; because the Athenians, forgetting their former moderation and gentleness in command, had alienated the greater part of their allies by the severity of their government, and incurred the hatred of other states, who

who were apprehensive of becoming their dependents.

After the attack on Platæa, the Lacedæmonians marched two-thirds of their forces to the isthmus of Corinth. Archidamus, one of the Spartan kings, dispatched an ambassador to the Athenians, to require of them to relinquish their pretensions; but the Athenians commanded the messenger to retire, without deigning to give him an answer. Upon this, the Lacedæmonians marched towards Attica with an army of sixty thousand men, while that of the Athenians amounted only to eighteen thousand; but to make compensation for the difference, they had a fleet of three hundred gallies.

The counsel of Pericles to the Athenians, was to waste the enemies strength by protracting the war; as they had not sufficient forces to oppose the enemy, their wisest plan was to retire with their effects into the city, and shut themselves up in it without hazarding a battle. Accordingly the inhabitants of the country sought an asylum in Athens.

Meanwhile the Lacedæmonians entering Attica, besieged Œnoe; but being compelled, after a few ineffectual assaults, to abandon that attempt, they advanced still nearer to the city, and encamped within half a league of the walls. It required all the art and address of Pericles to prevent the Athenians, exasperated at the sight of the ravages committed on their country, from sallying forth to attack the enemy; but, by means of his absolute power over the passions of the multitude, he kept both the senate and people from assembling to deliberate, notwithstanding the reproaches, insults, and menaces of his enemies. He dispatched, in the mean time, a fleet of a hundred sail, to lay waste the coasts of Peloponnesus, which being joined by that of the allies,

made a descent on Laconia, and ravaged the territories of Sparta.

Intelligence of these ravages committed in Laconia, and the difficulty of subsisting in a desolated country, induced the Lacedæmonians, and their allies, to withdraw from Attica.

After the Lacedæmonians had retired, the Athenians appropriated a thousand talents, and a hundred ships, for the more immediate defence of their country; and prohibited any person, under pain of death, to propose a different application of these resources. They afterwards sent a squadron to expel the rebellious inhabitants of Ægina from their possessions. To these islanders they imputed the principal cause of the war. Their territory was divided by lot among the inhabitants of Athens. Pericles then led out the army against the hostile province of Megara, and ravaged their territory.

Towards the close of the campaign, the Athenians concluded an alliance with Sitalces, king of the Odripians in Thrace; and in consequence of this treaty, his son was admitted a citizen of Athens. They also entered into an accommodation with Perdiccas, king of Macedonia, and restored to him the city of Thermæ.

At the approach of winter, the Athenians celebrated funeral rites to the memory of those brave men who had fallen since the beginning of the war. For this purpose, a large tent was erected to contain the bones of the slain, which were covered with flowers and perfumes. To the place of public sepulture in the Ceramicus, the most splendid suburb of Athens, they were conveyed in cypress coffins, on the day appointed for the funeral obsequies. Attended by persons of every age and rank, the remains of these citizens were committed to the tomb, and Pericles was appointed to pronounce their eulogium.

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This celebrated oration, or one made by the historian, is to be found in Thucydides; but whether real or fictitious, it is, in every respect, suited to the character of the orator, and admirably calculated for all the ends he had in view.

In the beginning of the second campaign, the Lacedæmonians and their allies again invaded Attica, which was afflicted by a more dreadful disaster. The plague, which was said to have originated in Ethiopia, and had spread its ravages over Egypt, and a great part of Persia, at last communicated its contagion to Athens. This fatal malady, which baffled the power of medicine, turned Athens into a spectacle of horror; the bravest soldiers and best citizens perished in the most excruciating pains, and every part of the city exhibited a dreadful image of agony and death.

The confederates did not neglect to avail themselves of this opportunity for committing devastations in Attica. They now penetrated beyond the city, and spread devastation over every part of the Athenian territory, not sparing even the plains of Marathon, where Athens had nobly bled for the cause of Greece.

Pericles, still adhering to his established maxim, not to expose the safety of the state to the hazard of an engagement, would not permit his troops to sally out of the city; but having fitted out a fleet of a hundred vessels, he sailed through the Saronic gulph, and ravaged the coasts of Elis, Argos, and Laconia. Having arrived on the Argolic coast, the Athenians laid siege to the sacred city of Epidaurus; but the plague again breaking out in the fleet, they abandoned the enterprize, as the calamity was attributed to the anger of Æsculapius, who was its patron, and supposed protector. They were equally unsuccessful against Trœzenè, Hermione, and other cities

cities of Peloponnesus. Overwhelmed by these accumulated calamities, murmurs against Pericles, and a general despondency, took place. Ambassadors were sent to Sparta to supplicate for peace on any terms; but even an audience was denied them. The popular rage recurred of course with double force upon Pericles, whom they considered as the author of all their calamities, who at last assembled the people, and endeavoured to vindicate his measures. But his eloquence and address were exerted in vain; the feeling of present evils rendered them insensible to every other consideration. They deprived him of the command of the army, and imposed on him a considerable fine.

The public disgrace of this great man was embittered by afflictions of a domestic nature. Xantippus, his eldest son, a youth of a profuse and extravagant turn, unable to bear the strict œconomy of his father, was among the first to murmur at his conduct, and to exclaim against him in all public places. This ungracious youth was cut off by the pestilence, while at the same time many of the firmest and most useful friends of Pericles, with the remains of his numerous and flourishing family, perished by the same fatal disorder; but the strength of his mind was not shaken by these disasters, till the death of Paralus, the last of his children. That desolating stroke suspended his fortitude. When he was to put the crown of flowers upon the head of his deceased son, the hero yielded to the parent; he could not support the cruel spectacle, nor conceal the transports of his grief, which forced its way in sobs, inarticulate cries, and a flow of reluctant tears.

The Athenians, whose character was marked by fickleness and inconstancy, and who were led by the passions of the moment, soon repented of the injury they had done to Pericles. Their observation convinced

vinced them, that they had no other person capable of directing their affairs; they therefore implored his forgiveness, and entreated him to resume the administration, and to command the army.

Meanwhile Potidæa, which had been besieged almost three years, could no longer endure the miseries of famine, and surrendered on conditions. The inhabitants were permitted to depart from the city with their wives, children, and some of their effects; Potidæa was re-peopled by an Athenian colony.

Soon after this event, Pericles died of the pestilence; according to Plutarch, of a languishing consumption. The history of his life delineates his character. Brave, magnanimous, eloquent, political, he was qualified to take the lead either in the council or the field; he rose to distinction and authority by his admirable and unparalleled eloquence; and, by the power of that talent, governed the fickle and capricious Athenians with absolute power for the space of forty years. He employed this vast and extensive authority with such mildness and moderation, that his administration was never charged with tyranny. His talents for war were eminent and conspicuous; yet he cautiously avoided all military expeditions, till he was almost certain of success; and when engaged in hostilities, depended more on stratagem than the impetuosity of courage. He managed the revenues with irreproachable disinterestedness, so far as regarded his private fortune: as an individual, he lived with the most exemplary œconomy; while he gloried in the magnificence of Athens, whose opulence was the fruit of his wise administration, and which owed its magnificence to his taste, and to his encouragement of the arts. In his last illness, his death-bed was surrounded by some of the principal citizens, who celebrated his illustrious exploits and numerous victories; for while he was general

neral of the Athenian army, he had erected nine trophies, in memory of as many battles he had gained. After hearing their encomiums, "You extol," said the dying statesman and philosopher, "a series of actions, in which fortune had a principal share, and which are common to me with many generals; but you forget the most glorious circumstance of my life, *that no citizen ever wore mourning on my account.*"

The confederated army invaded Attica for the third time. All the inhabitants of Lesbos, except those of Methymne, determined to renounce their alliance with the Athenians. Sensible of the great loss they would suffer by the defection of that island, the Athenians sent out a fleet of forty gallies to attack that of the Mitylenians, who, being repulsed, proposed terms of accommodation. A suspension of hostilities having taken place, the Mitilenians sent ambassadors to Athens and to Lacedæmon at the same time. The Lacedæmonians informed the deputies that they should be fully heard at the approaching Olympic games, where the other allies would be present to assist at the conference. From the speech of the ambassadors, as transmitted to us by Thucydides, we find that they assigned the ambition, tyranny, and oppression of the Athenians, not their present calamities, as the reason that induced the Lesbians to break that treaty, and relinquish that alliance. The allies, as was to be expected, were satisfied with their declaration, and admitted them into their confederacy.

It was also resolved in this assembly to prosecute the war against Athens more vigorously than ever. Receiving intelligence of the vast preparations making against them, the Athenians equipped a fleet of a hundred sail, and appearing suddenly off the promontory of the Corinthian isthmus, made a descent upon Peloponnesus, while another fleet protected the coast of Attica. Never had they raised such a formidable armament

armament with so much celerity; it struck such terror into the Lacedæmonians, that they immediately hurried back to the defence of Laconia. The Athenians, in the mean time, sent a detachment of a thousand soldiers to the siege of Mitylene, and the town was invested by sea and land. Pressed by famine, and receiving no assistance from Sparta, the citizens were obliged to surrender at discretion. The authors of the revolt, amounting to more than a thousand, were conveyed to Athens and put to death. Orders were at the same time issued to massacre the rest of the inhabitants by way of example; but this sanguinary decree was almost instantly revoked by the returning good sense and humanity of the people. The town was then dismantled, and the whole island, Mitylene excepted, was divided by lot among the citizens of Athens.

The city of Platæa had been invested by the confederates in the preceding year. This siege was rendered remarkable, not only for the obstinate resistance of the besieged, but for its being the first recorded in the Grecian history that was conducted with any kind of regularity. Both parties employed ramparts and mounds of earth; the one to attack, the other to defend. It is not a little astonishing, that so inconsiderable a town as Platæa, which contained only four hundred citizens, and eighty Athenians, should have made a long and vigorous resistance against a powerful army. The enemy changed the siege into a blockade, and surrounded the town with two ditches. The besieged at last, having lost all hopes of relief, attempted to make their escape, which the half of them effected by a daring stratagem suggested by despair. The remainder, affrighted at the dangers attending the effort, continued in the town, but finding themselves unequal to its defence, were obliged to surrender at discretion. Eight Spar-

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tans were sent to decide their doom. In vain did the wretched Platæans alledge in their own defence, that they had been compelled, through necessity, to espouse the side of the Athenians, in order to obtain their protection against the Thebans, their antient oppressors. They were all butchered in cold blood; their wives were sold, and their city consumed to ashes. Such were the calamitous effects of the violent and furious hatred, which now reciprocally possessed the minds of the Athenians and Spartans, that each party, after the hour of victory, carried their revenge to the most sanguinary and savage extremes. This was the mournful and disastrous fate of the Platæans, who, during the Persian war, had obtained an honourable name in arms, and performed the most important services to their country.

In the four hundred and twenty-sixth year before the Christian era, the plague broke out afresh at Athens, and swept multitudes to destruction. According to the regular opening of every campaign, the confederates invaded Attica, and the Athenians made a descent on Peloponnesus. The siege and capture of Pylus, a small town of Messenia, by Demosthenes, the Athenian commander, forms the most memorable event of this campaign. The Lacedæmonians, being anxious to recover possession, it became the scene of very extraordinary military operations. A detachment of four hundred Spartans seized the little island of Sphacteria, opposite to the city. The Athenians surrounded the island, and cut off all supplies of provisions. The siege, however, went on slowly; but Cleon and Demosthenes being joined in command, they landed in Sphacteria, and drove the enemy to the extremity of the island; but the Lacedæmonians, having possessed themselves of a fortification, defended it with the most desperate valour. At last, the commander of the Messenians, having

having discovered a difficult pass which led to the fort, marched that way, and appearing unexpectedly on the rear of the Lacedæmonians, called to them to lay down their arms. Exhausted with the fatigues of the day, the Lacedæmonians complied with the summons, by laying their shields upon the ground; and, after a short conference, surrendered at discretion. After the happy termination of this siege, which continued sixty-two days, the Athenians erected a trophy. The Lacedæmonian prisoners were carried to Athens, and thrown into prison till peace should be established; with threats, at the same time, to put them all to the sword, if the Lacedæmonians made any more incursions into Attica.

The four campaigns which followed the reduction of the small island Sphacteria, were distinguished by few important events. The Athenians, under the command of Nicias, took the little island of Cythera, situated near Cape Malea, on the Lacedæmonian coast, from which they infested the whole country.

Brasidas, on the other side, marched towards Thrace. The Lacedæmonians were induced, by several motives, to undertake this expedition. They believed, that they would thus compel the Athenians, who had invaded Laconia, to divide their forces. The Thracians had invited them to their country, and offered to pay the army. They rejoiced also at any occasion of ridding themselves of the Helots, whom they expected to rise in rebellion after the taking of Pylus. They had already dispatched two thousand of these devoted wretches in a most shocking manner. They issued a proclamation, purporting, that such of the Helots as had rendered important services to the state in the last campaigns, should enter their names in the public registers, in order to their being emancipated; accordingly two thousand gave in their names. They were led in procession through the temples,

temples, with garlands of flowers on their heads, as if in reality they had been going to receive their liberty. When this ceremony was over, they suddenly disappeared, and were heard of no more. A striking instance of the jealous policy and atrocious cruelty of the Spartans, who, on the shadow of suspicion, were led to commit the most enormous crimes, and did not hesitate to make the sanctity of religion, and the majesty of the gods, subservient to their perfidious designs.

Actuated by similar views, they sent seven hundred Helots to accompany Brasidas in his Thracian expedition. He took Acanthus, Stagyra, and several other cities, and laid siege to Amphipolis, a place of much importance to the Athenians, as supplying them with timber. Accordingly, Thucydides the historian was sent to its relief; but the town was taken before his arrival. His countrymen, however, afflicted with the loss, banished him at the instigation of the bold and profligate demagogue Cleon. The Athenians, having about the same time advanced into Bœotia, under the command of Hippocrates, were defeated near Delium, by the Thebans.

Hitherto, the losses and advantages had been pretty equally balanced; and the rival Republics grew weary of a war, which involved them in a prodigious expence, without procuring them any real benefit; a truce for a year was therefore concluded between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians. The news of this accommodation highly offended Brasidas, as it stopped him in the career of his conquests, and disconcerted all his projects. Cleon, on the other hand, who had acquired an ascendancy at Athens by his vehemence, presumption, and plebeian eloquence, incited his countrymen to renew the war. Thus a coward on one side, and a hero on the other, opposed the tranquillity of Greece; the former, because the war

veiled

veiled his vices and misdemeanours; and the latter, because it added new lustre to his reputation; but their death, which happened at the same time, prepared the way for a new accommodation.

The Athenians had appointed Cleon to command the army, which was sent to oppose Brasidas. Cleon, elated by his last fortunate undertaking, attempted to retake Amphipolis; but Brasidas, informed of his intentions, took possession of the town. To increase the presumption and temerity of Cleon, the Spartan general, who was well acquainted with his character, affected to be intimidated by his approach. Deceived by this appearance, Cleon neglected every precaution, and the discipline of his army was relaxed. Brasidas, having made the necessary preparations, sallied forth suddenly, and attacked the left wing of the Athenians, which, being the strength of their army, made a vigorous resistance; but six hundred of them being slain, the whole army turned their backs and fled. Struck with terror and trepidation, Cleon betook himself to flight, but was killed by a Spartan soldier before he could make his escape from the field of battle. Brasidas was wounded in the engagement; and when it was over, was carried into the city, where he survived his victory but a few moments. He was a general, no less distinguished by conduct than courage, and deserves to rank among the Lacedæmonian heroes. It was the mother of Brasidas, who, hearing her son applauded as being superior to all other generals, replied, "My son was brave; but Sparta, I doubt not, has many braver citizens."

The two persons who had been the chief obstacles to peace, having fallen in the late engagement, both parties seemed more inclined to an accommodation, and a suspension of hostilities took place. Accordingly, after mutual conferences, a truce was agreed on for the space of fifty years, between the two commonwealths

commonwealths and their respective allies. This pacification was greatly forwarded by Plistonæa, one of the Spartan kings, and Nicias the Athenian general, who was no less distinguished by his probity and patriotism in the assembly, than by his courage and skill in the field. The treaty was concluded ten years after the declaration of the war. The Bœotians and Corinthians were extremely offended and disgusted at the peace, and employed their utmost efforts to excite new animosities; but Nicias persuaded the Athenians and Lacedæmonians to conclude an alliance, offensive and defensive, which would render them more formidable to their allies, and more assured with regard to each other. In consequence of this new arrangement, the Athenians restored the prisoners they had taken in the island of Sphacteria.

Notwithstanding this treaty of peace, the war was very distant from a conclusion. Before the expiration of the first year, animosities sprung up afresh between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians, and both parties prepared for hostilities. Alcibiades, who now began to appear in the public assemblies, was principally active in breaking the peace of Nicias, and renewing the Peloponnesian war.

This extraordinary youth was brought up in the house of his uncle Pericles. His education seems to have been neglected; for the instruction of his youth was committed to Zopyrus the Thracian, one of Pericles's slaves, and ill qualified for such an arduous and sublime employment. Nevertheless, his noble birth, his great opulence, and the authority of his guardian, conspired to give him high ideas of his own importance, and to inspire his mind with premature plans of ambition, which proved in the end pernicious to himself, as well as fatal to his country. His uncommon talents, and promising reputation,

reputation, drew the attention of Socrates; who discerning in him a singular mixture of good and evil qualities, bestowed incredible pains on his instruction, and studied to remedy the defects of nature by the lessons of philosophy. But it was the eloquence of Socrates as a public teacher, and the graces of his conversation, more than his moral lectures and his virtuous life, that induced Alcibiades to become his disciple.

At his first appearance in the Athenian assembly, he displayed a bold and eccentric genius, capable of the greatest and most hazardous designs. He possessed a singular versatility of character; he could with ease accommodate himself to all companies, and conform to every situation. He made the transition from virtue to vice, and from vice to virtue, with equal facility and ardour; and the people applied to him the observation of Homer concerning Egypt, "That it produces excellent medicines, and pernicious drugs in equal abundance." Although he was addicted to pleasure, and even debauchery, at Sparta he lived according to the laws of Lycurgus, and exceeded the Spartans in temperance and sobriety. In Ionia he assumed the softness and effeminacy of the natives; and in the Persian dominions he rivalled the superb Satraps in oriental luxury and magnificence. Ambition, however, had the ascendancy in his mind; and even in frivolous disputes, he always contended with eagerness, and aspired to victory. He possessed, indeed, most of the qualifications which were requisite to form a leader in the Athenian assembly. His illustrious, though remote, and perhaps fabulous descent from Ajax, the manly gracefulness of his person, which captivated the love and admiration of all who beheld him, and even of the philosophic Socrates; his expertness in the affairs of the commonwealth; his immense wealth,

which

which he spent in magnificent profusion, and lavished in public entertainments on the people, dazzled all eyes, and commanding the respect, invited the confidence of his fellow citizens. When, to all these endowments and advantages, are added his popular eloquence, and his superior knowledge in the military art, it is easy to trace his subsequent progress to pre-eminence and power in Athens. His faults were construed into the negligencies of a great character; his affectation of superiority, which would have been accounted criminal in any other citizen, was referred to ignorance of the world; and his wild excesses were construed into the effervescence of a luxuriant and youthful mind.

With such talents and such a temper, it will be readily conjectured that Alcibiades was not born for the repose of his country. He had employed every effort to traverse the treaty of peace which had been lately concluded between Athens and Sparta; but failing in his attempt, he endeavoured to prevent it from taking effect. He studied secretly to detach the Argives from the Spartan interest, and to irritate his countrymen against the Lacedæmonians, because they had surrendered the fort Panactum in a ruinous condition, and not fortified according to the terms of the treaty. He endeavoured also to render Nicias suspected by the people of too strong an attachment to the interests of Sparta. At the treaty of peace, the Lacedæmonian ambassadors had addressed themselves only to Nicias, in whom they reposed confidence, and totally neglected Alcibiades, though his ancestors had enjoyed the rights of hospitality in their republic. This was a rival, therefore, whom he wished to remove; and opportunities soon presented themselves for accomplishing all his designs.

The

The citizens of Corinth contributed to renew the war, which had originated from their quarrel with their colony Corcyra. The article in the league between Athens and Sparta, granting a power to each to make such alterations in the treaty as situations and circumstances might demand, the Corinthians considered, or affected to consider, as portending something fatal to the rights and liberties of Greece, and endeavoured to inspire the citizens of Argos with similar sentiments. The Argives, having remained neuter during the former part of the war, could now appear in full vigour, and with an unexhausted treasury to maintain their rights, which, it was alledged, had been shamefully abandoned and betrayed by the Spartans: and they seemed willing to regain their antient superiority in the Peloponnesus. The inhabitants of Mantinæa and the Elians joined the Argive alliance, and it soon received a new addition of strength from the Macedonian allies.

This confederacy was soon rendered more formidable, by the junction of a power no less respectable than the Athenian republic. This unexpected event which, while it shocks modern ideas, illustrates antient manners, arose from the machinations of Alcibiades. Ambassadors from Sparta arrived, who declared to the senate that they were invested with full powers to put an end to all divisions and animosities. Next day they were to receive audience from the popular assembly, and to deliver their proposals. Alcibiades, apprehensive of their success, endeavoured to engage them in a conference. Having invited them to an entertainment, during which he expressed an uncommon regard for their republic, and the warmest wishes for the success of their embassy, he afterwards told them, that one circumstance affected him with much concern, their declaration before the senate that they were invested with

full powers. He intreated them to beware of repeating this declaration in the assembly, as the people, extravagant in their pretensions, and rapacious in their demands, would not fail to avail themselves of this circumstance, and insist on conditions injurious both to the interest and the honour of Sparta. He concluded with assuring them, that if they concealed their full powers, he would support them with all his influence; procure the restoration of Pylus; and prevent the accomplishment of the Argive alliance. The Spartans confided in the man whom they had formerly offended; looked upon Alcibiades as an extraordinary statesman and politician; and soon found that they had not erred in their conjecture.

Next day the people being assembled, the ambassadors were introduced. Alcibiades enquired of them the subject of their embassy, and the extent of their powers. According to the pre-concerted plan, they answered, "That they came to propose an ac- "commodation, but were not invested with full powers." "No later than yesterday," said the artful politician, affecting a transport of indignation, "they declared their full powers to the senate, and to-day they deny them before the assembly of the people. But such is the hypocrisy and duplicity of their republic. It is thus they have restored Amphipolis and the Macedonian cities! And it is thus, Athenians, that they have given you possession of Panactum, dismantled and demolished! Nay, after concluding a league with Athens, and ratifying it by a solemn oath, they have basely and audaciously infringed it, by entering into an alliance with Thebes, your determined and devoted enemy. Men of Athens! can you still submit to such injuries and indignities? Or is it consistent, either with your justice or your honour, that these traitors, who call themselves

selves ambassadors, should remain longer within your walls?"

No language can express the astonishment and confusion of the ambassadors, who gazing wildly on one another, could scarcely give credit to their eyes or their ears. Nicias, unacquainted with the base stratagem of Alcibiades, wondered at their folly, and partook of their disgrace. Retiring abruptly from the assembly, they departed with indignation to Sparta, and their departure announced the renewal of hostilities. The Athenians soon afterwards joined the Argive alliance; appointed Alcibiades their general; and sent troops to Pylus, in order to ravage Laconia.

At this period, Nicias and Alcibiades enjoyed all authority in Athens. The former had wearied the patience of the people, by his firm perseverance in opposing their unjust inclinations; the latter had provoked their resentment, by his insolent behaviour and his profligate life. Alcibiades was supported by the young men, who were eager for war; Nicias by the aged citizens, who knew the value of peace. Both were in danger of being banished by the ostracism, through the intrigues of Hyperbolus, a bold but abandoned man, who possessed some influence in the republic, and who was sometimes employed by the people to humble those in exalted stations; but Nicias and Alcibiades, wisely uniting their interests, procured the banishment of Hyperbolus. The ostracism, which was looked upon as an honourable exile, and which had never before been inflicted but on persons of superior merit and renown, was henceforth abolished as having lost its dignity, by being exercised upon a subject so contemptible.

The eccentric but vigorous character of Alcibiades, had gained an unaccountable ascendancy over the minds of the people, though they were well ac-

quainted with the defects and vices of his character, which he hardly endeavoured to conceal. The dissolute luxury in which he lived, made every virtuous Athenian blush. He expressed too an aversion to the customs of his country, and a disregard to religion and the gods. The intelligent and serious citizens dreaded, lest by his address, his boldness, his eloquence, and his extravagant profusion to the people, he should rise, with all these vices, to uncontrouled and absolute power.

Timon, the misanthrope, formed a proper judgment of his character. Instead of shunning him as he did the rest of mankind, "Persist, my son," says he, "in pushing thy fortune; for thy advancement will be the ruin of Athens." The subsequent events of the war form a commentary on Timon's prediction.

The expedition of the Athenians into Sicily, to which they were chiefly excited by Alcibiades, forms the most remarkable and important event which took place in the course of the Peloponnesian contest. "Pursue the war temperately, but with firmness and perseverance," said Pericles to his countrymen at the commencement of hostilities; "throw your chief strength into the naval line; meditate no increase to your dominions already too extended; never leave your cities or arsenals open, or exposed to sudden attacks; and, in the course of time, you will gain the victory over your enemies." But, on the decease of that great statesman, says Thucydides,* "the Athenians acted in every respect contrary."

No sooner had Pericles paid the debt to nature, than the wild and ambitious project of subduing Sicily recurred to the people, and their eyes continually turned to that fertile and opulent island. I have al-

* Lib. II. sect. 65.

ready

ready mentioned its flourishing situation under the mild and beneficent reign of Gelon. Hieron, king Syracuse, is represented as avaricious and cruel in the early period of his reign; but, by conversing with the Grecian sages, and making philosophy the school of life, he learned to correct the errors of his mind, and to reform the vices of his reign. His sentiments and character underwent a total change, and he filled that throne with lustre which he had formerly disgraced.

His illustrious reign was followed by the oppressive tyranny of Thrasybulus, which produced his expulsion from the throne, and banishment from Sicily. After his expulsion, the Syracusans, that they might never again experience the odious rod of tyranny, established a republican government. The Agrigentines too, having dethroned their king Thrasideus, and banished his family, instituted a democracy, a mode of government which, notwithstanding its turbulent and tumultuous nature, appears to have been the most natural and congenial to all the Grecian tribes. They were imitated in this revolution by the inferior states. The republic of Syracuse, treading in the ambitious steps of Athens, had brought most of the Dorian settlements to be their tributaries or dependants; and, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, that aspiring state, though agitated by internal commotions, had carried their successful arms against the Ionic settlements of Leontium, Catana, and Naxos.

In the sixth year of the Peloponnesian war, and soon after the death of Pericles, the Leontines, originally from Chalcis, an Athenian colony, solicited assistance against the Syracusans, by whom they had been invaded. At the head of the embassy was Gorgias, the most celebrated orator of the age. His pathetic eloquence, the harmony of his periods, and the elegance of his diction, adorned with figures,

which he is said to have introduced into the language, so much transported Attic ears and Attic imaginations, that the assembly immediately concluded an alliance with the Leontines, and sent a fleet to Rhegium to the assistance of their Ionic descendants. At the distance of two years a similar request was made, and the Athenians sent a more numerous fleet, not simply with a view of relieving the cities oppressed by the Syracusans, but with the design of producing a revolution in Sicily, and of bringing that island under the dominion of Athens.

Alarmed by the repeated visits of the Athenians, the sagacious and provident Hermocrates prevailed on his countrymen to convene a general assembly of the Sicilian states at the town of Gela. Deputies were sent from all the Doric and Ionic cities. Hermocrates was deputy from Syracuse, and appears to have acted with true patriotism and sound wisdom. His eloquence, enforced by reason, at last prevailed in the assembly; and all parties agreed to terminate their domestic quarrels, and resist, with united force, the projected tyranny of Athens.*

The wisdom and patriotism of a popular assembly, might approve and adopt such a salutary plan of union; but in republican states, projects of peace and concord are transient in their operation, while the principles of dissension and hostility are permanent and perpetual. A few years after this amicable convention, Leontium was taken and destroyed; the miserable inhabitants driven into exile; and the confederated city Egesta besieged by the combined armies of Syracuse and Selinus. The oppressed and afflicted states again sent ambassadors to the Athenians, pleading the rights of consanguinity, the habits of alliance, and the ties of interest. They represented, that if they should now be abandoned by the

* Thucyd. p. 290.

parent

parent state, they must experience the fate of Leontium; and the Syracusans, after making themselves masters of Sicily, would add their forces to the Peloponnesians, from whom they were descended. To these arguments the ambassadors added an artful amplification of the riches of their republic, and an offer to defray the whole expences of the war. The Athenians, who only waited for an opportunity of commencing hostilities, sent deputies to Egesta to enquire into the situation of their affairs, and the funds in their treasury. Carrying on the deception, the citizens of Egesta made an ostentatious display of gold and silver, which they had borrowed from the neighbouring states; contributed the sum of sixty talents of silver, to maintain an Athenian fleet of sixty sail for a month; and promised to repeat monthly the same ample subsidy, from funds which they affirmed to be deposited in the public treasury and in the temples.

Although every consideration of wisdom, expediency, and interest, dissuaded the Athenians from undertaking a hazardous expedition against so distant and so powerful a republic, yet the popular assembly, tempted and seduced by their evil genius Alcibiades, would have ventured to atchieve impossibilities, and saw no obstacles where he pointed the way.

This irregular character carried the same extravagance of speculation and action into public life, which he had displayed in private. The ordinary maxims of prudence, and the established forms of policy, were little adapted to a mind that aimed at the vast and unbounded. His wild and ambitious views did not stop short at the conquest of Sicily, but looked forward to the possession of the cultivated shores of Italy and Africa, and to the establishment of super-eminent dominion both by land and sea.*

* Isocrat. de pace Andocid. Orat. 3d.

Possessed of the most insinuating talents, he communicated the contagion of ambition to the Athenian people, who, blinded by these romantic and fallacious prospects, precipitately granted the demand of the Egestæans, and appointed Alcibiades, Nicias, and Lamachus to command the fleet; with full powers, not only to relieve Egesta, and restore the Leontines to their city, but to regulate the affairs of Sicily in such a manner as was best adapted to the interest of Athens.*

Nicias, distinguished by his prudence, no less than by his probity, remonstrated against the Sicilian expedition with unusual warmth and vigour, and described, in strong colours, the calamities that might thence result to the republic. He represented to the people his surprise, that an affair of such importance should have been determined, almost the very moment it was taken into deliberation; that in pursuit of an airy and impracticable scheme they had gone abroad in search of enemies, when they were surrounded with them at home; and that though they were but just beginning to recover from the calamities of the late war and the pestilence, they were wantonly exposing themselves to unnecessary and greater dangers.

Nicias, in his discourse, pointed his censure in strong terms against the luxury and extravagance of Alcibiades; vices which that licentious youth carried to an incredible pitch. He lavished prodigious sums of money on his furniture, equipage, and retinue; his table vied in profusion and delicacy with that of a Persian satrap; and he contended at the Olympic games with seven different sets of chariot horses. Extraordinary resources were necessary for supporting such enormous extravagance; and Nicias insinu-

* Thucyd. lib. vi. p. 415.

ated,

ated, that Alcibiades was no less solicitous for conquering Sicily to repair his own ruined finances, than to extend the dominions of his country.

To a speech, that was chiefly directed against himself, Alcibiades replied with eloquence and spirit; he acknowledged, "that he wished to lead the Athenians against Sicily, and that he thought himself not unworthy of that command. The splendor in which I live," continued the orator, "and which has been imputed to me as a crime, reflects lustre on my country. The wealth I have expended among the Athenian people, and the magnificence I have displayed at the Olympic games, convey to foreigners an idea of the glory of Athens, and shew, that the state is not ruined, nor its finances exhausted, as our enemies pretend. But dismissing this subject, let the world form a judgment of me, not from the illiberal passions, jealousy and envy, but from my actions. Was it an inconsiderable service I rendered to the republic, in conciliating in one day to its alliance the people of Elis, of Mantinea, and of Argos, and in raising armies against Sparta, in the center of Peloponnesus? Employ, therefore, in order to aggrandize your empire, the youth and ignorance of Alcibiades, as well as the wisdom and experience of Nicias, and do not abandon, from chimerical apprehensions, the illustrious enterprize to which you have already given your solemn sanction, and which, if skilfully conducted, will ultimately terminate both to your advantage and renown. The Sicilian cities, fatigued and provoked with the arbitrary government of their princes, and the tyrannical authority of Syracuse, watch the first opportunity to open their gates to the deliverer, who shall offer to emancipate them from the yoke under which they have groaned so long. The expences of the expedition will be furnished by the Egestæans and their

allies; nor will it be difficult to subdue a multitude of independent states, unconnected with one another, and unacquainted with military discipline."*

The applauses of the people followed the speech of their leader; and their favourite Nicias, no longer venturing to oppose the violence of the popular torrent, made a last effort to break or divide its strength; but his attempts to magnify the difficulties of the expedition, and to state the obstacles in their way to conquest, served only to heighten the ambition of the assembly; and instead of extinguishing their ardour, inflamed it the more. It was immediately decreed, that the generals should be invested with full powers to raise sums of money, to levy such a body of troops, and equip such a number of gallies, as should be judged necessary or adequate to the enterprize. The internal forces of the republic being insufficient for the expedition, agents were sent to demand contributions and auxiliary troops from its allies and tributary states.

When the preparations were completed, and the fleet was ready to sail, evil omens and presages filled the minds of the people with apprehension and terror. The festival of Adonis, which was celebrated annually, returned at the time of the embarkation. During this gloomy ceremony, the whole city was in mourning; statues were carried through the streets in funeral procession; and the temples resounded with the cries and groans of the women who lamented the mystical death of the favourite of Venus. From a natural association of melancholy ideas, the minds of the superstitious foreboded, that the splendid armament before them would pass away like a pageant, and wither like the flowers in the *Gardens of Adonis*, which were carried about in the hallowed procession.

* Thucydid. p. 422—426.

To

To increase the general affliction, the statues of Mercury, which had been erected in the streets as the boundaries of different edifices, were all thrown down, maimed, and defaced on the night preceding the intended navigation. The licentious character of Alcibiades exposed him to suspicion as an accomplice in this act of sacrilege; but the boundless affection entertained for him by the soldiers and sailors, who declared they would leave the service if violence was offered to his person, emboldened Alcibiades to demand a trial before his departure, that he might have an opportunity of justifying his conduct. But his enemies postponed their resentment; and the people, impatient for the expedition, obliged him to set sail.

On the day appointed for the departure of the fleet, the Athenians crouded the Piræus by daybreak, to behold and admire the most magnificent armament that had ever been fitted out by any city in the antient world. It consisted of a hundred gallies, carrying six thousand two hundred and eighty soldiers, the greater part of whom was heavy armed. Thirty vessels, and a hundred barks, attended the fleet, loaded with provisions, and all things necessary for the length of the voyage. Besides the marine forces, there was a land army, and a few cavalry, to the raising of which private persons had contributed as well as the public. The grandeur and beauty of the spectacle delighted the eyes of all beholders. The gallies were decorated with every ornament of naval pomp; the troops, composed of the flower of the Athenian youth, strove to excel one another in the gaiety of their dress, and the splendor of their arms; the mgnificence of the whole had the appearance of a triumphal shew, rather than a warlike expedition. But amidst this pomp and pageantry which distinguished the Athe-

nian adventurers, the joy of their friends and kinsmen was overcast with sorrow, when, with parting tears, they considered the length of the voyage, the dangers of the ocean, and the uncertainty of their success in distant regions, from which they might never return.

When the troops had embarked, the trumpet sounded, and solemn prayers were offered up to the gods for the success of the expedition; the accustomed libations were poured out from vessels of gold and silver. The people who lined the shore, shouting at the same time, lifted up their hands to heaven, to implore a prosperous voyage for their fellow-citizens. And now, the hymn being sung, and the ceremonies ended, the gallies set sail, and arrived without any accident at Corcyra, where the army of the allies was assembling with the remainder of the fleet.*

The armament assembled at Corcyra consisted of a hundred and thirty-four ships of war, besides transports. Five thousand heavy armed troops were attended with Rhodian slingers, and archers from Crete. At a moderate computation, the whole land and marine strength, including slaves and attendants, amounted to twenty thousand men.

The fleet having been prohibited from entering the harbours of Tarentum and Locres, directed its course to Rhegium. There they received information, from vessels which they had sent from Corcyra, that the citizens of Egesta possessed only thirty talents in their treasury. Nicias, who had foreseen and foretold that the Egistæans were unable to fulfil their promises, enforced his former arguments against the expedition, and gave it as his opinion, "That the Athenian fleet ought to terminate the dispute between Egesta and Selinus, by persuasion or arms; and after having dis-

* Thucyd. lib. vi. p. 432, de Plut. in Nicia.

played

played to the inhabitants of Sicily their power to protect their allies, should return immediately to Athens." Alcibiades maintained, "That it would be inglorious for so noble an armament to return without having performed some signal exploit; that by the prospect of immediate support, the inferior cities might be detached from their reluctant confederacy with Selinus and Syracuse; and that, after being strengthened by new alliances, the Athenians should attack Selinus and Syracuse with vigour, unless the former concluded a peace with Egesta, and the latter restored the Leontines to their city."

Lamachus offered a third opinion: "That they ought to sail directly for Syracuse, before the citizens had leisure to recover from their surprise, or prepare for their defence. That they had thus the fairest chance of ending the war at one blow; and that the present time was the most proper, while the courage and the hopes of the Athenians were high, and the Syracusans were unprepared and unarmed." The timidity of Nicias, and the ambitious vanity of Alcibiades, rejected this wise and spirited advice.

The opinion of the latter prevailed. Accordingly the fleet sailed from Rhegium to Sicily, and Alcibiades took Catana by surprise. With another detachment he sailed to Naxos, and persuaded the inhabitants to accept the alliance of Athens. Messenè, the key of Sicily, was on the point of surrendering to his intrigues, when he heard, that he was recalled by the Athenians to stand trial before the people for his life. When he received this intelligence, such was his baseness and profligacy, that he betrayed his friends in Messenè to the party favourable to Syracuse, who immediately put them to death.*

After the departure of the fleet from Athens, the

* Thucyd. p. 462.

enemies

enemies of Alcibiades, intent on gratifying their private resentment, without any regard to the welfare of their country, renewed against him, in his absence, the accusation of having defaced the statues of Mercury, and of having profaned the mysteries of Proserpine and Ceres. Many persons, accused of being accomplices in these crimes, were thrown into prison without being heard, and condemned to death without evidence. The ship of Salamis was dispatched to bring Alcibiades to Athens, to be tried by the judgment of the people. He went on board the galley, but on arriving at Thurium, he disappeared. From Thurium he made his escape to Argos, and hearing that the Athenians had condemned him to death, and confiscated his estate, he threw himself on the protection of Sparta, which received him with open arms. By his versatile character, intriguing disposition, and active genius, he soon gained an ascendancy in the commonwealth of Lycurgus; and yielding to the dictates of a base resentment, seized the first opportunity to employ his influence in advising and promoting those fatal measures which accelerated the ruin of his country.

This perfidious Athenian shewed the Spartans, that the Sicilians could only be conquered by want of experience and unanimity; that they abounded in brave and hardy citizens, but wanted the assistance of veteran officers to instruct them in military discipline, and train them on to battle. He also informed them, that their own forces in Greece had been idly and unprofitably employed; that their frequent invasions of Attica had been uniformly unsuccessful, from their strange and unaccountable neglect of omitting to secure and fortify some strong hold in a province, whence they might, at leisure, harass the country, intercept parties, and keep the capital itself in constant alarm.

The

The Spartans availed themselves of these important instructions. On their next incursion into Attica, they strengthened and garrisoned the fortress of Decelia, only twelve miles distant from Athens; and they immediately dispatched Gylippus, with a small force, to inspirit and discipline the Syracusan armies.

From the departure of Alcibiades, Nicias, by his opulence and eloquence, possessed the whole authority in the fleet; for Lamachus, notwithstanding his valour, his spirit of enterprize, and his experience in the field, was held in contempt by the soldiers on account of his poverty. Such were not always the sentiments of Athens. Finding himself invested with the sole command, he carried on his operations in that timid, irresolute, and dilatory manner which marked his character; and, instead of attempting to make a bold impression on Selinus and Syracuse, wasted the ardour of his army in laborious insignificant marches along the coasts, and in destroying the inconsiderable town of Hyccara, inhabited by barbarians. Every thing languished under his command; the bravery of the army was disgraced by their unsuccessful attempts against Hybla, and Himera; their spirit declined by their obscure and inactive summer quarters at Naxos and Catana; while fresh courage was inspired into the Syracusans by the tardy measures and timid counsels of Nicias.

While the Athenians murmured against these dilatory and ignominious proceedings, Nicias at last determined to gratify their ardour, and to attack Syracuse by sea and land. As the siege of this city is one of the most remarkable in the Grecian History, it will be requisite to give a detail of it at some length.

Syracuse, of which the magnificent ruins still form an object of admiration, was founded by Archias the Corinthian,

Corinthian, on the eastern coast of Sicily, seven hundred and nine years before the Christian era. The city, which was one of the strongest and most beautiful possessed by the Greeks, was situated on a promontory, surrounded on three sides by the sea, and defended by lofty and abrupt mountains towards the west. It consisted of three principal divisions, the Island, Achradina, and Tyché. The Island, which composes the whole of modern Syracuse, formed the least extensive division of the ancient. It communicated with the main land by a bridge. Here the Syracusans afterwards built the citadel, and the palace of their kings. This division of the city was of great importance, because it gave the possessors the command of the two harbours by which it was surrounded. For this reason the Romans, when they became masters of Syracuse, prohibited the Syracusans from inhabiting the Island.

Achradina, the most spacious, beautiful, and best fortified quarter of the city, stretched along the sea to a vast extent, from the northern shore of the promontory, to the southern island Ortygia.

Tyché, so called from the temple of fortune which adorned that part of the town, stretched along Achradina on the land side, and was crowded with industrious inhabitants.

Syracuse was fortified by walls eighteen miles in circumference; possessed two harbours separated by the island; and was peopled by above two hundred thousand inhabitants.*

The first rumours of the Athenian expedition had been regarded by the Syracusans as vague and ill-grounded reports. The fleet had arrived at Rhegium, before they could be induced by the provident Hermocrates to prepare for a danger which was no longer

* Strabo, p. 266. Thucyd. lib. vi.

at

at a distance. But when they beheld the powerful armament covering the sea of Sicily, and ready to invade their unprepared state, they were seized with terror and trepidation, and sunk from their former presumption into despair. It required all the magnanimity and vigour of Hermocrates to restore their courage. By his spirited advice, they sent deputations to every part of the island, soliciting the assistance of their allies; they garrisoned all their castles; reviewed their troops; examined the arms in their magazines; and made serious preparations for the defence of their island.

At the close of the summer, information was brought to Nicias, that the Syracusans, having resumed courage, intended to march against him, and to attack him in his camp. Already their cavalry harassed the Athenians, beat up their advanced posts, intercepted their convoys, and, elated by success, added sarcasm and reproach at the pusillanimous inactivity of the invaders.

These reproaches, and the murmurs of his own troops, rouzed the timid and inactive temper of Nicias; but openly to attack Syracuse, was a bold and hazardous attempt. The distance between Catana and that capital by sea, was but thirty miles; but much peril would attend a descent, as the shore was well fortified, and the enemy numerous and prepared for defence. Nor was it safer to march by land, as the Athenians were deficient in cavalry, and that of the Syracusans was numerous, which watched their motions, and with whose activity and force they were ill-qualified to contend. To extricate himself from these perplexities, Nicias had recourse to stratagem. A citizen of Catana appeared in Syracuse, as a deserter from his native city; he informed the magistrates, that a conspiracy against the Athenians was formed in Catana; and that, with the aid of the Syracusans,

Syracusans, it would be easy to defeat an unprepared enemy. No proposal could be more acceptable to the Syracusans in the present ferment of their minds. The plan of the enterprize was concerted, and the day appointed for carrying it into execution.

In consequence of this engagement, the Syracusans marched towards Catana, and encamped near Leontium. On receiving this intelligence, the Athenians set sail for Syracuse in the evening, and arrived by day-break in the Great Harbour. They immediately disembarked their troops, and fortified a camp in a favourable situation near the temple of Olympian Jove. When the cavalry of Syracuse proceeded to the walls of Catana, they discovered, by the departure of the enemy, the stratagem by which they had been over-reached. They returned with the utmost expedition to protect Syracuse; they were joined by the forces of Gela, Selinus, and Camarina; and it was determined, without delay, to give battle to the Athenians.*

In a few days Nicias marched out of his entrenchments, and both parties prepared for the engagement. Nicias having gone round the ranks, and exhorted his soldiers to remember their antient valour, and the atchievements of their ancestors, led them on against the enemy, who did not decline the engagement.

The battle was long disputed with firmness and vigour on both sides. Victory hitherto continued doubtful; when a sudden thunder storm arising, decided the engagement in favour of the Athenians; they considering it merely as the effect of the season, while the inexperienced Syracusans, looking upon it as an omen of the divine displeasure, betook themselves to flight.

After this indecisive battle, Nicias, abandoning all

* Thucyd. p. 445—57.

hopes

hopes of taking the town, retired with his fleet to winter at Naxos and Catana.

The recent success of the Athenians over the Syracusan forces, emboldened them to send messengers among their allies in Sicily, and the Italian coast in the neighbourhood. They sent ambassadors also to Tuscany and to Carthage, the rival of Syracuse, soliciting assistance; large supplies of men and money were demanded from Athens; and every probable measure was pursued for opening the next campaign with vigour and success.

The Syracusans were no less zealous and active in preparing for the defence of their city. Hermocrates, to whose wisdom and experience they had recourse in every moment of difficulty or danger, advised them to lessen the number of their generals, which amounted to fifteen. Accordingly they invested himself, Heraclides, and Sicanus, with unlimited authority both in civil and military affairs.

The expected succours now arrived from Athens. Nicias, in possession of four hundred talents, and at the head of a numerous army, strengthened by the addition of six hundred and fifty cavalry, now prepared, in the eighteenth year of the war, to lay siege to Syracuse. The Athenian fleet sailed from Catana, and having disembarked the troops at the port of Trogilè, retired to Thapsus, a small peninsula of Syracuse. The land forces marched with the utmost expedition to take possession of Epipolæ, before the enemy had received information of their arrival. On the first news of their approach, seven hundred soldiers, under the command of Diomilus, advanced in confusion to meet them; but were soon defeated, and three hundred of them, with their leader, left dead in the field. The Athenians, after erecting a trophy, built a fortress to secure their baggage and effects, on the summit of Epipolæ, the highest of the mountains which overlook and command

mand the city. A blockade was the method adopted by Nicias for gaining possession of Syracuse. He surrounded the city on the land side with a strong circumvallation, in order to cut off all communication with the country; while he expected that, by his numerous fleet, he should be able to block up the harbours, and prevent the Syracusans from receiving any succours or provisions by sea.

The strength of the whole army was employed in building a wall, to shut up the city northward from Tyché to Trogilè; and the work was carried on with such rapidity, as struck the besieged with surprize and consternation. They attempted to prevent the completion of the wall; but their sallies were always unsuccessful, and even their cavalry was routed. After these recent defeats, the wise counsel of Hermocrates deterred them from farther hostilities, and persuaded them to raise new bulwarks against the walls of the Athenians.* Accordingly the projected wall was begun, and carried on with vigour; and as the works on each side drew nearer, frequent skirmishes took place between the contending parties, in one of which the gallant Lamachus fell a victim to his unguarded valour, but the Athenian troops were still victorious.

The Athenian army was animated by these successes, but the Syracusans began to lose hopes of defending their city; and this despondency was increased by the continual supplies which arrived to the besiegers, while Syracuse was abandoned or forgotten by her perfidious or ungrateful allies. The populace, as was usual in the Grecian democracies, clamoured against the incapacity of their leaders, to whom they ascribed all the misfortunes of the war. New generals were appointed in the room of Hermocrates and his associates; and this injudicious

* Thucyd. lib. vi. p. 482.

change

change brought Syracuse to the brink of ruin, so that at last it prepared to surrender.*

In this critical moment, and while the assembly were deliberating concerning the mode of capitulation, a Corinthian vessel, commanded by Gongylus, entered the harbour. On his landing all ranks of men flocked eagerly around him. He announced the speedy arrival of Gylippus, with a considerable fleet, to relieve Syracuse. While astonished and delighted with this information, the citizens could scarcely give credit to what they heard, a courier arrived by land from Gylippus himself, giving them intelligence of his arrival, and ordering them to meet him with all their troops. He had landed with four gallies on the western coast of the island, to avoid the Athenian fleet, and advanced towards Syracuse on the side of Epipolæ, where the line of circumvallation was still unfinished. Surprised and disconcerted by his arrival, the Athenians drew up under the walls with precipitation and disorder. Gylippus, laying down his arms, sent a herald to inform the Athenians, that he allowed them five days to leave Sicily. While Nicias disdained to answer this insolent proposal, some of his soldiers, bursting into laughter, asked the herald, "Whether the presence of a Lacedæmonian privateer, and a petty wand, made any alteration in the state of the city?" Both sides now prepared for hostilities. The first engagement was unfavourable to the Sicilians, from the inadvertence of Gylippus in posting them between their own walls and those of the enemy. To remedy this error, he arranged his army in the subsequent engagements on more spacious ground; drove the Athenians in disorder from the field; and pursued them to their camp with considerable loss, and still greater disgrace.

The effects of this victory were sudden and im-

* Thucyd. p. 487.

portant.

portant. While the Athenians were victorious or superior in the field, they were furnished with provisions in abundance from the neighbouring tribes; but after their defeat, they found the gates of every city shut against them. The foraging parties were attacked or cut off; and at length they were reduced to depend for subsistence on precarious supplies from the Italian coasts. The slaves whom they had armed, deserted in great numbers. The mercenary troops preferred the more secure and beneficial service of Syracuse; and even the Athenian citizens, worn out and disgusted with the length and hardships of the war, abandoned the care of the gallies to the young and inexperienced. In this critical situation of affairs, Nicias sent messengers to Athens, and faithfully unfolded, in a letter to the assembly, the distresses and disorders which prevailed in the army and the fleet; at the same time beseeching the assembly either to recal him without delay, or to give him the most speedy and effectual succour.

The Athenians were strongly affected with the representation of their affairs made in his letter, and prepared to send him relief. They appointed two generals, Eurymedon and Demosthenes, to succeed Lamachus and Alcibiades. The former embarked immediately with ten gallies and a hundred and twenty talents; while the latter was employed in raising troops and contributions to set sail early in the spring.

Meanwhile the Lacedæmonians, following the counsel of Alcibiades, entered Attica early in the spring, under the command of King Agis; and after having ravaged the country, fortified Decelia, a town on the Attic frontier, at an equal distance of fifteen miles from Thebes and Athens. This garrison kept Athens in a state of constant anxiety and alarm; as, instead of being harassed by the annual incursions of the Spartans, they were now infested with perpetual hostilities.

hostilities. The country around Athens was entirely laid waste; the communication interrupted with the island of Eubœa; and vessels which brought provisions from that island, were obliged to make a circuitous voyage, and double the Cape of Junium. Athens was now become a kind of frontier town; a guard was mounted at the gates by day, and by night the citizens were on the walls, or under arms. Harassed by unremitting toils, and threatened with all the miseries of famine, twenty thousand slaves, chiefly artisans, deserted to the enemy.

But even in this depth of internal distress, the Athenian magnanimity appeared: unawed by danger, unsubdued by misfortune, the exertions of Athens strike us with wonder and astonishment, and appear as boundless as her ambition. Thirty gallies were employed against Amphipolis; twenty were stationed at Naupactus to prevent the Peloponnesian fleet from effecting the relief of Syracuse; a numerous squadron raised contributions, and levied soldiers among the Asiatic colonies; while another laid waste the coast of Peloponnesus; and preparations were making to raise an army and a fleet to assist in besieging the capital of Sicily.

Hermocrates, who had now resumed his authority, and Gylippus, the Spartan commander, acquainted with the present distress of the besiegers, and their future hopes of assistance from Athens, resolved to seize this opportunity of attacking them by sea and land. They persuaded the Syracusans to fit out a strong naval armament, and to endeavour to wrest from the enemy the empire of the seas. Hermocrates observed, "That the Athenians had become a naval power from necessity, and had acquired the dominion of the sea in repelling the Persian invasion. The Syracusans had now the same motive for exerting their marine strength; and as they were possessed of equal

equal bravery and greater power, might expect to become still more formidable and successful."*

This advice was followed, and a fleet of eighty gallies was equipped. A naval engagement soon took place, in which eleven of the Syracusan gallies were sunk, and three were taken; but this defeat was compensated by their success at land, Gylippus having attacked the fortifications at Plemmyrium, which commanded the mouth of the Great Harbour, took three forts, containing naval stores for the equipment of forty gallies, a large quantity of arms, provisions for the troops, and sums of money to a considerable amount. Not disheartened by their defeat in the first engagement at sea, the Syracusans prepared for another. They corrected their former errors; built gallies of a more favourable construction; and, by their invention and activity, made such proficiency in the naval art, that at length they gained a victory at the entrance of the Great Harbour. The Athenians lost seven gallies; and Nicias, with difficulty, saved the remains of his fleet, by retiring behind his transports, from the masts of which enormous masses of lead, named Dolphins, had been suspended, capable of sinking every vessel that approached.

This unexpected disaster threw Nicias and his army into the utmost consternation: but while he was revolving these gloomy ideas, and past as well as present calamities were crowding on his mind, the Athenian fleet, commanded by Demosthenes and Eurymedon, appeared on the coast of Sicily. From the elegance and the gaiety of its decorations, it seemed to exhibit a spectacle of triumph; the admirals having resolved to make their approach with an air of pomp and triumph, in order to strike terror

* Thucyd. lib. vii. p. 497.

into

into the enemy. The fleet, besides transports, consisted of seventy-three gallies, containing five thousand pikemen, and above three thousand slingers and archers.

The Syracusans were alarmed and dejected beyond measure, by the appearance of this formidable armament. Notwithstanding all their former exertions and sufferings, the war was again to begin; and they saw no prospect of a termination, or even suspension to their calamities.

Demosthenes, who now assumed the chief authority in the fleet, instructed by the dilatory conduct of Nicias, proposed "to take advantage of the alarm which the sudden arrival of such a powerful reinforcement had spread among the enemy, and, by assaulting the walls of Syracuse, at once put an end to the war; or, if that was found to be impossible, to raise the siege, and no longer to exhaust, in indecisive engagements, the treasure and the strength of Athens, which might be better employed against the invaders of their own country."

This spirited, but rash counsel, was highly approved by Eurymedon and the rest of the commanders; Nicias, though extremely reluctant, was forced at last to acquiesce.

After some fruitless attempts against the fortifications on the banks of the Anapus, Demosthenes determined to attack the fortresses in Epipolè, believing, that should he possess himself of that post, the wall would be quite undefended. As he could not proceed undiscovered during the day, he marched thither in a moonshine night, with the flower of his army, accompanied by Eurymedon and Menander, Nicias remaining behind to guard the camp. Their first efforts were successful. They stormed the first entrenchment, and put to the sword those by whom it was defended. Encouraged by fortune, Demos-

thenes marched forward. During this interval, Gylippus led his whole forces out of their entrenchments. At the approach of Demosthenes, the Syracusans were defeated and retired; but as the Athenians advanced in disorder, to bear down whatever might oppose their arms, their tumultuary attack was checked by a body of Thebans, who repulsed them with loud shouts, made a dreadful havoc among their troops, and spread universal consternation through the rest of the army. Their ignorance of their situation, and the dubious aspect of a night, not sufficiently bright to distinguish objects, nor sufficiently dark to render them imperceptible, added to the perplexity and panic of the Athenians. Their watch word being betrayed to their enemies, they could not distinguish their allies from their foes, and frequently imbrued their hands in the blood of their friends. The confusion encreased, and the route became general. Some in their flight fell from the tops of the rocks, and were dashed in pieces; others wandered into the country, and were next morning discovered and slain by the Syracusan cavalry. Upwards of two thousand men fell in this fatal engagement on the side of the besiegers.

This severe and unexpected repulse subdued the spirit of the Athenians, whose numbers were continually diminishing by the diseases incident to the autumnal season, and the unwholesome vapours arising from the morass near which the army was encamped. Demosthenes urged this calamity, which was daily encreasing, as an additional reason for raising the siege, while they could with safety cross the Ionian sea before the commencement of approaching winter. But Nicias, whose ruling principle seems to have been that of delay, dissuaded them from the attempt, affirming, that an abrupt departure would betray their weakness, and that, at all events, they should wait for

for orders from Athens. The other generals, believing that the unusual firmness and obstinacy of Nicias proceeded from some secret discovery, or concealed ground of confidence, assented to his opinion, and adopted his measures, which ultimately involved themselves, the army, the navy, and the city of Athens, in irretrievable destruction.*

Meanwhile Gylippus, having made the tour of of Sicily after his late victory, returned to Syracuse with a powerful reinforcement; and the troops so long expected from Peloponnesus, arrived in the harbour of Syracuse. Such an augmentation to the army and the navy of the Syracusans, with the increasing danger of the malignant distemper, threw the Athenians into the deepest dejection; and even Nicias agreed to abandon the shores of Sicily. Private orders were given for this purpose, and the hour of midnight chosen for the time of their departure, in order to avoid the immediate pursuit of the enemy. When every preparation was made, and they were just going to set sail, the moon was suddenly eclipsed. Nicias and his army were astonished and terrified at the phenomenon. The soothsayers, who were consulted, interpreted it as an inauspicious omen; and advised them to defer the voyage till the mysterious number of three times nine days was completed, and a full revolution of the moon had taken place. But before that time expired, the voyage was impracticable, as the design was discovered to the Syracusans, who resolved to attack the fugitives by sea and land. During three days they carried on their military and naval operations without intermission. On the first day they attacked the entrenchments of the Athenians, and gained the advantage in the contest. On the second, they sailed with seventy-six gallies against

* Thucyd. p. 524. Plut. in Nicia.

eighty-six of the Athenians. Eurymedon having separated his squadron from the rest of the fleet, in order to surround the enemy, was pursued by them to the bottom of the gulf and defeated. He fell in the engagement, and the gallies under his command were driven on shore. On the third day, Gylippus having meditated an attack on the Athenian soldiers as they were escaping from their gallies that had run aground, was repulsed with considerable loss; but eighteen of these gallies were taken, and their crews put to the sword.

With a view to intercept the retreat, and totally to destroy the fleet of the Athenians, Hermocrates prevailed on the Syracusans to place a line of vessels, fixed with anchors and chains, across the mouth of the Great Harbour, which was five hundred paces wide. When the Athenians found themselves shut up in the harbour, a council of war was held to deliberate on the state of their affairs. They were in want of provisions, and none could be procured, unless they were masters of the sea. This determined them to risk a naval engagement. Nicias, whose fortitude rose in adversity, now exerted his utmost efforts to retrieve the falling fortunes of his country. He immediately refitted a hundred and ten gallies, and filled them with the flower of his infantry; having drawn up the remainder of his forces in order of battle on the shore. As the Athenians had suffered much on former occasions from the firm and weighty prows of the Sicilian vessels, Nicias had provided grappling irons to lay hold on the hostile vessel, that they might come immediately to a close engagement. When the firm decks of opposing vessels were thus crowded with armed men, an engagement at sea resembled a battle at land.

The generals on both sides employed all their eloquence and ardour to animate the courage, and heighten

heighten the exertion of their soldiers; and no commanders could ever have been prompted by stronger inducements; for the impending battle was not only to determine their own fate, but to decide the fate of their country, and the destiny of succeeding ages.

When the Syracusans were acquainted with the intentions of the enemy to engage, they prepared to defend the chain of gallies at the entrance of the harbour. A narrow opening was left, on either side of which a considerable squadron was stationed.* Sicanus and Agatharcus were appointed to command the wings; and Pythen, a native of Corinth, to command the centre of the fleet. Gylippus having given every necessary order, returned to take the command of the land forces. The Athenian fleet consisted of a hundred and ten gallies; the Syracusan of ninety; but the latter was amply provided with every necessary article for attack or defence; even the new invention of the Athenians was not overlooked; to prevent the impression of the grappling irons, the prows of the Syracusan vessels were covered with raw hides.

The engagement was desperate and sanguinary on both sides. When the Athenians arrived at the mouth of the harbour, they repelled with ease the gallies that were stationed to defend it. But when they attempted to break the chain of vessels that guarded the entrance, the Syracusan fleet approached, and rushed into the harbour, which was more favourable to the form of their vessels, and their mode of fighting, than the open sea. The confusion, tumult, and havoc occasioned by the engagement of two hundred gallies in so narrow a space, strike the imagination with horror, and surpass the powers of description. From the motion of the ships by the agitation of the

* Thucyd. p. 451.

sea, the darts and arrows of the Athenians were spent without effect; but the frequent and furious discharges of stones from the Syracusan vessels were dreadfully destructive. The efforts of distant hostility being over, the nearest vessels came into close contact, and grappled each other. The heavy armed troops boarded the enemy's ships, and fought hand to hand; the decks were covered with blood; and nothing was to be seen around but fragments of ruined vessels, and dead bodies floating on the wave. The crash of the ships that rushed against each other, and the mingled shouts of the victors and the vanquished, occasioned such uproar and disorder, that the orders of the commanders could no more be heard. The object of the Athenians was to break the chain of vessels that shut the harbour, to secure their return to their own country. This the enemy endeavoured to prevent, to render their victory more decisive and complete. The two armies, which were drawn up on the neighbouring shore, saw clearly every circumstance of the engagement, and contemplated the interesting scene with solicitude and terror. Attentive to every movement of the fleet, and shuddering at every change, they discovered their hopes or their fears by shouts of exultation, or groans of despondency. Sometimes stretching out their hands towards their countrymen, as if to animate and direct their efforts; at other times raising them towards heaven, to implore the assistance and protection of the gods. At last, after an obstinate contest and a vigorous resistance, the Athenian fleet was dispersed and driven on shore. The Syracusan land army, when they beheld this event, conveyed to the whole city, by a sudden and universal shout, the news of the victory. The Athenians were protected in their landing by a small but heroic band, commanded by Nicias.

Nicias. The Syracusans, now the acknowledged masters of the sea, sailed to Syracuse, and erected a trophy. In this engagement the victors lost forty vessels, and the vanquished fifty.

Defeated by a new power, on an element in which they had not only reigned, but triumphed for half a century, the spirit of the Athenians was broke, and their courage annihilated. On this occasion they neglected the sacred duty of burying the dead; and did not so much as request that the bodies of their deceased countrymen might be delivered to them, in order to pay the last duties to their remains. Though their fleet was still more numerous than that of the enemy, they refused to meet the Syracusans a second time, and to engage with an inferior force. The dauntless Athenian spirit no longer appeared; their only wish was to escape at any rate.

The evening after the engagement, the Syracusans celebrated the festival of Hercules, their favourite hero, and celestial protector. Nothing could be more favourable to the silent and unobserved departure of the Athenians, than the gaiety, jollity, and giddiness in which the capital of Sicily indulged itself during the greatest part of the night. Piety, as well as duty, seemed to second the double call, which a festival and a victory gave to pleasure and enjoyment. Hermocrates alone, who suspected the designs of the enemy, saw the necessity of intercepting or preventing their flight, since they might again become formidable, and renew the war. For this purpose he selected a band of horsemen, who, pretending friendship to the Athenians, were ordered to inform Nicias, "that it would be dangerous to depart till morning, as the Syracusans lay in ambush for him, and had occupied all the passes." This false intelligence suspended the march of the dilatory Ni-

cias; and he remained two days longer to make every necessary preparation for the departure of the army.

This delay gave full time to the Syracusans to seize the most difficult passes, to fortify the places where the rivers were fordable, to break down the bridges, and spread detachments of horse up and down the plain to harass the Athenians on their march. On the third day after the battle, the Athenian army, consisting of forty thousand men, set out from their camp with a view of retiring to Catana. The lofty expectations which they had formed were now vanished; they had abandoned their fleet to the enemy; they had been conquered on their own element; had disgraced the achievements, and fallen from the fame of their ancestors. To this public dishonour was added the keenest pungency of private distress. A melancholy spectacle presented itself wherever they turned their eyes; vast numbers of the sick, the wounded, and the dying, following them with feeble steps, clinging to their garments, and imploring them with tears, and in the accents of unutterable woe, not to abandon them to the fury of wild beasts, or the more merciless rage of the enemy. but self-preservation prevailed over every other care; the miserable victims were left to perish, sending up towards heaven their plaintive and unavailing groans, invoking gods and men to hear their lamentations, and avenge their wrongs.

The sufferings of Nicias, and his magnanimity in supporting them, form a striking part of the spectacle. Worn out with a tedious sickness: deprived of common necessaries; and pierced not only with his own grief, but that of others, which preyed upon his heart; this great man, whose courage rose in adversity, thought of nothing but how to console the sorrows and revive the hopes of the army. He moved with alacrity among the ranks, proclaiming aloud, "That

"That there was yet room for hope; that other armies had escaped from greater evils; and that therefore they ought not to yield to misfortune. That if they had incurred the displeasure of some deity, by their invasion of Sicily, his vengeance must be satiated by the greatness and the length of their sufferings; that their numbers and their bravery rendered them still so formidable, that no city in Sicily was able to oppose them; and that, by a firm and prudent retreat, which was now become their only resource, they would not only save themselves but their country; since the strength of a state consisted in brave and good men, not in evacuated fleets or undefended walls."*

The army marched in two divisions, both drawn up in the form of a phalanx, as the most secure and commodious arrangement. The first was commanded by Nicias; the second by Demosthenes; the baggage and the slaves were placed in the centre. In this arrangement they passed the river Anapus, the ford of which was disputed by a detachment of Syracusans. Being much harassed by the cavalry and archers after they had passed the river, they proceeded only five miles on their march. Next day they were exposed to the same dangers, and compelled to dispute every inch of their way. The enemy did not chuse to venture an engagement against an army that despair might render invincible; whenever the Athenians offered battle, the Syracusans retired; but when the former proceeded in their march, the latter advanced, and charged them in the rear.

The situation of the Athenian army grew more and more deplorable. On three successive days they attempted to pass the mountain Acræum, and were thrice repulsed by the enemy with considerable loss.

* Thucyd. p. 550.

The numbers of the wounded had been greatly increased by these unavailing attempts; the neighbouring territory could no longer furnish them with provisions; Nicias and Demosthenes now found it necessary to alter their route, and to make a circuit by the sea shore. To conceal their design from the enemy, fires were lighted in every part of the camp. The troops then marched out under covert of the night, but with confusion and disorder. The horrors of a gloomy sky, an unknown country, and the apprehension of the enemy, who were at no great distance, spread terror and consternation among the Athenians; and Demosthenes, with the greater part of the troops under his command, lost their way, and made a fatal separation from the rest of the army.

Next morning, Gylippus having received intelligence of this event, marched with the utmost celerity to intercept the smaller division, and overtook them at noon near the ford of the river Erinios. Having surrounded them with his cavalry, he drove them into a narrow defile, where they defended themselves with the most desperate bravery. Towards the approach of evening, oppressed with fatigue, and faint with their wounds, they were exhausted rather than defeated. Gylippus offered indemnity and protection to all who would desert their leaders; an offer which was accepted by the Asiatic Greeks, and the troops from other tributary states. At last Demosthenes, and the remainder of his host, consented to lay down their arms, on condition that they should not suffer death or imprisonment.* These, still amounting to six thousand, were sent prisoners to Syracuse.

Gylippus then pursued the division of the army

* Thucyd. 553.

conducted

conducted by Nicias, which had marched twenty miles, and was advancing towards the margin of the river Assinaros. He overtook them before they could reach the banks of the river; and sent a herald to Nicias, sommoning him to imitate the example of Demosthenes, and to surrender without farther effusion of blood. Nicias, not giving credit to the intelligence of an enemy, was permitted to send a messenger for information. When the intelligence was confirmed by the return of the courier, Nicias proposed terms in the name of the Athenians, engaging to repay them all the expences of the war, and to deliver hostages for the repayment, on condition that they would permit him, with his army, to depart from Sicily.

The Syracusans, as was to be expected, would not listen to his proposals; and Gylippus made an attack on the army of Nicias, which was sustained during the whole day with incredible bravery, the Athenians still hoping they should be able to make good their retreat in the obscurity of the night. But their intentions and movements were discovered by the wary Gylippus, and only three hundred men broke through the enemy and escaped. The rest returned with despondency to the post they had left. Next morning, prompted by despair, they resumed their arms, and ran towards the river amidst the attacks of the Syracusan bowmen and cavalry. The feverish sensation of thirst excited them to rush with frenzy into the rapid stream; while their pursuers, who lined the rocky banks, attacked them with darts, arrows, and javelins. The Assinaros presented a new scene of danger; multitudes were borne down the stream by the rapidity and force of the current; while others joined in a body to stem its force, were butchered without mercy as they were drinking the turbid element. Nicias, unable to bear this spectacle of horror, surren-

dered at discretion, and implored pity and protection for the miserable remains of his army. Before the orders of the generals could be known, many of the soldiers had, according to the custom of the age, seized their prisoners, so that Athenian captives were dispersed through all the cities of Sicily. The Athenians, displeased with Nicias for surrendering at discretion, omitted his name in a public monument, on which were recorded the names of those commanders who had fallen in the battles of their country.

The conquering army suspended the arms taken from the vanquished, on the largest trees which adorned the banks of the river, as a trophy of their victory; then crowning themselves with garlands of flowers, and decking their horses with the richest caparisons, they returned to Syracuse in triumph, after having brought to a happy termination a war, which threatened not only their liberties, but their political existence.

On the following day an assembly was held to deliberate on the fate of the prisoners. Diocles, a leader of great authority among the people, proposed, "That all the Athenians and the Sicilians who had joined their army, should be imprisoned, and fed with bread and water; that the slaves and allies should be publicly sold; and that the two generals should be scourged, and afterwards put to death."

The injustice and severity of the last excited compassion, or rather horror in every humane bosom. Hermocrates attempted to remonstrate, but notwithstanding his acknowledged and respected character for patriotism, as well as for justice and integrity, his voice was interrupted by the clamours of the multitude. At that instant a venerable old man, who had lost two sons in the war, the sole heirs to his name and estate, ordered his servants to carry him to the tribunal of harangues. When he appeared, a profound

found silence took place: "You behold in me," said the hoary-headed Nicolaus, "an unfortunate father, who has felt more than any other Syracusan the calamities of this war, by the death of two sons, who were the sole supports, and formed all the consolation of my old age! I cannot, indeed, cease to admire their courage and their felicity in losing, in defence of their country, a life, of which they must one day have been deprived by the course of nature; but then I cannot but strongly feel the cruel and incurable wound which their untimely death has made in the heart of a bereaved and forlorn father; nor forbear to detest the Athenians, as the authors of this unhappy war, and the murderers of my children. But, however sensible to private affliction and to domestic sorrow, I feel no less strongly for the honour of my country, and the character of my fellow-citizens, especially when I see them exposed to perpetual infamy, by the inhuman counsel which is now given you. The Athenians, indeed, merit every punishment that can be legally inflicted on them, for having so unjustly declared war against us. But have not the gods, to whom vengeance belongs, punished them in an exemplary manner, and revenged our cause? When their generals laid down their arms, did they not surrender on condition of having their lives spared? And if we put them to death, how can we avoid the reproach and ignominy of having broken solemn engagements, violated the law of nations, and disgraced our valour by savage and sanguinary cruelty? What! will you suffer your glory to be sullied in the face of the whole world; and have it said, that a nation, who first dedicated a temple in their city to clemency, found none in yours? To enjoy prosperity with moderation, to exercise humanity towards a vanquished foe, and to imitate the gods in pity and in clemency, will reflect more lustre

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on the commonwealth than victories and triumphs. Have you forgotten that this Nicias, whose fate you are going to pronounce, was the person who pleaded your cause in the Athenian assembly, and employed all the influence of his authority, and the whole power of his eloquence, to dissuade his country from engaging in this war? and will you pronounce sentence of death on this virtuous and unfortunate man, as a return for the zeal he expressed for your interest? With regard to myself, death would be less grievous to me than such flagrant injustice and shocking cruelty, committed by my countrymen and fellow-citizens."

The assembly was struck with admiration, as well as softened to compassion, by this magnanimous and pathetic speech; when the venerable and unfortunate father, instead of imprecating vengeance on the authors of the calamities that had befallen his house, preferred the honour of his country to his private resentment, and interceded for their pardon. But the party hostile to the Athenians, having represented in strong colours, the numberless miseries brought on their country by the Athenians; and the calamities in which they had involved Syracuse, where multitudes bewailed the death of their children and relations, whose manes could only be appeased by the blood of their murderers; the people resumed their sanguinary sentiments, followed the advice of Diocles, and condemned the two generals to death.

Besides the resentment of the Syracusans, the fears of the Corinthians, and above all, the suspicious jealousies of those traitors who had maintained a secret correspondence with Nicias, and which they dreaded might come to light were he permitted to live, called loudly for the instant execution of the captive commanders.

The prisoners, amounting to the number of seven thousand,

thousand, were treated with the same degree of rigour. They were either doomed to a life of slavery in the mines and quarries of Sicily, or publicly sold to the highest bidder. The condition of the latter was infinitely preferable to that of the prisoners who were condemned to labour in the mines and quarries. As many of them were citizens who had concealed their condition, their talents, their probity, and the dignified melancholy of men who had seen better days, procured a kind reception and generous treatment from their masters, who soon restored most of them to their freedom.

But the Athenians, and such natives of Sicily as had joined their cause, were doomed to languish out life in the horrors of bondage and imprisonment. Yet even here a ray of humanity illuminated the gloom of barbarity; and many Athenian captives received from the taste of the Sicilians, a boon which their virtue would not have conferred. The name of Euripides was celebrated in Sicily; and the Syracusans had often been dissolved into tears, at the tender scenes of the most affecting and impassioned of all the Grecian dramatic poets. The pleasure which they had derived from the pathetic and melting strains of his muse, induced the desire to hear them recited in the melodious accents of Athenian voices, modelled and corrected by the delicacy of Attic ears, and expressed in the inimitable sweetness of the Ionic dialect, so superior to the rudeness of their own. The melancholy situation of the prisoners naturally turned their attention to the plaintive scenes of their pathetic poet. While the tragic tale rushed upon their minds, and they represented the fate of kingdoms and the fall of heroes, they felt the bitterness of their own situation, and traced a faithful picture of their own sorrows. The Syracusans were transported and delighted; mutual taste and sensibility reconciled enemies,

enemies, and endeared them to one another. The prisoners were received as inmates into the bosom of private families, were admitted to the honours of antient hospitality, and soon restored to their country, and the longing arms of their relations and friends. At their return to the Athenian capital, they walked in solemn procession to the house of Euripides, and hailed their deliverer from slavery and death, with strains of gratitude approaching to devotion.* This civic crown for numbers, saved from destruction by the charms of his heaven-taught muse, was a more honourable testimony to the poet's merit, than the laurel wreath or the regal diadem. In this divine moment, Euripides must have enjoyed the highest triumph which the human heart can feel; for his superiority as a poet does not so much consist in intellectual as in moral excellence; in that tenderness and sensibility which is the finest expression of virtue, and in the dignity and purity of moral sentiment, which he studied in the school of Socrates; which shook the theatre of Athens with transient bursts of admiration, even when the people had degenerated from the virtue of their ancestors; and which established the unfading reputation of the author over the continent, and through the islands of Greece.

SECTION II.

From the Conclusion of the EXPEDITION *to* SICILY, *to the Establishment of the* THIRTY TYRANTS.

THE defeat of the Athenians at Syracuse, and the dreadful calamities which followed, when first reported

* Plut. in Nic.

ported at Athens, obtained no credit. The imaginations of the people had been so intoxicated with ideas of conquest, that they had never supposed the possibility of a reverse of fortune; and their minds were so totally unprepared, that the feeble accents of the wounded and meagre fugitives, who had just escaped from the scene of blood, could hardly convince them of the reality. But when the evidence could no longer be resisted, consternation and dismay universally prevailed; and the people, as if the war had not been decreed by themselves, vented their fury and resentment against the orators who had encouraged the expedition, and the diviners, whose blind predictions and fallacious oracles had flattered them with hopes of success. Never, since the commencement of the republic, had they been reduced to so deplorable a condition; without a revenue, without an army, and without a fleet; they seemed to stand on the brink of ruin, and trembled every moment, lest the enemy, elated with such extraordinary success, should invade Athens both by sea and land, not only with the forces of Peloponnesus, but with the fleets of Sicily.

These tidings, so afflicting to the Athenians, were received with very different emotions in other parts of Greece. The states, who had not hitherto taken a side, but watched the course of events, now declared against them. Their own allies and tributaries prepared to assert their liberty. Eubœa, Chios, and Lesbos, solicited the protection of the Lacedæmonians. These various commotions suggested great views to the Spartans, who thought that the time was now approaching, when they should rise on the ruins of Athens to supreme authority in Greece.

To strengthen this formidable confederacy, a new enemy remained more powerful than all the rest. Artaxerxes Longimanus, king of Persia, died in the eighth

eighth year of the Peloponnesian war, leaving the crown to Xerxes, his only son by his queen. He had many children by his concubines; among whom were Sogdianus and Ochus. Xerxes, after having reigned forty-five days, was assassinated by Sogdianus, who usurped the throne. Having become the horror of the nobility and the empire by his cruelties, Ochus advanced against him at the head of a strong army, and deprived him of his crown and life. Ochus, succeeding to the sovereignty, assumed the name of Darius, to which has been added the sirname of Nothus, or the Bastard. The reign of this prince was disturbed by conspiracies and commotions. In the ninth year after his accession to the throne, Egypt revolted, and Amyrtæus being proclaimed king, reigned six years. The defection of Lydia happened at the same time. The governor having collected a considerable body of Grecian troops, threw off his allegiance to the Persian empire, and attempted to establish his own authority over the rich provinces of Asia Minor. Darius sent Tissaphernes against him, who being a man of address and intrigue, by means of presents and promises, brought over the army to his side. Deserted by his troops, the governor surrendered to Tissaphernes, who flattered him with hopes of pardon; but Darius put him to death.

After this rebellion was quelled, Tissaphernes was appointed to govern the southern, and Pharnabasus the northern districts of Lower Asia; and the abilities of these generals extended the Persian arms towards the shores of the Egian, as well as of the Hellespont. These governors, provoked at the Athenians, because they prevented them from levying the usual contributions and taxes in their respective provinces, promised to furnish the Lacedæmonians with all the necessary expences of the war, in order

order to incite them to march against the Athenians with greater alacrity and expedition.

Notwithstanding this formidable combination, the Athenians resumed their antient spirit, and acted with wisdom as well as magnanimity. They introduced œconomy into their finances, and retrenched every unnecessary expence. They took the thousand talents out of the treasury which had been deposited there at the commencement of the war, and reserved for a case of exigency like the present. They silenced the harangues of the turbulent demagogues, and appointed a council of old and experienced men to examine and prepare all public affairs before they should be proposed to the popular assembly. New levies were raised; the fleet, repaired and augmented, was put to sea, in order to watch the motions, and prevent the desertion of the allies. A train of favourable circumstances co-operated with these wise and vigorous measures, to prolong the destiny of Athens. The proceedings of the Spartan confederacy, which had been always tardy, were now feeble and dilatory to an extreme. The Persian governors were guided entirely by interest, and their conduct was equivocal, capricious, and indecisive. Above all, the enterprising genius of Alcibiades, full of resources, of energy, and intrigue, contributed to retard the fall of the republic. This statesman, to whom change of political parties appeared no contradiction of character, and who was resolved to ruin or to rule his country, now exerted in its defence that spirit and ability, which he had formerly employed for its destruction.

This eccentric character had prevailed on the Spartans and Peloponnesians to comply with the request of Tissaphernes, and to furnish the Persian with gallies and soldiers, which he victualled and paid at his own expence. By his influence and address he had also

also induced several of the Ionic cities to declare for the Lacedæmonians. But his power and authority in Sparta were too great to be permanent. The magistrates and generals of Sparta, envying the fame and fortune of an exile whom they had protected, could not bear that the success of every enterprize should be imputed to Alcibiades. Agis, the king, had better reason for his resentment. The intrigue of Alcibiades with Rimea, the spouse of that monarch, was divulged by female vanity and folly. Vain of conquering, and, as she imagined, fixing the heart of a character so celebrated, she privately gave the name of Alcibiades to her son Leotychides. The intemperate tongues of her female companions soon revealed the secret to the world; and Alcibiades mortified her vanity, by publicly avowing, that he paid his addresses to her, not as a woman, but as a queen, that his progeny might reign in Sparta. The cause of an injured and affronted husband was embraced by all his countrymen; and secret orders, under the sanction of the Spartan senate, were sent to the commander of the Peloponnesian army, to assassinate Alcibiades, for the commission of crimes which were punished with death in every Grecian commonwealth. Alcibiades, who had faithful intelligence conveyed to him of this design against his life, avoided the snares that were laid for him; but, for his more perfect security, committed himself to the protection of Tissaphernes, the Persian governor of Sardis. The pleasing manners, the insinuating address, the accommodating temper, the versatile humour, joined to the great talents for business, possessed by this illustrious adventurer, soon gained the attachment as well as admiration of Tissaphernes, who had studied in the same school of hypocrisy, deceit, and affectation. So much did he become enamoured of this Athenian, notwithstanding his avowed hatred

hatred to the Greeks, that he gave the name of Alcibiades to the most beautiful of his gardens, the favourite scene of his pleasures, adorned with all the embellishments of Asiatic taste, the coolness of fountains, the verdure and fragrance of groves, and the refreshment of romantic retreats and solitudes. To secure his protection, Alcibiades studied to flatter and to gratify his avarice, the ruling passion of his nature. Tissaphernes allowed the Peloponnesian sailors a drachma, or seven pence of daily pay. Alcibiades exclaimed against this impolitic profusion, and informed him that the pay given by the Athenians never amounted to more than three oboli, as experience had taught them that more would produce idleness and profligacy. If the sailors should murmur at the reduction, a bribe to the commanders, and a few venal orators accustomed to govern the multitude, he assured him, would soon hush every complaint.*

This advice was too congenial to the mind of Tissaphernes not to be adopted; and so well acquainted was this Grecian with his countrymen, that Hermocrates, the Syracusan, alone refused the bribe, or to second the views of the Persian satrap.

The seeds of jealousy and distrust were now sown in the Peloponnesian fleet; nor was it difficult for Alcibiades to detach Tissaphernes from the Spartan alliance.

He represented to him, "That if the Persians proposed to recover their antient possessions in Asia Minor, they should be cautious of giving a decided ascendancy to the Spartans. That by holding the balance even between the contending republics, by secretly exciting troubles and divisions among them, and sending pecuniary remittances, sometimes to

* Thucyd. p. 534.

Athens,

Athens, and sometimes to Sparta, they would mutually exhaust each other's strength, and ultimately fall an easier prey to the Persian ambition."

Tissaphernes adopted this plan, to the great joy of Alcibiades, who, as he was proscribed by the Spartans, saw no hopes of safety but from his native country. The Athenians, informed of his influence at the court of Tissaphernes, bitterly repented their having passed sentence of condemnation upon him; for, though they had lately reduced the revolted islands to obedience, yet they dreaded Tissaphernes, who was soon to be reinforced with a hundred and fifty vessels from Phœnicia. Alcibiades, who had intelligence of all that passed among the Athenians, applied secretly to Pisander, Theramenes, and other leading men in the camp at Samos, where, at this time, they had collected all their forces. To them he lamented the desperate situation of public affairs, expatiated on his own influence with the Persian governor, and expressed his unwillingness to comply with the wishes of his country in returning to Athens, provided the administration of the republic was taken from the capricious and furious multitude, and entrusted to the hands of the powerful and the noble. He insinuated, that it might be yet possible to prevent the Phœnician fleet from joining the Spartan; and at last promised to the Athenians, not only the favour of Tissaphernes, but of the Persian monarch himself, provided they would abolish their tumultuous democracy, so odious to kings, and commit the administration of government to the nobility, and to men worthy to negotiate with a sovereign.

These views were the more acceptable to Pisander and Theramenes, as they had adopted them beforehand, and formed parties both in the camp and the city for carrying them into execution. Accordingly they, and the other leaders of the aristocratical party,

party, warmly approved the measures of Alcibiades. The army, too, admired the valour of this illustrious exile, and longed to see him restored to the service, and fighting the battles of his country. The dangerous situation of Athens was lamented by all; many rejoiced in the prospect of an alliance with the Persians; and the recall of Alcibiades was desired by general consent.

Phrynichus, the personal enemy of Alcibiades, alone opposed his return; but the measures of Pisander and his associates were carried into execution. An extraordinary assembly, summoned in the theatre of Bacchus, passed a decree, investing ten persons with full powers to treat with the Persian governor.

Meanwhile, Tissaphernes concluded a new treaty with the Spartans, in which it was stipulated, that king Darius should provide for all the expences of the Peloponnesian fleet till the arrival of the Persian; and that the confederated forces should exert all their efforts to recover to the Great King the dominions of his ancestors, so long usurped by the Athenians. It was farther agreed, that they should unite their forces, and continue hostilities, or make peace, by common consent. As a step to the fulfilment of the treaty, Tissaphernes sent for the fleet of Phœnicia.

The course of this negotiation is sufficient to prove that the deceitful Persian, however he might relish the counsel of Alcibiades to weaken both parties, never entertained a serious thought of the Athenian alliance; accordingly he shewed the utmost unwillingness to enter into any conference with the ambassadors of Athens; and it was not till after he had long employed the humblest intreaties, and all the arts of insinuation, that Alcibiades at last obtained an audience for his fellow-citizens. At that audience, among other proposals, he demanded that Ionia

Ionia and the neighbouring islands should be surrendered to the Persian king. These conditions, however ignominious, being complied with, he required permission for the Persian fleets to sail unmolested in the Grecian seas. On hearing this demand, which was equivalent to expressing a desire that Athens should become a province of Persia, the ambassadors broke up the conference with indignation, and saw that Alcibiades had deceived himself, as well as them, with regard to his influence over the Persian satrap.

The leaders of the aristocratical party, however disappointed, were happy to get rid of a man, whose indefatigable ambition and intolerable vanity rendered him a dangerous and disagreeable associate in public affairs. They negleced not, however, to introduce the revolution into the Athenian government, which they had for some time premeditated. They gained over Phrynichus, who had opposed them only from personal animosity to Alcibiades. The most licentious and turbulent of the demagogues were assassinated; and the Athenians, intimidated by the numbers and authority of the conspirators, yielded without resistance. A faction acting with union and energy, whose leaders were Pisander, Theramenes, Phrynichus, and Antiphon, subverted the Athenian commonwealth, which had subsisted with splendor and celebrity for near a hundred years, and erected an aristocracy, invested with absolute power, on the ruins of the antient constitution. Five persons (nominated beforehand) obtained the sanction of the people to chuse a hundred others, each of whom should nominate three associates; and the four hundred, thus chosen, were appointed to administer the affairs of the republic without limitation or controul. To amuse the people with a phantom of liberty, it was decreed, that the four hundred should occasionally

ally call a council of five thousand citizens, to assist them in their deliberations, when they judged it expedient. Accordingly, the assemblies of the people were held as usual; and the antient forms of the constitution were preserved, though its spirit was lost.

These new rulers soon discovered their tyrannical and sanguinary disposition. They entered the senate armed with daggers, and surrounded with guards, and, after paying the members their salaries, deprived them of their office. They banished, proscribed, and put to death all who opposed them, and confiscated their estates. The reports of their cruelty and tyranny were carried to the camp at Samos, and excited the indignation of the army and the fleet, who, roused by the sufferings of their fellow-citizens, determined to strike a decisive blow for freedom and their country. Encouraged by Thrasyllus and Thrasybulus, they attacked by surprize the supporters of the new administration, punished thirty of the most criminal with death, banished others, and bound the soldiers by an oath to maintain the antient government, against public enemies or domestic faction. By the advice of Thrasybulus, who headed this revolution, Alcibiades was recalled. Immediately on his arrival, he was appointed general of the Athenian forces: leaving the care of his troops to Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, his colleagues in command, he proceeded to Miletus, to exhibit himself in his new dignity to Tissaphernes, and to convince the satrap that the power of his countrymen was still formidable. As he had formerly kept the Athenians in awe by Tissaphernes, he now awed Tissaphernes by the Athenians. Returning to Samos, he found ambassadors from the four hundred, who had been attempting to vindicate the revolution at Athens, and the subsequent conduct of the new government.

Their attempts to justify the enormities and injustice of the four hundred, served only to exasperate the resentment of the army, who, with one voice, demanded that they might be led instantly against Athens to punish the tyrants. Alcibiades, acting with consummate wisdom on this occasion, refused to comply with this rash request, and, by his firmness and fortitude, preserved the city of Athens. For, had they sailed thither immediately, the Peloponnesian fleet would have invaded and subdued Ionia, the Hellespont, and all the islands; while the Athenians, by kindling a civil war in their own city, would have exhausted their whole forces against one another. But Alcibiades ordered the ambassadors to deliver to the tyrants this short and emphatic message, "That, unless they divested themselves of their illegal power, and restored the antient form of government, he would sail to Athens, and at once put an end to their lives and their authority."

The return of the ambassadors without success, and the answer of Alcibiades, added to the troubles of Athens, and gave a mortal wound to the authority of the four hundred. The tumult and disorder increased to an extreme, when intelligence was brought, that the Peloponnesian squadron, commanded by Hegesandridas, the Spartan, had defeated the fleet sent out by the four hundred to oppose them, and made themselves masters of the island of Eubœa.

Neither the invasion of Xerxes, nor the defeat at Sicily, occasioned such terror and consternation as this alarming calamity. Since the fortification of Decelia, and the consequent desolation of the Attic territory, the Athenians had derived their chief supplies from Eubœa; they dreaded the revolt of the islanders; they had no more ships to launch; and their treasury was exhausted; the city, torn by internal

ternal commotions, was divided against the camp. If, in this moment of disorder and distraction, the conquering fleet had profited by their victory, and attacked the Athenian harbour, the army at Samos must have sailed to the defence of their country; Ionia and the Hellespont would have been abandoned to the Peloponnesians; and the republic retained only the city of Athens of all its extensive dominions. But the great and decisive strokes of war were unknown to the enemy. The tardy measures and heavy movement of the Lacedæmonians, frequently checked the career of their success, and lost the advantages which fortune put into their hands.

The four hundred tyrants were now deposed, to whom the people ascribed all the calamities which they suffered. Alcibiades was recalled, and the conduct of the army at Samos obtained the sanction of public approbation. The democracy was restored; the government was brought back to its original principles, as established by Solon; and the Athenians resolved, with more ardour than ever, to defend, to the last extremity, their antient constitution.

Alcibiades, though recalled by the unanimous voice of the assembly, did not immediately return; but resolved, by performing some heroic atchievement, to render his arrival not only joyful, but triumphant. For this purpose, leaving Samos with a small number of vessels, he cruised about the islands of Cos and Cnidos, and receiving information that an Athenian fleet was on the point of engaging the united squadrons of Rhodes and Peloponnesus, near Abydos, he hastened to the assistance of the former. The battle had lasted the whole day, and was still undecided, when the arrival of Alcibiades, with eighteen gallies, gave victory to the Athenians. Having taken thirty of the enemies gallies, and retaken fifteen of

their own, which they had lost in a former engagement, they erected a trophy. It was next resolved to attack the enemies fleet at Cyzicus; for this purpose a detachment of eighty gallies sailed to the small island of Proconnesus, about ten miles distant from the station of the Peloponnesian fleet. A thunder-storm, followed by rain and a thick gloom, concealed their approach; and, favoured by the darkness, Alcibiades surprized sixty vessels, which had been separated from the Peloponnesian fleet. When the gloom dispersed, the rest of the fleet sailed to their assistance, but were totally defeated by the Athenians, who took every vessel, except the Syracusan gallies, which were set on fire by Hermocrates in the face of a victorious enemy.

The news of this victory elevated the Athenians as much as it depressed the Spartans. For several years the operations of the Athenians had been crowned with success, but the twenty-fourth year of the war was peculiarly fortunate. The Carthaginians invaded Sicily, and prevented any effectual aid from being sent to the Peloponnesian allies from that quarter. The revolt of the Medes withheld the Persian reinforcements, which were necessary to recruit the army of Pharnabasus. The Athenians having repeatedly defeated both the confederated Greeks and the Persians, returned in trriumph to attack the fortified cities, in which Alcibiades displayed the extraordinary resources of his genius. By sudden assaults or gradual approaches, by force or by stratagem, in a few months he became master of Chalcedon, Selembria, and at last of Byzantium. His fleet was no less successful than his army, and he restored to the Athenians the empire of the sea. It was computed by his friends, that Alcibiades, since he was invested with the chief command, had taken or destroyed two hundred Syracusan or Peloponnesian gallies.

After

After so many atchievements and victories, Alcibiades eagerly desired to re-visit his native country, and to enjoy the honours he had merited by his success. He set sail for the Piræus; and, on the joyful day of his arrival, the people crowded to meet him, and to behold the deliverer of Athens. His fleet was adorned with the arms and spoils he had taken from the enemy. The ships which he had captured attended the triumph; and he displayed, as trophies of success, the ensigns and ornaments of those he had sunk or destroyed. He landed amidst the universal shouts and acclamations of the spectators, who, inattentive to the naval pomp, fixed their eyes on Alcibiades alone. They gazed on him with admiration as a tutelar divinity, who had brought victory in his train; reflecting on the deplorable situation of the commonwealth, when he undertook its defence, and the many illustrious atchievements he had since performed, by which he had rendered her victorious both by sea and land.

As Alcibiades had been charged with a crime, and condemned in absence, it was requisite that he should be absolved in due form. Accordingly an extraordinary assembly was summoned by the magistrates, that he might explain and vindicate his conduct. He found little difficulty in making his defence before judges so strongly prepossessed in his favour. Having deplored his past misfortunes, he imputed them entirely to his evil destiny, and not to the people. He concluded by exhorting them to pursue the war, and to hope every thing from its success. Charmed with his eloquence, his candour, and magnanimity, the assembly decreed him a crown of gold, restored his estate, and appointed him commander in chief by sea and land. So excessive were the grateful transports of the people, that they would have offered him the sovereignty, if they had not been prevented

by himself and his friends. The utmost exertions were made both in the army and the navy, a hundred gallies were fitted out, and transports prepared to carry a large body of infantry and cavalry.

When these preparations were finished, he deferred his departure for some time, to celebrate the Eleusinian mysteries. Nothing in the history of heathen religion is more memorable or illustrious than the festival of Ceres Eleusina. The origin of the institution is referred to the goddess herself, who, coming to Eleusis in the reign of Erectheus, and finding the country afflicted with famine, taught the inhabitants the culture of corn, and instructed them in the principles of justice and humanity.

These mysteries were divided into the greater and the lesser. Those who desired to be initiated into the greater mysteries, were prepared and purified by watching, temperance, sacrifices, lustrations, and prayer; and, previous to the revelation of the mysterious secrets, the most profound silence was enjoined them. When the time for their initiation arrived, they were brought into the temple; and, to inspire the greater reverence, the ceremony was performed in the night. Wonderful things passed upon this occasion; visions were seen, and voices heard of an extraordinary nature. A sudden splendor illuminated the darkness of the place, and immediately disappearing, added new horrors to the gloom. Apparitions, claps of thunder, shaking of the earth, heightened the terror and amazement, while the trembling candidate heard the mysterious volumes read to him by the hierophant. These striking ceremonies were contrived to teach, with greater efficacy, the most important principles of religion and virtue, and to express, by external emblems, the immortality of the human soul, and the rewards appointed for the virtuous

tuous in a future state of existence. "The knowledge of these mysteries," says Isocrates,* "dispels the terrors of death, by inspiring the initiated with the pleasing hopes of an eternity of happiness."

Besides the secret and awful ceremonies, the worship of Ceres was celebrated by public shows and exhibitions, and, above all, by the solemn and magnificent procession which proceeded along the sacred road leading from Athens to Eleusis. The Athenians, for some time past, had been obliged to conduct this procession by sea, as the Lacedæmonians were in possession of the road to the temple. Alcibiades, who had resolved to celebrate this festival in its antient lustre and solemnity, ordered the procession to go by land in the usual manner, under the convoy of an armed force. Having posted centinels upon the hills, he placed the venerable ministers of the goddess, and the initiated, under the protection of his army. No enemy appeared to disturb the solemnity and pomp of the procession, which Alcibiades conducted to Eleusis, and back to Athens, without interruption from the enemy. No spectacle, says Plutarch, was ever more august or more worthy the majesty of the gods, than this mingled pomp of war and of religion; and even the enemies of Alcibiades were obliged to acknowledge, that he was no less qualified to discharge the functions of a high-priest than those of a general. The principal design of Alcibiades, in this public ostentation of his piety, was to efface from the minds of the people the suspicions of irreligion, to which the mutilation of statues and the profanation of mysteries had formerly given rise.

After this effusion of religious zeal, so meritorious in the eyes of the people, and particularly acceptable to the army, Alcibiades prepared for his military ex-

* Panegyr. p. 24.

pedition; and his countrymen expected every thing from his abilities.

Alarmed at the late victories of the Athenians, and apprehensive of their future success, the Spartans now thought it necessary to oppose one of their best generals to Alcibiades, and appointed Lysander chief commander of the fleet. This general, though of noble birth, and a descendant of Hercules, was educated with all the rigour and severity of Spartan discipline. He had spent his life in arms, or in embassies to foreign states. To unabated valour he added the fruits of his experience, and knew well how to gain by policy what could not be obtained by open violence; how to join, according to his own expression, the cunning of the fox to the courage of the lion. Ambition was his ruling passion, to which he could sacrifice every principle, and resign every pleasure.

Since the remarkable defeat at Cyzicus, the Peloponnesian states had been employed in building ships and preparing a fleet. The whole armament, amounting to ninety sail, was now collected by Lysander at Ephesus. While he was making preparations for his expedition, he was informed that Cyrus, the youngest son of the Persian monarch, was appointed governor of Sardis. As he had no permanent fund for the payment of his forces, he repaired to the Lydian capital without delay, to congratulate the arrival of the young prince. Having insinuated himself into the favour of Cyrus, he complained of the perfidious partiality of Tissaphernes to the Athenians, whose power had formerly been, and might still be, destructive to the interests of Persia. Pharnabasus, he added, had more effectually served the cause of his master; but that neither the one nor the other had furnished the stipulated pay to the Grecian seamen and soldiers, without which desertion would take

take place, and no vigorous measures could be pursued. Cyrus answered, "That he had orders from the king his father, to assist the Lacedæmonians; that for this purpose he had brought with him five hundred talents;* and, should that sum be found inadequate, he would coin into money the golden throne on which he sat."

Lysander endeavoured to profit by the favourable dispositions of the Persian court, and requested that the pay of the seamen might be raised from three oboli to a drachma a day. The young prince replied, that on this subject too he must be guided by the instruction of his father, "That the pay must continue on the original footing, and the allied fleet receive thirty minæ† a month for every ship." Lysander seemed to acquiesce, but did not abandon his project.

Soon after, at a magnificent entertainment given by Cyrus, the artful Spartan, by his address and flattery, insinuated himself so far into the good graces of the young prince, that he desired him to prefer a request, with full assurance it should be granted. Lysander replied, "That he had nothing to desire but the addition of an obolus a day to the pay of the mariners." The apparent magnanimity and disinterestedness of this request charmed the youthful mind of Cyrus, and the Spartan received ten thousand darics.‡ Returning with this sum to Ephesus, he paid off the arrears due to his troops, gave them a month's pay in advance, augmented their daily allowance, and thinned the Athenian gallies by tempting the mariners to desert.

Though Lysander had considerably enfeebled the

* Near a hundred thousand pounds.

† Above ninety pounds.

‡ Above five thousand pounds.

naval power of the enemy, and strengthened his own by the augmentation of the mariner's pay, yet he ventured not to hazard a battle; being apprehensive of Alcibiades, who had the superiority in number of ships, whose reputation was equally high for valour and military skill, and who had never been defeated in any engagement by sea or land. But the Athenian general was soon obliged to sail to the Ionian coast, in order to raise contributions to pay his troops, and committed the charge of the fleet to Antiochus; a favourite so unworthy of such a trust, that even Alcibiades gave him positive orders not to hazard a battle. But such was the insolence and folly of the new commander, that he entered the port of Ephesus with two gallies, and, having challenged Lysander to an engagement, retired with loud laughter and derision. The Spartan knew how to restrain his resentment; but, when he observed the enemy thrown into disorder, he ordered the Peloponnesian squadrons to advance. The battle was soon decided; the Athenian insolence was not supported by their valour; and, having lost fifteen gallies, retired in disgrace to Samos. Alcibiades soon returned; but Lysander, though favoured by fortune, still declined an engagement with that commander, who entered the port of Ephesus to offer him battle, and employed threats and insults, to procure an opportunity of retrieving the honours of the Athenian fleet.

In the mean while, another revolution, with regard to him, had taken place in the minds of the Athenian people. Expecting nothing but conquests, such an ignominious defeat filled them with disappointment and rage. They had such confidence in the abilities of Alcibiades, that they began to suspect his integrity; and, as they believed nothing impossible for him to atchieve, they imputed the disasters which happened in his absence to design. These suspicions, though

though groundless, were confirmed by Thrasybulus, who, jealous of the fame and honours that had been bestowed on a rival, accused him before the assembly of the people. He charged him with the ruin of his country, by introducing licentiousness into the navy; with having selected his friends from the most notorious libertines and debauchees, and entrusting the command of the fleet to such unworthy hands; while he spent that time, which should have been dedicated to the service of his country, in the arms of Ionian courtezans, or in raising contributions on the provinces to defray the expence of his castle on the Thracian coast, his meditated asylum against the vengeance of the state which he had betrayed.

Nothing can more strongly illustrate the levity, inconstancy, and capriciousness of the Athenian democracy, than their treatment of Alcibiades. The man on whom they had so lately poured accumulated honours, whom they had almost worshipped as a tutelar Divinity, was now, in one day, accused, tried, and condemned unheard. Ten generals were chosen in his stead; among whom Thrasyllus, Leon, Diomedon, and Conon were entitled to the honours of the commonwealth, and the confidence of their country. Alcibiades retired for refuge to one of his castles in the Thracian Chersonesus.

The new generals had scarcely arrived at Samos, when Lysander's year of command expired, and Callicratidas, a Spartan of the antient mold, was appointed his successor. The ambitious and political Lysander had employed his annual period of command to lay the foundation of systematic influence and permanent authority. To attach the soldiers and sailors to his service, he indulged them in licentious pleasures; he encouraged the most daring with liberal rewards and magnificent promises; and from this faction, which was entirely devoted to his inte-

rest, he raised his favourites to the first employments and highest honours in the army. He had partizans in all the islands and cities dependent on Sparta. He established aristocracy, or rather the government of his own creatures, in all the towns he had taken. He bestowed his confidence on those who were void of fear and of shame, committed authority to their hands, and, by the influence of Persian gold, rendered them entirely devoted to his interest.

When Callicratidas laid his commission before the council, the partizans of Lysander raised an universal clamour, and declared against yielding, on such a critical emergency, a scrupulous obedience to the laws of Lycurgus. But when Callicratidas addressed the assembly, with the manly simplicity and unaffected dignity of a virtuous mind, they listened with respect and admiration, the faction of Lysander was ashamed, and all acknowledged that it was necessary to obey the orders of the Spartan government.

Lysander, though not without the strongest symptoms of jealousy and resentment, resigned his command, but resolved to render it more humiliating than honourable to his successor. He returned to the court of Cyrus, and restored the unexpended remains of the ten thousand darics, which that prince had given him for the augmentation of the mariners' pay; at the same time he represented Callicratidas as an ignorant, obstinate, unpolished Spartan, unworthy the conversation or confidence of a prince. On his return, he told Callicratidas, that to provide subsistence for his army, he must apply to the Great King. Compelled by necessity and duty, this high-minded Spartan at last repaired to Sardis. He was refused admission to the royal presence; making a second attempt, he was treated with derision and scorn by the vain and insolent minions of a court. He then left Sardis with disdain, execrating the haughtiness

haughtiness and treachery of the Persians; lamenting the internal dissensions of the Greeks, which compelled them to solicit the assistance of such insolent allies; and vowing, if ever he returned to Sparta, to exert his utmost efforts to reconcile the Grecian states to one another.

As he had not obtained the object of his expedition, he proceeded to Miletus and other towns of Ionia; and, after unfolding the jealousy of Lysander, and the arrogance of Cyrus, solicited contributions to carry on a war which was undertaken on their behalf. By this fair and honourable conduct he obtained considerable sums, which enabled him to return with credit to Ephesus, and, by satisfying the demands of the seamen and soldiers, to raise their spirits for the day of battle.

In the twenty-sixth year of the Peloponnesian war, Callicratidas, having gained some advantages over the Athenians at Lesbos, pursued Conon, the most illustrious of the ten generals, into the port of Mitylené, where he kept him blocked up.

Conon found means to apprise Athens of his extreme danger. Extraordinary efforts were made for his relief; and in less than a month a fleet of a hundred and ten sail was fitted out, containing all the Athenians, slaves as well as free, that were capable of bearing arms. Reinforced at Samos by the allied states, they now amounted to a hundred and fifty sail; and, steering for the islands of Arginusæ, situated near the promontory of Lesbos, they prepared to engage the enemy.

Nor was Callicratidas averse to the engagement. Having left Eteonicus at Mitylené, to continue the blockade with fifty gallies, he set sail with a hundred and twenty to the southern point of Lesbos, within four miles of the Athenian fleet. The counsellors of Callicratidas dissuaded him from hazarding a battle against

against such superior strength and numbers. He replied, "To fly would cover me with perpetual shame. My death is of little importance to the republic; Sparta does not depend on one man." He then gave the signal for engaging. The victory was long disputed with undaunted and persevering bravery. Callicratidas distinguished himself in the fight. At length, being opposed by the galley of Pericles, son of the celebrated statesman and orator, his ship was held fast by a grappling iron, and he was instantly surrounded by several Athenian vessels. In this situation the brave Spartan fell, overpowered by numbers. The right wing, which he commanded, was put to flight. The left, composed of Bœotians and Eubœans, made a long and vigorous resistance, from fear of falling into the hands of the Athenians, from whose authority they had revolted; at last they were obliged to give way, and fled in disorder. The Athenians having gained a complete victory, erected a trophy in the islands of Arginusæ. They lost twenty-five gallies in this engagement, and the enemy more than seventy, in the number of which were nine of the ten furnished by the Lacedæmonians.

After the battle, the Athenian generals gave orders to Theramenes and Thrasybulus to collect the dead bodies, that they might be interred with the accustomed ceremonies. Fifty vessels were appointed to discharge this religious and humane office. The rest of the fleet sailed in quest of the Peloponnesians on the coast of Lesbos, who were saved by a stratagem of Eteonicus. Soon after the battle, a vessel arrived at Mitylené announcing the defeat of the Peloponnesian fleet. Eteonicus, who anticipated the consequences of that event, ordered the vessel secretly to leave the harbour, and to return in a short time, the rowers crowned with wreaths of flowers, and calling out, with shouts and acclamations, that Callicratidas

Callicratidas was victorious, and had destroyed the whole Athenian fleet. The contrivance was successful; hymns were sung, and sacrifices offered to the gods. Eteonicus took advantage of a favourable gale to send his gallies to the Isle of Chios; and, after having burned the camp, marched his land army to Methymna, which was threatened with an attack from the enemy.*

Theramenes and Thrasybulus, who were ordered to convey home the bodies of the dead, that they might be honoured with the rites of sepulture, were prevented by a violent tempest from the execution of these orders. When the Athenians heard that the last sacred duties, on which they believed the happiness of departed spirits in a future life to depend, had not been paid to their brave and victorious countrymen who had fallen in battle, they were affected with horror, as well as the deepest sorrow, and considered the neglect, although unavoidable, as a capital offence. The Athenians had other reasons for being offended at the ten generals; they were disappointed of the advantages which they expected from the engagement. Immediately after the battle, the commanders had sent a vessel to Athens, acquainting the magistrates that they had taken seventy gallies from the enemy, and meditated expeditions against Mitylené, Methymna, and Chios; but Methymna was too strongly fortified to be taken by assault; and when they sailed to Chios, in quest of the Peloponnesian fleet, they found it carefully secured in the principal harbour of the island.

Theramenes returning to Athens during this popular fury, accused the other admirals of having neglected the favourable moment to save those who were perishing, or to recover the bodies of their dead

* Xenoph. Hellen. 446. Diodor. p. 334, &c.

countrymen

countrymen. The Athenians, who listened with eagerness to this invidious calumny, dismissed the commanders in their absence, and unheard, and appointed Conon to the command of the fleet. Two of the generals, Prolomachus and Aristogenes, went into voluntary exile; the rest returned home to justify their conduct. The cause having been brought before the senate, it was there resolved, that it should be referred to the decision of the people, and that the suffrages of each tribe should be given separately. This iniquitous decree, approved of by a majority of the senate, and received with all the clamorous applause of democratical frenzy by the people, left no room for a legal defence, or impartial hearing. From that moment the admirals had only to prepare for death. In vain did the Prytanes, who officially attended to regulate the proceedings of the assembly, endeavour to calm the minds of the people. Callixenes, the chief accuser, threatened them, if they did not desist, with the fate that awaited the accused. The voice of reason was silenced by the fury of the people, and a shameful compliance with injustice disgraced the firmness and integrity of the Athenian judges. Socrates remained a single and sublime exception. In opposition to the unanimous voice of the assembly, he sustained the dignity of a philosopher and a judge; and persisted, with a heroic boldness, in opposing a decree so contrary to every principle of justice, and subversive of all laws.

But his solitary opposition could not save the admirals. They were condemned and executed. The speech of Diomedon, before his death, deserves to be recorded. "I wish, Athenians, that the sentence you have passed may not prove a calamity to my country. I have one favour to ask of you, in behalf of my colleagues and myself, which is, to acquit us, before the gods, of the vows we made to them for you

you and for ourselves, as we are not now in a condition to discharge them; for it is to their protection, invoked before the battle, that we acknowledge we are indebted for the beneficial and glorious victory which we gained over the enemy." The patriotism and the piety of this discourse dissolved every good citizen into tears; but the people, inflamed by the accusers, remained obstinate and unrelenting, and the commanders were put to death. This temporary madness, not uncommon to an Athenian assembly, was followed by the deepest remorse. They could make no compensation to the innocent, but they took vengeance on the guilty, and inflicted on Callixenes the punishment due to his crimes.

The Peloponnesian confederacy having met with such a severe blow at Arginusæ, the allies, supported by the authority of Cyrus, sent ambassadors to Sparta, soliciting that the command of the fleet should again be conferred on Lysander. Although it was contrary to the Spartan institutions, that the same person should be twice appointed admiral of the same fleet, the Lacedæmonians gratified the allies, and at the same time, in appearance, complied with the laws, by giving the title of Admiral to Aracus, and appointing Lysander second in command, though, in fact, invested with supreme authority. This appointment gave great joy to the factious devoted to his interests in the different cities, who foresaw their own elevation on the fall of democratic power. Cyrus, who was preparing for a journey to Upper Asia, sent for Lysander to Sardis previous to his departure, and received him with the warmest demonstrations of friendship. He supplied him with considerable sums to satisfy the present demands of his fleet; and during his absence consigned to him the revenues of the opulent cities in his government. With the seasonable aid of these copious resources, Lysander augmented

mented his fleet with Ionian and Carian seamen, and carried on his naval preparations with such vigour and success, that in a few months he sailed to the Hellespont with a hundred and fifty gallies. He laid siege to Lampsacus, which he took by storm, and abandoned to the rapacity and licentiousness of the merciless soldiers.

During these operations of the enterprising Spartan, the affairs of Athens suffered from the incapacity and folly of Philocles, Adimanthus, Tydeus, Menander, and Cephisodorus, the five generals who were joined as colleagues to Conon. On hearing that Lysander had taken Lampsacus, they advanced with a hundred and eighty ships, and anchored on the opposite side of the Hellespont, at the distance of near two miles from the enemy. The station which they chose was the mouth of the Ægos Potamos, or river of the Goat, so called from a cluster of small islands which rise above its surface, bearing a resemblance to that animal. They anchored in this inconvenient place, in order to provoke the enemy to an engagement, as the two fleets were in sight of each other.

Alcibiades, though a banished man, could not divest himself of anxiety for the success of Athens; he therefore visited the Athenian fleet, and represented to the commanders the danger of their situation on an insecure and inhospitable coast, without either harbours or cities to which they might retire in case of necessity. At the same time he offered to cooperate with them, and to attack the enemy by land with a strong body of Thracian forces. The commanders, who were still jealous of this favourite of the people, refused to accept of his services, and reproached him for presuming, while an exile, to give counsel to the admirals of Athens.

As

As the Peloponnesian fleet was inferior in numbers to the Athenian, Lysander employed stratagem to accomplish his designs. He drew up his land-army, in order of battle, upon the coast by break of day, and ordered the seamen to go aboard their gallies, and to hold themselves in readiness, as if an engagement were to take place. When the sun arose, the Athenian fleet advanced, and bid defiance to the enemy. Lysander pretended to decline the engagement; his ships remained at anchor, and the Athenians, who imputed this conduct to fear, returned in triumph to harbour. During four days Lysander bore the insolence and nourished the presumption of the Athenians, having stationed his fleet in a place of security, where it could not be attacked without manifest disadvantage. After this daily parade, the Athenians landed in security from their ships in the evening, indulging themselves in pleasure or repose; a circumstance well known to Lysander, who regularly sent swift-sailing vessels to watch their motions.

On the fifth day the Athenian commanders proceeded, as usual, to offer battle to the Peloponnesian fleet. As they now counted on certain success, they yielded to all the dreams of presumption, and began to dispose of the Lacedæmonian prisoners who should fall into their power. Philocles proposed to cut off their right hands; and this cruel and unmanly proposal was sanctioned by the majority of his colleagues. After having attempted to provoke the enemy to an engagement, by more daring menaces and mortifying insults than on any former occasion, they retired with an air of triumph, as if they had obtained the victory. Lysander detached his boats, as usual, to observe their movements, with orders to return when they saw the Athenians landed, and, as a signal, to hoist their shields in the middle of the channel.

Lysander,

Lysander, in the mean time, made every necessary preparation, and went through the whole fleet, exhorting the officers to hold the mariners and soldiers in readiness for an engagement. When the scouts, on their return, had reached the middle of the channel they hoisted their shields to the top of the vessel. The signal was given from the admiral's galley, by sound of trumpet, and immediately the whole fleet was in motion. The narrow strait of the Hellespont was soon passed by the activity and diligence of the rowers. Conon, the chief in command, first perceived the approach of the enemy, and called with a loud voice for the troops to embark. But all his efforts were in vain; the troops and their commanders, equally infatuated, had deserted their ships, were amusing themselves in the fields, indulging in the luxury of the table, or preparing to sleep in their tents. In this critical moment, Conon resolved to save himself by flight; and, carrying along with him nine gallies, set sail for Cyprus. Mean while Lysander arrived, and his forces gave full indulgence to their resentment and animosity, which had been rendered more violent from the long restraint which their prudent commander had imposed on them. An engagement, with little resistance, was attended by a victory with little bloodshed. The ships, when taken, were either empty, or so feebly manned as to be incapable of resistance. No defeat was ever more decisive in its effects, or more disgraceful to the vanquished, than that at Ægos Potamos. Of a fleet consisting of a hundred and eighty vessels, nine only had escaped. Lysander, amidst triumphal shouts and acclamations, returned to Lampsacus, with a hundred and seventy-one gallies, three thousand prisoners, and the plunder of the camp. It was his glory or good fortune to have performed one of the most important military exploits recorded in history, and

to

to have terminated in an hour, a war which had lasted twenty-seven years, which had embroiled all the states of Greece with their dependencies, and which, without such a seasonable and decisive blow, might have extended its malignant effects to a longer duration. Lysander immediately sent couriers to convey this welcome intelligence to Sparta.

The fate of the Athenian prisoners taken in the engagement was soon decided at a hostile and a Spartan tribunal. They were all condemned to death, and massacred in cold blood. However this severe sentence may shock the feelings of humanity, it was in some measure excused by the law of retaliation, as the Athenian commanders had, of late, without the shadow of necessity, thrown the helpless crews of a Corinthian and an Andrian vessel from the top of a precipice into the sea; and had meditated cruelties on the Spartans, if they had proved victorious. Three thousand prisoners were put to death; Adimantus alone was spared, because he had opposed the sanguinary resolution of Philocles, a merit which, it is said, was augmented by his having carried on a correspondence with the Spartans.

This war had been expensive, ruinous, and sanguinary from the beginning, and continued so to the end. It was their superiority at sea that enabled the Athenians to support it for such a length of time, and to recover from their frequent calamities and disasters at land; and the Spartans prevailed at last merely by the influence of Persian gold, the distraction of the Athenian councils, and the weakness of their commanders. By the battle of Ægos Potamos, the Athenians lost the sovereignty of the sea, which they had acquired by the consent of their maritime allies, in the fourth year of the seventy-fifth olympiad. They had enjoyed that empire from the four hundred

and seventy-seventh till the four hundred and fifth year before the Christian era; that is, during a period of seventy-two years.

After this battle, which left him without an enemy to engage, Lysander did not immediately attack Athens. He knew, that from the strength of the fortifications, as well as from the valour of the inhabitants, heightened by despair, the siege would be an arduous undertaking. He proposed, therefore, after he had extended his conquests, to reduce it by famine. Having now the command of the sea, he employed his naval force to establish the Lacedæmonian empire over the extensive coasts of Greece and Asia. He attacked the flourishing cities of Chalcedon and Byzantium, and easily subdued them during the panic into which they were thrown by the total defeat of the Athenians. He soon after took Mitylené; and all the neighbouring islands, as well as the sea-ports of Lydia and Caria, submitted to his arms. In the meanwhile a squadron, commanded by Eteonicus, laid waste the shores of Macedon and Thrace, and met no opponent in all the Grecian seas. In about seven months after the defeat of Conon and his colleagues, the finest provinces of Europe and Asia became either the tributaries or allies of Sparta.

But the main object of Lysander was the conquest of Athens. For this purpose his fleet prevented all supplies from reaching that city, and every Athenian prisoner was compelled, under pain of death, to return home. By thus keeping back all supplies, and by the accumulation of inhabitants, the Lacedæmonian commander expected that famine would reduce the Athenians to surrender.

Nothing can be conceived more deplorable than the situation and the prospects of the Athenians. Agis and Pausanias, the two kings of Sparta, advanced

vanced towards the city with all their forces ; Lysander, with a hundred and fifty sail, blocked up their harbour. Surrounded by sea and land ; without an army or a fleet, an ally or a friend ; destitute of provisions and resources, they represented to themselves the cruel calamities of a siege, the horrors of famine, the ruin of the republic, the destruction of the city, and the unknown, though miserable and ignominious fate of its inhabitants ! But even then their antient spirit did not forsake them. They defended their walls and ramparts with unabated courage, endured fatigue and hunger with patience, and, amidst the ravages of disease and death, punished with severity a citizen who proposed, that they should capitulate ; but when their provisions were almost exhausted, and the famine had made dreadful progress, necessity prompted them to send deputies to Agis, to propose a treaty with Sparta. Agis informed them, that ambassadors must be sent to the Lacedæmonian capital, to consult the Ephori. The fickle and treacherous Theramenes, with nine colleagues, were appointed to this office, and invested with full powers. During four months the negociation was purposely protracted till the progress of famine aud disease, and the daily depopulation of Athens, should compel the inhabitants to submit to any terms. Theramenes at last returned with the fruits of his embassy. The conditions of peace were these, "That the fortifications of the Piræus, together with the walls that communicated with Athens, should be demolished ; that the Athenians should deliver up all their ships, twelve only excepted ; that they should abandon all their foreign possessions, and remain satisfied with their own territories ; that they should recall the surviving members of the aristocracy ; that they should enter into a treaty offensive and defensive with the Lacedæmonians, and in war should march under their standard; and

and lastly, that their adored commonwealth should be subverted, and the odious oligarchy imposed; that oligarchy which the Athenians had spent so much blood and treasure to overturn in every city of Greece! The period of twenty-seven years had now elapsed, which had been marked out by frequent oracles as the term of the Peloponnesian war, and of the Athenian empire. The chief leaders of the democracy had been cut off by the stratagems of the opposite party, who regardless of the interest or honour of their country, only thought of being subordinate tyrants under the conquerors. Superstition, therefore, and necessity pressed equally on the feeble and dispirited Athenians, and produced a reluctant submission to the decisions of Sparta.

On the same day in which the Athenians had gained the celebrated victory at Salamis, they fell a victim to the confederacy of their countrymen. The walls and fortifications of the city, sacred to Minerva, were rased to the foundation, and, amidst every wanton and exulting display of triumph, the tyranny of Athens was execrated, and her fall declared to be the revival of Grecian freedom.

Lysander immediately changed the form of the Athenian government, established thirty archons or tyrants over the city, and bribed to their interest three thousand, collected from the refuse of the people, to sport the more securely with the lives and property of the rest.

CHAP. XXI.

From the Conclusion of the PELOPONNESIAN WAR, *to the Peace of* ANTALCIDAS.

AT the close of the Peloponnesian war, the Spartan empire revived on the ruins of the Athenian, and the Lacedæmonians became the leading people in Greece. Lysander having reduced Samos, the last of the Athenian settlements which submitted to his arms, governed the islands and cities of Asia Minor with arbitrary and oppressive sway. He had a party in every little state, with a Spartan Harmostes, or governor, at their head, who were the ready instruments of his ambition, avarice, or resentment. The contributions, of which the Asiatic Greeks had so much complained, under the stern dominion of Athens, appeared no longer exorbitant under the cruel tyranny of Sparta. Lysander imposed on these exhausted communities the enormous tribute of a thousand talents.

The thirty archons established at Athens, soon shewed themselves to be the fit instruments of Spartan oppression and cruelty. With a guard always attending them, and three thousand armed men at their command, they kept the whole city in terror and dismay. At first, the people rejoiced when they saw that informers and turbulent demagogues were delivered over to condign punishment, without considering that this gave the last blow to their liberties, and was intended to introduce a scene of rapine and bloodshed.* Their private enemies became the first

* Xenoph. p. 462. Sallust. de Bell. Catalin. cap. 51.

victims of their cruelty, on pretence of their being enemies to the state. Power was considered as a crime, because it might be dangerous; riches induced a sentence of death on the possessors, which was followed by a confiscation of estates, which the thirty tyrants divided among themselves. In short, says Xenophon, they put more people to death in eight months of peace, than the enemies had done in a war of thirty years.

The abandoned Critias, whose vices had raised him to the head of this council, carried his oppression and cruelty to such an extreme, that Theramenes, who, in fact, had been the author of the usurpation, either prompted by virtue, or the suggestions of inconstancy, resolved to demolish the fabric which he had reared. He became the protector of his countrymen against the injustice and violence of his colleagues; and the citizens, considering his influence over the foreign troops, as well as the Athenians, looked up to him alone for deliverance from their present state of humiliation and distress.

Critias, who knew the precarious tenure of his own authority, and that of his colleagues, accused Theramenes before the senate of conspiring to disturb the tranquillity of the state, and to subvert the government. After an able and artful accusation by Critias, Theramenes made his defence, which was managed with such strength of argument, that the senators, notwithstanding the presence of Critias and his associates, could not restrain the murmurs of their applause. The sanguinary tyrant, afraid that he might be acquitted, introduced privately into the senate armed men, who, from time to time, discovered to the eyes of the judges the points of their daggers. The astonished and intimidated senators condemned him to death. Amazed at this atrocious sentence,

Theramenes

Theramenes sprang upon the altar of the senate-house, and implored the assistance of the surrounding spectators, who, in permitting his execution, he warned them, were establishing a precedent for their own. But the terror of the tyrants, and their armed associates prevented any exertion in his behalf: he was torn from the altar by the ministers of public justice, and dragged to execution. Of all the senators, Socrates alone, in whose school he had studied philosophy, opposed the sentence with the wisdom of a sage, and the magnanimity of a patriot; and even when his efforts were unsuccessful, exhorted the senate and the people to avenge themselves of their insolent oppressors. When the hemlock was presented to Theramenes, he drank it with tranquillity, and made some atonement for the inconsistencies and contradictions in his life, by his fortitude in the hour of death.

Delivered from the only associate who ventured to oppose their measures, the Athenian tyrants indulged themselves in every species of oppression without resistance or controul. Accusations, imprisonments, murders, succeeded each other. Every one trembled for himself or his friends. The antient Athenian spirit seems entirely to have deserted Athens; and the pusillanimous citizens ventured not to utter the voice of complaint. Socrates alone remained firm and intrepid; he preserved his independence, sustained his dignity, and discoursed with boldness against the government of the thirty.

The most considerable citizens of Athens, who retained any sentiments of freedom, at last resolved to withdraw from their native city, now become a scene of cruelty and oppression, and to seek an asylum in different parts of Greece. At the head of these was Thrasybulus, a person of extraordinary merit, who

beheld, with the most lively sorrow, the calamities of his country. The savage resentment and inhuman cruelty of the Spartans, not yet gratified by all the sufferings of the Athenians, endeavoured to deprive the miserable wanderers of this last refuge. The senate issued a decree prohibiting the Grecian cities to receive the unfortunate fugitives. Most of the states obeyed this cruel injunction; but in some the sacred laws of humanity and hospitality prevailed. Argos, Thebes, and Megara opened their gates to the Athenian exiles. The Thebans, with unwonted generosity, made a decree to punish every citizen who beheld an Athenian attacked by his enemies, without exerting his utmost efforts to assist him.

By continual acts of injustice, rapine, and cruelty, the thirty tyrants had rendered themselves so odious and detested, that nothing but a leader of abilities and spirit was wanting to shake the foundations of their power, and precipitate their downfall. Such a leader appeared in Thrasybulus; who, collecting the scattered exiles in Thebes and Megara, to the number of seventy, seized the fortress of Phyla, on the Athenian frontier. The tyrants, alarmed at this enterprize, hastened, at the head of three thousand men, to dislodge the new garrison. But the natural strength of the place, with the uncommon violence of a tempest, aided the efforts of Thrasybulus's little army, and compelled the enemy to return, without success, to Athens. The garrison at Phyla, by the concourse of Athenian exiles, was soon augmented to seven hundred men.

Apprehensive that this determined and daring band might attack the capital, the tyrants sent a detachment of cavalry and Lacedæmonian auxiliaries to encamp near Phyla, as a check upon the garrison; but Thrasybulus made a sudden and unexpected attack

tack by night on the Lacedæmonian camp, put the enemy to flight, and slew a hundred and twenty men in the pursuit.

Alarmed at this defeat, the tyrants withdrew from the defenceless city of Athens to Eleusis. As a proof of their atrocious and unrelenting cruelty, the very first step they took was to put to death all the Eleusinians whom they suspected of disaffection to their interest.

The garrison at Phyla was reinforced by five hundred men, raised by Lysias the orator, at his own expence, in order to take vengeance on the tyrants for the murder of his brother, and his own expulsion from his country.

Encouraged by this accession of strength, Thrasybulus resolved to march towards Athens, and attack the Piræus. The tyrants opposed him with all their forces, but were defeated by his superior abilities. The enemy, drawn up in deep and close array, were obliged to ascend an eminence, which had been wisely occupied by the general of the exiles. The javelins thrown from the rear could not reach beyond their own van; while, on the contrary, from the advantage of the ground, every weapon discharged from the army of Thrasybulus did execution. The battle was short but decisive; Critias and Hippomachus, the two most sanguinary and violent of the tyrants, were in the number of the slain.

Thrasybulus restrained the ardour of his troops, and stopped them from pursuing the fugitives. He then ordered a herald to proclaim, with a loud voice, "Athenians, wherefore do you fly from your countrymen; We are not enemies, but fellow-citizens; we have the same origin, country, religion, and laws; we have often jointly fought to defend our common liberty; we have declared war, not against the city, but against the tyrants; and we come not as con-

querors to load you with new chains, but as friends to avenge your wrongs, and assert your liberties."

This seasonable proclamation aided the effects of the victory to raise a general abhorrence of the tyrants; who were next day deprived of their dignity, and ten magistrates (one elected from each tribe) appointed in their stead. The surviving members of the council of thirty, with their chief accomplices in guilt, fled to Eleusis.

The council of ten, who now assumed the government, were no sooner invested with the badges of authority, than they followed the track of the thirty, adopted, in like manner, the Lacedæmonian policy, and equally oppressed their fellow-citizens. Thrasybulus, who still kept possession of the Piræus, struck terror into the Decemvirs; who, in conjunction with the remains of the thirty, sent messengers to Lysander, to implore assistance from Sparta. He soon arrived to their assistance, with a powerful army and a squadron of gallies, and invested the Piræus by sea and land.

Nothing could have defeated the projects of Lysander to subdue Athens a second time, and to extirpate the last roots of the democracy, but his own overbearing demeanour, and the boundless rapacity of his dependants. A powerful party was formed against him, and Pausanias, the most popular of the Spartan princes, suddenly raised an army, and marched with celerity to Athens, to thwart or defeat the operations of Lysander. After some skirmishes, in which the army of Thrasybulus defended the Piræus with more valour than success, Pausanias conveyed to them his favourable intentions, and his design to restore their liberties. These tidings were received with universal joy. Pausanias entered into a negociation with the senate of Sparta, and the Ephori, which was traversed by Lysander and the ten tyrants; but notwithstanding

withstanding their opposition, fifteen commissioners were appointed, who, in conjunction with the Spartan king, were empowered to settle the government, and fix the security of Athens.

Factions now ceased to contend with each other; the tyrants were degraded from their rank, and, amidst the exultation of the Athenians, their beloved democracy was re-established. This revolution was as remarkable for its clemency and gentleness, as the former usurpation had been for its cruelty and oppression. The tyrants, with the despicable tools of their oppression, were allowed to retire in safety to Eleusis, and, by the influence and persuasion of Thrasybulus, an enthusiasm of generosity and a spirit of forgiveness pervaded all orders of the people.

The tyrants of their country, who had fled to Eleusis, might have shared the benefits of indemnity and forgiveness, if the consciousness of former guilt had not involved them in new crimes. They again collected troops, and attempted to reinstate themselves in the government. But the unprepared efforts of rage and resentment were of no avail; the remaining tyrants expiated their crimes with their blood, and thus established the safety and tranquillity of the new republic. Their adherents, upon their submission, were received to mercy, all the exiles were restored, and the wise and generous Thrasybulus obtained a decree of the people for reinstating them in their former rank and fortunes, and for burying in perpetual oblivion the remembrance of their delinquency. This law, equally prudent and generous, was not, however, strictly adhered to; the remembrance of injuries could not be totally effaced; and many of the adherents of the tyrants were afterwards condemned and punished, in violation of the public faith.

Thus, in less than two years after the subversion

of the Athenian commonwealth by a Spartan general, the same form of government was re-established with new lustre by the authority and assistance of a Spartan king. To understand this historical phenomenon, it is requisite to review the character and conduct of Lysander. After the siege and surrender of Athens, he was in the zenith of his glory. He had the principal share in those celebrated engagements and victories which raised Sparta to her former pre-eminence in Greece; and, assuming the consequence which he thought due to his merit, he began to display the pomp and parade of state, and to court the flattery and adoration which were conferred on eastern princes. Poets, enriched by his bounty, employed their talents to celebrate his atchievements; a venal tribe of flatterers continually surrounded him, who studied to excel one another in the licentious strains of panegyric. He ordered his own statue to be cast in brass. He permitted the Grecian cities to erect altars to him as to a divinity, to offer sacrifices to him, and to sing hymns in his honour. The Samians ordained, by a public decree, that the feasts sacred to Juno, and which bore the name of that goddess, should be called the *Feasts of Lysander*.

The ambition of this general was not satisfied with pomp, ostentation, and flattery; he had acquired a degree of power and authority, prohibited by the laws of Lycurgus, and of which there had been no example in Sparta. The states and cities annexed to the dominion of Sparta, were governed by his dependants, over whom he possessed absolute power. He knew no bounds in resenting injuries and punishing his enemies. Whoever incurred his displeasure was punished with death; and, in accomplishing his plans, whether of ambition or revenge, he employed, without hesitation or remorse, treachery, perjury, and the worst of crimes. He massacred eight hundred inhabitants

inhabitants of Miletus, though he had solemnly sworn to preserve their lives. The multitudes that he caused to be murdered in the other cities is almost incredible; for he had not only his own resentments to satiate, but those of his friends and dependants, to whom he gave unlimited power to gratify their malice and avarice, by the destruction of their enemies, and the confiscation of their effects.

There was no kind of injustice, violence, or cruelty, which the people did not suffer under the government of Lysander and his deputies. Frequent complaints were made by the cities of the intolerable vexations and oppressions which they endured; but he had found out a method to render the Lacedæmonians deaf to the voice of petition or remonstrance.

Before Lysander returned to Sparta, after the reduction of Athens, he sent Gylippus before him with the gold and spoils which he had amassed in the course of his last campaign. This wealth, besides the presents of golden crowns and ornaments received from the cities, amounted to fifteen hundred talents.* Gylippus converted a fifth part of this treasure to his own use, by opening the bottom of the bags in which it was contained; but the treachery being detected, to avoid punishment, he went into voluntary exile. On this occasion it was debated in the senate, whether it were not a violation of the laws of Lycurgus to admit gold and silver into Sparta. Those who were attached to the antient constitution, condemned Lysander for introducing that pernicious metal, which had always proved the bane and corruption of morals; and presented a strong remonstrance to the Ephori, who ordered it to be carried out of the city. But this sentence was over-ruled by the party of Lysander, who proposed, as a conciliating

* 337,000*l.*

ating measure, that the iron money should be employed in ordinary currency, and that the gold and silver should be deposited in the treasury, and applied solely to the service of the state.

Such a debate, in the present situation of Sparta, carried more of the ostentation than the reality of public virtue. As the Lacedæmonians had adopted a new plan of administration, a public treasury was become absolutely necessary. It was impossible to support a fleet, or carry on offensive war, without a revenue. Hence they applied so frequently to the Persian viceroys and governors for money. As the situation of the republic had changed, it was requisite that its customs should also change. A law passed, prohibiting private persons from receiving this new coin, as if individuals could long neglect what formed the strength and sinews of the state, or laws prevent money from penetrating into houses where avarice had gone before. Lysander's wealth did not remain in the treasury. By the influence of this secret but powerful persuader, he found means to defend himself against the complaints and accusations of desolated cities and plundered provinces.

The prohibition of the precious metals had the usual effect in rendering them more eagerly and passionately coveted. Sensible to the attractions of gold and silver, the Lacedæmonians employed the most unjust and violent means to obtain them; avarice and corruption being late introduced, made the more rapid advances; and the Spartan governors imposed exactions and tributes on the dependant states, more arbitrary and oppressive than either the Athenians or Persians.

But although the arm of Spartan authority was feeble, and slow to punish offences when the accusers were in the rank of subjects or dependents, it acquired new nerves and sinews when a person of rank

rank and dignity solicited its exertion. Pharnabazus, one of the governors of Lower Asia, harassed by the perpetual ravages committed in his provinces by the rapacious Lysander, sent deputies to Sparta to complain of his conduct. He was immediately recalled by the Ephori. He was astonished at the order, but obeyed, and endeavoured to defend his conduct before the senate. He was neither condemned nor acquitted. Accustomed to command at the head of armies, and to enjoy the secondary attributes and prerogatives of sovereignty in Asia, he could not endure this banishment to his native country, nor descend to the simplicity of private life. He therefore solicited the permission of the Ephori, to make a journey to the temple of Jupiter Hammon to discharge a vow.

After his departure, the kings, senate, and Ephori, considering that he held the cities in dependence by means of his own partizans, whom he had raised to be magistrates and governors, and that, by blending the aristocratical authority with that of his own creatures, he had become, in some measure, lord and master of Greece, resolved to destroy this system of tyranny, by re-establishing democracy in the Grecian states. Hence the efforts of Pausanias to restore Athens to its liberty, in opposition to the plots of of Lysander. Of such casual incidents, the code of Athenian and Spartan policy is composed; of such unconnected links the chain of their history consists.

The concluding year of the Peloponnesian war terminated the prosperous reign of Darius Nothus. He appointed Arsaces, his eldest son, to be his successor; who, upon ascending the throne, assumed the named of Artaxerxes, from his great memory. Cyrus, his younger brother, was then at court, and, as he was the peculiar favourite of his mother, she employed all her influence over her husband to obtain

the kingdom for her younger son. This produced a rivalship between the two princes, which naturally ended in jealousy and hatred. The claim of Cyrus to the throne was not without authority and precedent in the Persian history; for, though he was the second son of Darius, yet, being born after his accession to the throne, he was the eldest son of the king. This distinction had induced the first Darius to bequeath his crown to Xerxes, in preference to his elder brother Artabazanes.

Artaxerxes succeeded to the throne according to the appointment of his father, and set out from his capital for the city of Pasargades to be crowned, according to custom, by the priests of Persia. Cyrus, whose dangerous ambition was inflamed by that of his mother, could not behold the scepter, which he claimed as his right, transferred into the hands of another; and conceived the criminal design of assassinating his brother in the temple, while he was assuming the robe of Cyrus, previous to the coronation.* His intention being discovered, he was seized and condemned to death. His mother Parysatis, who doated on him to distraction, interceded for his pardon with shrieks and lamentations. Artaxerxes, who was a generous and merciful prince, yielded to the prayers and tears of his mother, forgave the wild ambition of Cyrus, but sent him to his government in Asia, where he had been appointed hereditary satrap by the will of his father.

No sooner had he arrived at Sardis than he bent all his thoughts to revenge the supposed affront he had received from his brother, and to expel him from the throne. All the talents which he had received from nature, and improved by art, were exerted by him to forward this ungrateful and unnatural attempt.

* Plutar. in Artaxerx.

Whoever

Whoever came from the court of Susa found a welcome reception at Sardis; and every artifice was put in practice to attach them to the side of Cyrus. He gained the affections or secured the obedience of his Asiatic subjects, who, though inferior to the Greeks, excelled the effeminate troops of Upper Asia both in valour and military skill; but his chief confidence was in his Grecian forces, particularly in the assistance of Sparta. The maritime situation of his provinces connected him with the Greek states, whose favour he was solicitous to gain; and, as he had raised the Lacedæmonians to their present superiority in Greece, he had every thing to expect from their gratitude. Nor was he deceived in his expectations. He was allowed to recruit his army with the best soldiers of Peloponnesus; and, with the assistance of Clearchus the Spartan, he augmented his army with thirteen thousand Greeks. In order to disguise his policy, and draw a veil over his treason, he enticed the cities under the government of Tissaphernes, to revolt from his authority, and transfer their allegiance to himself. He then assembled his troops openly, under the pretence of arming against that governor, and filled the ear of his brother with complaints against Tissaphernes. That generous and humane, but weak and credulous prince, believed the representation of Cyrus, and was lulled into his usual security.

The friends of Cyrus at the Persian court, by disseminating rumours and opinions, endeavoured to prepare the minds of the people for the intended revolution. They hinted, that the vast dominions of Persia required a prince of abilities, valour, and activity; a king magnificent, brave, and generous; who, fired with a noble ambition, would emulate his ancestors, by extending the boundaries, or augmenting the glory of the empire which was founded by the great Cyrus.

The

The formidable preparations of this aspiring prince did not escape the vigilant eye of Alcibiades. This singular man, whose history now draws near to a conclusion, then resided at Grynium, a Phrygian town under the protection of Pharnabasus. Ambitious of conciliating the favour of the Persian monarch, he desired a guard from Pharnabasus to escort him with safety to Susa, that he might apprise Artaxerxes of the meditated rebellion. At this very time the Athenians, groaning under the cruel government of the Thirty, proposed to recal Alcibiades to his native country, and appoint him their leader against the tyrants. The reputation of this active and successful commander was still so formidable, that Lysander informed Pharnabasus the death of Alcibiades was equally necessary to Persia and the Spartans. The satrap, who wished that the Athenian should not have the merit of discovering the treachery of Cyrus, paid immediate attention to this sanguinary counsel. A troop of assassins was sent to seize him; but were so intimidated by the terror of his name that they durst not attack him by open force. In the darkness of the night, they surrounded his house, to which they set fire. Alarmed by the noise, Alcibiades drew his sword, and rushed through the flames, followed by the affectionate Timandra. His cowardly executioners retired from his presence, but, discharging their darts at a distance, he fell, covered with wounds. No outrage was offered to Timandra; she was even permitted to bestow the last duties on the remains of her illustrious and unfortunate friend. Thus fell Alcibiades, who had so frequently embroiled the affairs of Europe and Asia, whose contradictory life had been almost equally beneficial and pernicious, honourable and ignominious, to himself and his country.

Cyrus completed his army without interruption or molestation;

molestation; and, in the beginning of the fourth century before the Christian era, began his march from Ionia to Upper Asia, at the head of thirteen thousand Greeks, and a hundred thousand Asiatics.

Clearchus, the Lacedæmonian, commanded all the Peloponnesian troops, except the Achæans, who had Socrates for their leader. The Thessalians were conducted by Menon, and the Bœotians by Proxenes the Theban, who introduced Xenophon to the service of Cyrus. Their fleet, consisting of sixty vessels, was commanded by Samius, who was appointed successor to Lysander in the government of the Ionian coast. It was ordered to keep near the shore, and co-operate with the land army.

Cyrus, apprehensive that the boldness of his enterprize, and the length as well as dangers of the march, would intimidate the Grecian officers, as well as soldiers, had imparted his design only to Clearchus. The troops knew not into what countries they were going to march, nor with what enemies they were to engage. Cyrus had only caused it to be given out to the army, that they were to act against the Pisidians, who had infested Ionia by their incursions.

Tissaphernes, at last acquainted with the real intentions of Cyrus, and the object of his expedition, posted to the court of Susa, and informed Artaxerxes of the danger with which he was threatened. In consequence of this information, that monarch assembled a numerous army, and prepared to resist his rebellious brother.

Having at length set out from Sardis, Cyrus advanced with rapid marches towards the upper provinces of Asia; passed through Lydia, Phrygia, Cappadocia, and the high grounds of Cilicia; crossed the river Euphrates at Thapsacus; and, having traversed the desert, reached the confines of Chaldea. After having passed, not without opposition, the narrow defile

file of Cilicia, he arrived at Tarsus. Here the Grecian troops refused to continue their march. As the design of advancing to Babylon, and making war against the Persian king had never been communicated to them, they complained with loud clamours of the deceit, accused their generals of treachery, and even insulted the dignity of Cyrus. It required all the address and insinuation of Clearchus to quell this commotion. He publicly espoused the cause of the soldiers, affected to sympathize with all their grievances, and to approve their measures for redress and relief. He openly declared, that he considered his interest as inseparable from theirs, and advised them to send deputies to treat with the prince, that he might either, by granting the demands of the Greeks, induce them to follow him, or permit them to return home. The tumult was thus appeased, and all differences adjusted, by adding half a daric to their monthly pay.

Leaving Tarsus, the army continued their march to Issus, the last town of Cilicia, on the borders of Syria. Two fortresses, called the gates of Syria and Cilicia, defended this narrow pass between the mountain and the sea. The Lacedæmonian fleet, commanded by Pythagoras the Spartan, who had succeeded Samius, prepared to land the Greeks beyond the Syrian works, so that their fortifications must have been assaulted on both sides; but the commander, Abracamas, abandoned his forts and fled. After this feeble opposition, Cyrus proceeded unmolested to the banks of the Euphrates. That river at Thapsacus extends in breadth to more than half a mile, but is remarkably shallow, especially in autumn, which was the season when Cyrus and his army forded it. This afforded an opportunity for Asiatic flattery to the inhabitants of Thapsacus, who scrupled not to declare

declare to the prince, that the Euphrates knew and submitted to its sovereign.*

Having passed the Euphrates, Cyrus continued his route through Mesopotamia; and having crossed the desert in seventeen days, arrived at the fertile and opulent plains of Babylon. After a march of five days, he came to a ditch five fathoms broad and three deep, extending twelve leagues in length from the Euphrates to the wall of Media. Between the Euphrates and the ditch, was a road twenty feet broad, by which, as it was left unguarded and unprotected, Cyrus passed with his whole army. From the neglect of the Persian monarch to dispute this pass, it was generally believed that he had laid aside the design of risking a battle. Confiding in this conjecture, the troops of Cyrus no longer observed any order of march, deposited their arms in the waggons, and proceeded negligently along, as if they had no enemy to encounter. But when they arrived at the plain of Cynaxa, a day's journey from Babylon, a confidential friend of Cyrus rode up to them with full speed, and called aloud in the Persian language, that the king was at hand with a great army.

Cyrus, leaping from his car, in which he rode carelessly in the van, put on his armour, mounted his horse, and prepared his troops for engaging. He was obeyed with alacrity; and the army soon advanced in order of battle. A little past noon-day, a thick cloud of dust announced the approach of the royal host. The army of Artaxerxes was commanded by Tissaphernes, Gobrias, and Arbaces. In the front were a hundred and fifty chariots, armed with scythes. The cavalry, under the command of Tissaphernes, were distinguished by white corslets; the Persians by bucklers made of wicker; and the

* Xenoph. 253. Xen. p. 263, &c.

Egyptians

Egyptians by wooden shields, which covered their whole body.

These formed the principal strength of the regal army; the rest consisted of a multitude without discipline, and almost without arms. Cyrus gave orders to Clearchus to attack the centre of the enemy, where, according to the Persian custom, the king had taken his station, surrounded by the flower of his army, assuring him that victory would inevitably follow the defeat of that body; but Clearchus, from a fear of being surrounded by the Persians, who, from their numbers, greatly outflanked him, disobeyed the orders, and kept his post near to the Euphrates. To this, and the blind impetuosity of Cyrus, must be ascribed the defeat which ensued.

When the armies were within four hundred paces of each other, the Greeks began to sing their sacred pæans, intermixed with the martial sound of their spears against their brazen bucklers. Then moving at once, they sprung forwards upon the enemy, who fled with precipitation. While the Greeks were occupied in the pursuit, Artaxerxes commanded his centre to wheel to the left, to attack the rear of the enemy. Cyrus at this moment rode with eagerness and impatience to meet him at the head of six hundred horse. He threw the guards of the king, consisting of six thousand cavalry, into confusion, and killed Artagerses, their leader, with his own hand. When he discovered his brother amidst the ranks, his eyes sparkled with rage. Rushing forward with the instinctive fury of revenge, he cried out, "I see him," and opening a way through the attendants, aimed a javelin at the king, which killed his horse, and brought him to the ground. Artaxerxes having mounted another steed, Cyrus aimed a second dart, and wounded him in the breast; but his eagerness for revenge rendered him inattentive to his own preservation.

servation. He was overwhelmed by a shower of darts during the furious conflict between the king's attendants and his own; eight of his confidential friends having fallen round the dead body of their lord.

Artaxerxes, having caused the head and right hand of Cyrus to be struck off, pursued the enemy into their camp. Ariæus, who commanded the forces of Lower Asia, led them off in dejection and despair for the loss of their prince; nor did they stop at their camp, but continued their flight to the place where the army had encamped the day before, at the distance of four leagues.

Meanwhile Clearchus had defeated the left wing of the enemy, and pursued the fugitives to the distance of three miles from the field of battle. Upon his return, he found that the Persians were in possession of the camp, and perceived, that satiated with plunder, they advanced to attack his rear. Apprehensive of being surrounded on all sides, he wheeled about, and halted with the river in his rear. The remainder of the day was spent without any decisive action, the Persians constantly retiring with precipitation from the charge of the Greeks. Clearchus at last returned to his camp, which he found plundered by the enemy, and all the provisions either carried off or destroyed.

Next morning he prepared to decamp, when messengers arrived from Ariæus, informing him that Cyrus was slain; that the new general, with the Asiatic troops, would wait for that day, and no longer, in their camp, for the junction of the Greeks, intending on the next to march for Ionia.

Clearchus replied, "We lament the death of Cyrus; but acquaint Ariæus that we have compelled the king and his army to fly before us, and assure him, that

that if he will join his forces with ours, we will place him on the Persian throne."

Artaxerxes, on the other hand, flushed with what he esteemed a complete victory, sent heralds to the Greeks, commanding them to deliver up their arms. "Let him come and take them," replied an unknown voice from the midst of a multitude, which heard the demand with indignation. "It is better to die, than to surrender our arms," said another intrepid Greek. Xenophon delivered the following answer: "All we now have are our arms and our valour; while we have courage and our swords we are free; we are slaves as soon as we lay down our arms. Expect not therefore, that we shall throw away our sole advantage; but be assured, on the contrary, that, confiding in our arms and our valour, we will dispute with you all your boasted advantages." Clearchus added, "That if the Great King would receive them into the number of his allies, they would serve him with fidelity and valour; but if he imagined to reduce them to slavery, he should find that they had the means of defence in their hands, and were determined that the same moment should put an end to their liberty and their lives." After this unsuccessful attempt, the heralds returned to the Persian camp.

Ariæus replied to the Grecian deputies, "That there were many Persians of greater consideration than himself, who would never permit him to ascend the throne; that he should certainly set out next morning on his return to Ionia; and that, if they intended to march along with him, they should join him in the night." This proposal was adopted; the army marched in order of battle, and arrived at midnight in the camp of Ariæus. The Grecian and Asiatic commanders entered into a treaty, and bound themselves by oaths to mutual fidelity and attachment.

ment. They confirmed this engagement by a solemn sacrifice, the Greeks dipping their swords, and the Asiatics the point of their javelins in the blood of the victims. After consulting on their intended march, it was determined to alter their route; and, instead of returning by the desert, where they had formerly marched seventeen days amidst a barren wild, that they should direct their course towards the north, where they would find provisions in abundance, and cross the great rivers nearer their source.

Artaxerxes was, or pretended to be, so delighted with the courage and magnanimity of the Greeks, that he sent heralds to them the following day, with conciliatory propositions. Soon after Tissaphernes paid them a visit, to acquaint them with the clemency of the king, who, compassionating their situation, and foreseeing the dangers to which they were about to expose themselves, had given him permission to conduct them back to their own country. Clearchus replied, that the Greeks were led into Persia by Cyrus, without being acquainted with his intentions; that by his death their engagements with him were at an end; that they had undertaken this expedition without any view of making war against the Persian king; and that all they desired was a safe passage to Greece. Tissaphernes having departed to report their answer, returned on the third day to inform them, that the king was pleased with their declarations, and would favour their return; that as he himself was soon to set out for his province, he would accompany them in their journey, and supply them with provisions, on condition that they committed no disorders on their march. These conditions were sworn to on both sides, and Tissaphernes withdrew to settle his affairs, previous to his departure for Lower Asia.

During

During the absence of Tissaphernes, which continued for twenty days, the Persians had full opportunity of attempting the fidelity of Ariæus and his officers. His kinsmen and brothers warmly solicited his return to the allegiance which he owed to his natural sovereign, with full assurances of entire oblivion with regard to the past, and promises of future favours. Henceforth the affections of Ariæus appear to have been entirely alienated from his Grecian allies; and a visible coolness and distrust prevailed between the two armies.

On the return of Tissaphernes, they all set forward under the conduct of that satrap, who, according to his engagement, supplied the Greeks with provisions; but Ariæus and his troops no longer encamped with the Greeks, but with the forces of Tissaphernes. Yet, though the armies were mutually suspicious, for three weeks there were no open hostilities, except some inconsiderable skirmishes between the parties sent out to provide wood or forage. After having traversed the deserts of Media, they arrived at Cœnæ, a rich and populous city, and thence to the river Zabates, which, flowing westward from the Median mountains, pours its waters into the Tigris.

The occasions of distrust and aversion increasing every day between the Greeks and Persians, Clearchus proposed a mutual conference between the commanders, in order to remove every ground of suspicion or complaint, and bring matters to an amicable explanation. A motion so acceptable to both parties, though from very different motives, was readily carried into execution. The five generals, and twenty captains, went to the quarters of the Persian commander; two hundred soldiers followed, under the pretext of buying provisions in the Persian camp. Clearchus, with his four colleagues, Menon, Proxenus, Agias, and Socrates, were conducted into the tent

tent of Tissaphernes; the captains were not permitted to enter. The darkest suspicions were now entertained, and a silent interval of terror took place. On a signal given, those within the tent were seized, and those without were put to the sword; while a party of Persian horse cut to pieces the Greeks who had followed their officers. The five generals were sent to the Great King, who ordered them to be beheaded.

The astonishment and consternation of the Greeks at this tragic catastrophe, soon gave place to the horrors of their own situation. They were twelve hundred miles distant from their native country; they were surrounded by the dreary deserts, steep mountains, and dangerous rivers of an unknown and hostile country; they were exposed to famine, depredation, and the treachery of their Persian allies; and they were without a guide to conduct them through the multitude of dangers that opposed their progress.

In this general despondency, Xenophon, who had hitherto served in an inferior station, displayed an uncommon spirit of enterprize and energy of mind. Assembling the captains belonging to the division of his friend Proxenus, he represented to them that their valour was now their sole resource; that however small their number, they might render themselves formidable by their resolution and their fortitude; that the treachery of their enemies was the strongest proof of their timidity, of their dread of Grecian valour, that it would draw down upon them the vengeance of heaven, and enable the Greeks to baffle their numbers and their perfidy.

The magnanimous emotions of Xenophon roused the desponding spirits of his friends; and a council of the principal officers, to the number of a hundred, was summoned. In this council, Xenophon warmly exhorted

exhorted them to break off from the insidious alliance of the impious Ariæus and Tissaphernes, and to expect success from their virtue, valour, and the protection of the gods.

He advised them to appoint new officers in the room of their late commanders; to burn their superfluous baggage; to begin their march with all expedition towards the sources of the Tigris and Euphrates; and to advance in the form of a hollow square, that they might be prepared on every side to resist the enemy. The approbation of Cheirisophus the Spartan, gave weight to the counsels of Xenophon; his proposals were unanimously approved of, and carried into immediate execution.

This retreat of the ten thousand Greeks to their native country, has been celebrated by judges in the art of war, as one of the best conducted exploits to be found in antient history. It is recorded by Xenophon himself with an eloquent simplicity, much beauty of description, and a profound knowledge of the military art; but as it forms an episode in the history of Greece, rather than a part of it, I must refer the reader to his elegant and ingenious production.

Such was the catastrophe of an audacious and criminal enterprise, suggested by extravagant ambition, and violent revenge. Xenophon has given us a highly-finished picture of the younger Cyrus. According to his account, he surpassed his cotemporaries in bodily exercises, and exterior accomplishments. When he was appointed satrap of Lydia, instead of oppressing his subjects by extortion and rapacity, he preferred the interest of the provinces to his own; alleviated the load of taxes in order to encourage industry; set an example of rural labour with his own hands, and introduced a regularity of police, never before known in the Asiatic peninsula.

By

By his integrity in performing promises, and fulfilling engagements; by his generosity in rewarding merit, and bestowing favours, he conciliated affection to his person, as well as respect to his authority. By his character and conduct he gained the attachment both of the Greeks and Asiatics; and there have been few princes whom their people were more afraid to offend, or for whose sake they were more ready to sacrifice their fortunes and their lives.

But in this favourable portrait, Xenophon has omitted to mark the dark shades by which it was disfigured and disgraced. An ambition which was ready to sacrifice every thing to its own gratification, and to wade through blood to a throne; rebellion against his brother and his sovereign, who had spared his life when it was forfeited to justice and the laws; and the horrors of a civil war, in which he plunged the countries over which he proposed to reign, reflect an indelible stain on the memory of Cyrus, and, though not uncommon in the annals of Asia, ought not to have been passed over without censure by a philosophical historian. A letter which Cyrus wrote to the Spartan senate when he solicited their assistance, conveys some traits of his real character. There he boasts that his heart was more noble than that of his rival, that he was better instructed in religion and philosophy, and that he could drink more wine without being intoxicated.

The cities of Lesser Asia, that had espoused the cause of Cyrus, apprehending the resentment of Tissaphernes, applied to the Lacedæmonians for their protection and assistance.* The successful retreat of the ten thousand had lessened the character of the Persian monarch, and inspired through all Greece an enthusiasm for martial atchievements and

* Xenoph. Hellen, p. 479, &c.

military glory. Accordingly, Sparta armed at once to defend the liberty of the Asiatic states, and declared war against Tissaphernes and Pharnabasus. They immediately levied a body of five thousand Peloponnesian troops, and obtained three hundred horse from the Athenians. Thimbron, the Spartan, was appointed to the command of these forces, and had orders to offer employment to the Greeks who had returned from the expedition of Cyrus, and who, tired out by the perfidy of Seuthes, a Thracian prince, quitted his service, and joined the Lacedæmonian army with six thousand men, the remains of those hardy veterans who had experienced every species of distress, had seen danger in every form, and had returned unconquered by all the powers of the Great King.

Strengthened by such a powerful reinforcement, Thimbron commenced hostilities with considerable success, and gained possession of Pergamus, Teuthrania, Myrina, Cymé, and Grynium; but was repulsed at Larissa.

The licentious and seditious spirit of troops, collected from different and hostile communities, rendered them, during the intervals of war, formidable to each other, and to the cities they were appointed to protect. They even plundered the territories of the Lacedæmonian allies, who complained to the senate; and, in consequence of this complaint, Thimbron was recalled. The command was conferred on Dercyllidas, celebrated for his fertility in resources, and his ingenuity in inventing and improving machines of war. By joining the talents of an engineer to the abilities of a general, he soon became master of Larissa; and, in the space of a week, became master of eight other cities in the province of Pharnabasus.

In

In the spring, the Lacedæmonians sent commissioners to inspect the affairs of Asia, and to continue, for another year, the authority of Dercyllidas, if they approved of his conduct. The commissioners, finding that the conduct of Dercyllidas was in every respect irreproachable and meritorious, that he was popular in the army, and that the cities of Æolis and Ionia flourished under his administration, confirmed him in his command.

The Spartan deputies, before their departure, solicited the protection of Dercyllidas to the inhabitants of the Thracian Chersonesus, who were infested by the barbarous tribes that occupied the adjacent regions. Highly favoured by nature, the Chersonesus was cultivated by an industrious people; it was therefore rich and populous, but exposed, by the neck of land which connected it with Thrace, to the irruptions and depredations of the barbarians. Dercyllidas employed the labour of his soldiers to shut up the isthmus, and built a strong wall, which secured the cities in the Chersonesus from the predatory inroads of the Thracians.

The Spartans, now considering themselves as the protectors and sovereigns of Greece, zealously employed every opportunity of asserting their superiority, and displaying their influence. Offended with the Eleans, they resolved to make them striking examples of their vengeance. In the course of the Peloponnesian war, they had not only deserted the alliance of Sparta, but, with the Mantineans and Argives, had taken arms against that republic, excluded the Spartans from consulting the oracle, or disputing the prizes at the Olympic games, and even prevented Agis, their king, from sacrificing in the temple of Jupiter Olympius. That monarch was appointed to inflict the vengeance of Sparta on the devoted Eleans. Admonished by repeated shocks of an earthquake, he

refrained, for a year, from ravaging the sacred territories; but having appeased the wrath of heaven, as he imagined, by prayers and sacrifices, he laid waste the country during the two following summers, plundered the villages, spoiled the sacred edifices of their ornaments, and reduced to ruins many of the porticos and temples which adorned the city Olympia.

After the Spartans had plundered and laid waste the territory of Elis, they vouchsafed to suspend their ravages, and offered peace, on condition that the Eleans relinquished their authority over the villages originally independent, and accepted of the form of government which they should impose.*

Agis fell sick in his return from this expedition, and died soon after his arrival at Sparta. He acknowledged on his death-bed, the legitimacy of his son Leotychides; but a death-bed acknowledgment of a son, whom he had formerly disowned, was far from satisfactory to the party of Agesilaus, the brother of Agis, and failing Leotychides, the heir to the crown. The diminutive stature and lameness of Agesilaus were amply compensated by the virtues of his mind, a courage superior to danger, a noble elevation of character, and a generous ambition for the glory of Sparta. As the throne was the inheritance of his elder brother, he had been educated like a private person in all the strictness and severity of the Spartan discipline. Hence he had learned to obey, before he rose to command; and acquired, by living among his equals, the virtues of self-command, candour, and a respectful attention to others. Charmed with his extraordinary merit, notwithstanding his corporeal defects (more ignominious at Sparta than in any country) the majority of the Spartans supported his title, and estimated it a singular advantage to

* Xenoph. Hellen. lib. iii. cap. 4.

have

have a king, who was educated like themselves, in a rigorous submission to the laws of Lycurgus. Lysander in particular, whose own ambitious prospects were now blasted, employed all his eloquence and address in behalf of his public favourite; and, chiefly owing to his exertions, Agesilaus succeeded to the throne of Sparta.

Of all the Spartan kings, he was the most esteemed and loved by his subjects. Nature had endowed him with an heroic spirit, and talents for command; and his education had united to these the virtues of humanity and condescension. When he was declared king, the estate and effects of Agis, his brother, devolved to him by law, Leotychides being declared a bastard; but finding the relations of that prince, on the mother's side, in poverty, he divided the inheritance with them. By these, and similar actions, his reputation and popularity increased. The Ephori conferred on him the highest panegyric under the form of a punishment, and imposed a fine upon him for monopolizing the hearts and affections of all the citizens, which were the common property of the republic. His power was equal to his popularity. This arose from the respect and deference which he paid to the Ephori. As the authority of these magistrates was an innovation on the institutions of Lycurgus, the Spartan kings had retained an hereditary aversion for them, and looked upon them as rivals. On the contrary, Agesilaus, knowing that without their consent he could undertake no business of importance, endeavoured to concilitate their good opinion, and communicated to them the resolutions and enterprizes which he was forming.

At the distance of two years after the accession of Agesilaus to the throne, information was received, that the Persian monarch had fitted out a formidable fleet, in order to deprive the Lacedæmonians of their

empire at sea. By the influence of Lysander, the Spartan king was appointed commander in chief of the Grecian forces in Asia. He set out in the spring with three thousand emancipated helots, and six thousand troops collected from the allies. Since the illegal conduct of Agis in his expedition, the Spartan kings were usually attended in the field by a council of ten senators, invested with powers to sanction or controul their measures. Agesilaus got their number augmented to thirty. By this artful stroke of policy he lessened the consequence of the whole, and brought them more easily to submit to his direction.

The celebrated retreat of the ten thousand under the conduct of Xenophon, had, at this period, inspired the Greeks with a confidence in their own valour, and a contempt for the Persians. The Lacedæmonians resolved to improve so favourable a conjuncture for the delivering the Greeks in Asia from their subjection to a foreign yoke, and the oppressions of tyranny.

When Agesilaus arrived at Ephesus, Tissaphernes sent an embassy, demanding the reason of his coming to Asia with such hostile preparations. The Spartan king replied, "That he came to assist the Asiatic Greeks to recover their antient liberty." The deputies of Tissaphernes were prepared for this reply, and answered, that Artaxerxes was ready to acknowledge the independence of the Asiatic Greeks; and that ambassadors were soon expected from the Great King, invested with full powers to establish a lasting peace between the Persians and all the Grecian states. Meanwhile, the satrap desired a continuation of the truce; to which request Agesilaus, although suspicious of treachery, agreed, and the truce was sworn to on both sides. The perfidious Persian, who had no other intention but to amuse and deceive the Spartan general, continued to assemble forces and prepare for hostilities.

Agesilaus

Agesilaus employed this interval in making a tour through the principal cities, in order to redress injuries, and establish the government on a better foundation.

Lysander, whose power in Asia had been absolute, and whose name was still illustrious or formidable, rivalled and eclipsed the Spartan king in the eyes of the Ionians. They believed, that Agesilaus was general only in name and appearance, and that the whole authority was still vested in Lysander. Hence they paid their homage to him in crowds, and augmented his train when he went abroad, while Agesilaus remained almost in solitude. A general and a king could not but feel such a diminution, or rather annihilation of his authority; but Agesilaus, on this occasion, proceeded too far in humbling a rival, to whom he owed his throne, and his present command. He took every opportunity to diminish the influence, and mortify the pride of Lysander; and while he raised private officers to the highest commands and honours, appointed the man who had been celebrated as a conqueror in the east, a commissary of stores. Lysander required an explanation, and a pretended reconciliation took place; but there can be no cordial union between minds equally ambitious. He was appointed to the command of the Lacedæmonian squadron on the Hellespont, an honourable kind of exile, in which he nourished his resentments, but discharged his duty. Ashamed of a situation in which there were no laurels to gather, he returned in a few months to Sparta, inflamed by resentment, and stung with the ingratitude of his friend, whom he had first raised to the throne, and afterwards to the chief command of the army.

When Tissaphernes had collected his forces, and received his auxiliary troops from Persia, he sent heralds to Agesilaus, commanding him to retire from

the coast of Asia, and threatening him with the vengeance of the Great King in the event of disobedience. While his officers were alarmed at this message, and the prospect of hostilities, the Spartan commander, with all the appearance of chearfulness and satisfaction, desired the heralds to tell their master, "That he had laid him under a signal obligation for having made the gods, by his perfidy and perjury, the enemies of Persia, and the friends of Greece."

To the treachery of the Persian, he opposed a successful stratagem. He made a feint of marching his army into the province of Caria, the residence of the satrap, and where his treasures were deposited. Tissaphernes, believing that he intended to make Caria the scene of military operations, encamped on the plains of the Meander, in order to oppose his passage; but Agesilaus, have left a strong garrison in Ephesus, advanced with rapidity into Phrygia, captured many towns, and divided the rich spoil among his army. The ungenerous satrap made no effort to relieve Phrygia, which was the province of Pharnabasus; accordingly the Spartan army ravaged it, during the summer, almost without resistance, and returned to Ephesus crowned with victory, and loaded with plunder.

During the winter, Agesilaus was occupied in military preparations or martial exercises. The spoils of Phrygia were expended in fabricating all the implements of war. Horses were disciplined to the field, and the men trained to arms. The whole city was in motion, and Ephesus seemed to be a Palæstra, and a school of war. Agesilaus not only encouraged the martial games of the Greeks among his soldiers, but contended also for the prize himself; and as often as he obtained the crown of victory, devoted it to the gods, and placed it in the celebrated temple of the Ephesian Diana.

When

When the season for taking the field returned, Agesilaus declared, that he would march into Lydia. Tissaphernes, suspecting this to be a second stratagem, advanced with his forces immediately towards Caria, which he concluded to be the real destination of the Spartan army. But he found himself deceived; Agesilaus entered Lydia, and approached towards Sardis. Thither the satrap hastened with his cavalry, to relieve the place. Agesilaus, knowing that his infantry had not arrived, gave him battle on the banks of the Pactolus, made a great slaughter of his troops, and plundered his camp. Tissaphernes, as if foreseeing a defeat, had taken refuge within the walls of Sardis, where he passed his time in Asiatic pomp and luxury, while the army of Agesilaus was ravaging the territories, and plundering the cities of Lydia. After the unsuccessful event of this engagement, he was accused of treason to the king, who dispatched Tithraustes from court, with the sentence of his fate. The new satrap, on his arrival in Lydia, desired a conference with Tissaphernes, who suspecting nothing went with a guard only of three hundred men. Tithraustes having seized him while bathing, ordered his head to be struck off, and sent to the Persian king. He suffered the punishment due to his crimes; and, to aggravate his misery, these crimes had been committed in the service, and for the benefit of that sovereign who was the author of his death.

Tithraustes succeeded to the government of Lower Asia, and the command of the army. Having assumed his dignified station, he sent an embassy to Agesilaus with presents from the king his master. The ambassadors were commissioned to declare, "That Tissaphernes had suffered deserved punishment; that the Great King, having now discovered his artifices which had produced the war, was ready to acknowledge the independence of the Greek cities

in Asia, provided that Agesilaus withdrew his troops and returned to Greece." The Spartan commander replied, "That he was not master of peace or war; of these the senate must determine; nor could he withdraw his forces from Asia without the authority of the Lacedæmonian republic." The satrap, wishing at least to divert the cause of hostilities, proposed to Agesilaus to attack Phrygia, the province of Pharnabasus, and offered him thirty talents to defray the expences of the expedition. This proposal, shameful to both parties was accepted.

In his march towards Phrygia, a messenger from Sparta delivered him a mandate from the senate, prolonging the term of his military rule, and adding to it the command of a numerous fleet, consisting of ninety gallies. By these new powers, he found himself commander in chief of the forces both by sea and land; an honour which Sparta had never before conferred on any of her generals or Kings. During the victorious career of Agesilaus in Asia, Pharax, who was then at the head of that fleet, had performed signal services to his country. Forgetting, or wishing to forget, his important merits, Agesilaus superseded him, and appointed in his stead Pisander, his brother-in-law, who, indeed, possessed the rough and masculine courage of a Spartan, but none of the talents of a commander.

Agesilaus, having entered Phrygia, levied heavy contributions on the cities, and ravaged the country at his pleasure. The fame and terror of the Grecian name pervaded the neighbouring regions. The oppressed subjects of despotism courted the protection of a new and unknown power; galled by the weight of the Persian yoke, they hoped to gain by the change of masters. Colys, the prince of Paphlagonia, who had refused the proffered alliance of the Persian king, requested to associate his numerous cavalry with the army of Agesilaus. Ariæus, and the numerous

merous Asiatic forces who had followed the standard of Cyrus, might easily be inflamed into a second revolt against a master, who probably viewed them with the eyes of jealousy and distrust. Egypt was in a state of rebellion. All the Lower Asia was discontented, and wished to deliver itself into the hands of Agesilaus; who, encouraged by these favourable circumstances, resolved and prepared to carry the war into the heart of Persia, and, by crushing the power of the Great King at the center, prevent him in future from involving Greece in the crimes and calamities in war.

This ambitious and splendid project was defeated in its origin by the influence of Persian intrigue, and and the power of Persian gold. Tithraustes, who knew that, from the mercenary temper, constant jealousies, and unsteady politics of the Grecian states, it would be easy to set them at variance with one another, sent Timocrates, a man of boldness and address, with fifty talents,* into Greece, among the cities which opposed the oppressive dominion and imperious pre-eminence of Sparta. The negociation of Timocrates succeeded to his wishes. He bribed to the Persian interest the leading men in Argos, Corinth, and Thebes, who, in their respective cities, declaimed with the most vehement eloquence against the injustice, oppression, unbounded ambition, and insolent tyranny of Sparta. They recalled to the remembrance of the people the recent devastation of the consecrated territory of Elis, and predicted the same desolation to every community that incurred their displeasure. The Spartans, continued they, have emancipated their helots, that they may have no slaves but their allies, and aspire to dominion in Asia, in order to subjugate Greece.

* Above nine thousand pounds.

These severe accusations acquired double weight from their being founded on truth, and addressed to men who not only believed, but felt their reality. Since the close of the Peloponnesian war, the domineering authority of Sparta had rendered her equally odious to her old and new allies; and both were disposed for a revolution. The Athenians, on this occasion, displayed the virtues of their ancestors, and refused to admit the ministers of corruption within their walls;* but the occasion was too favourable to be lost of attempting to regain their former power, with Asia as well as Greece on their side. As Thebes had opened her gates to the Athenians in exile, the Athenians voted, from gratitude, an alliance offensive and defensive with Thebes, which was devoted to the interest of Persia.

As suspicions and animosities already prevailed on both sides, an occasion soon presented itself of coming to an open quarrel. A dispute having arisen between the Phocians and Locrians, concerning the property of a small piece of ground, the Phocians, who were the allies of the Spartans, took arms to attack the Locri, while the Thebans, their friends, prepared to defend them. Without enquiring into the cause of the quarrel, or condescending to remonstrate, the haughty and vindictive Spartans immediately flew to arms, and sent Lysander to invade Bœotia. Having assembled the northern confederates, he marched into the Theban territory, took Lebadea, and prepared to attack Haliartus, one of the most considerable cities of Bœotia. He sent dispatches to Pausanias, the Spartan king, requesting his co-operation on this critical occasion with his Peloponnesian troops; and fixed next morning at sunrise as the time to attack the city with their united

* Xen. Hellen. lib. iii.

forces:

forces: but the messenger was intercepted by the Thebans; and at the same time a powerful body of Athenian troops arrived to the assistance of their Theban allies. The care of the city was committed to the Athenians, while the flower of the Theban army set out in the dead of night, and reached the gates of Haliartus long before the break of day. When the citizens of Haliartus had recognized their friends, and were made acquainted with the cause of this unexpected visit, they mutually concerted measures to defeat the stratagem of Lysander, and amply to avenge themselves on the Spartan invaders.

A detachment of Thebans was placed in ambush without the walls. The remainder, together with the citizens of Haliartus, stood ready armed within the city. Lysander, as he had proposed in his letter, arrived in the morning; but Pausanias, who was ignorant of his intentions, remained at Platæa. The soldiers, animated by their recent victories, requested their commander to lead them to the attack; and he willing to reap all the glory of the conquest, readily yielded to their request.

Deceived by the apparent unguarded state of the city, he began the assault with great boldness. But while his army were attempting to make a breach in the wall, the Thebans and Haliartians rushed from the gates, and attacked their astonished foes. Lysander fell in the beginning of the action. His troops attempted to rally, but were prevented by the Thebans, who lay in ambush. The invaders were completely defeated; more than a thousand were left dead in the field, besides those who fell in the disorderly retreat.

Informed of this unexpected calamity, Pausanias marched to the field of battle, to celebrate the funeral obsequies of the slain. A herald was accordingly sent to Haliartus, intreating permission to bury the dead.

dead. The request was granted, on condition that the Peloponnesian army should immediately withdraw from Bœotia. From the want of success attending this expedition, Pausanias, on his return to Sparta, was tried, and condemned to death, but avoided the execution of the sentence, by flying to Tegea, where he soon afterwards died, transmitting his scepter to his son Agesipolis, an infant.

The defeat of Lysander's army at Haliartus, and the death of that renowned general, emboldened the enemies of Sparta, and accelerated the desertion of her allies. The republics of Thebes, Argos, Athens, and Corinth, now openly avowed their hostility to the Lacedæmonians. The island Eubœa, the provinces of Acarnania, Leucas, Ambracia, the cities of Chalcis, and the principalities of Thessaly, revolted from the alliance, or rather the yoke of Sparta. The consequence and power which she had acquired by her success in the Peloponnesian war seemed now in the utmost danger; and no resource remained to save her from the brink of ruin, but that of recalling Agesilaus from pursuing his victories in Asia. Accordingly, the orders of the republic were sent, commanding his return to the defence of his country, at the critical moment when he had assembled all his forces for marching into Upper Asia, in order to shake or overturn the throne of the Persian king.

Without deliberating a moment, Agesilaus obeyed. His answer, transmitted to us by Plutarch, expresses the character of the Spartan government. "We have reduced part of Asia, put the barbarians to flight, and made great preparations for a Persian war: but, as you order me to return, I am already on my march. I received the command, not for myself, but for my country; and I know that a general does not deserve that name, but as he submits to the laws, and obeys the Ephori, and the magistrates."

When

When he communicated his resolution to the army, they expressed their grief and reluctance at being torn from the promised spoils of Asia; but declared with tears, that they would never forsake the standard of a general, under whom they had so often fought and conquered. Agesilaus encouraged this ardour and attachment, and to secure its continuance, proposed to reward such officers as should join him with bodies of foot or cavalry in the Thracian Chersonesus. The wealth of Lydia and Phrygia enabled him amply to fulfil his promises, to defray the expences of the war, and to return to Greece with above a thousand talents.*

Meanwhile the Lacedæmonians had collected an army, and given the command of it to Aristodemus, tutor to their infant king. The confederated army, consisting of twenty thousand men, proposed to attack the Lacedæmonian capital; but the Spartan vigilance prevented this attempt, which, in the absence of Agesilaus, was a master-stroke of policy. Having assembled fourteen thousand men, of whom the greater part was furnished by the allies, they attacked the enemy near Nemæa, a city on the frontier of Corinth. The engagement was obstinate and bloody, but not decisive: the Spartans remained masters of the field.

After Agesilaus had assembled his forces in the Chersonesus, he proceeded with all expedition towards Greece, and in one month accomplished what had been the labour of a year to Xerxes and his army. Instead of pursuing his journey though the hostile territories of Locris, he marched through Doris and Phocis, that were in alliance with Sparta, that he might not be detained by unimportant skirmishes from attacking the Theban army. The recent en-

* A hundred and ninety-three thousand pounds.

gagement

gagement at Nemæa had inflamed, rather than depressed their spirits. They still amounted to twenty thousand men; the forces of Agesilaus were superior in number, as he had received considerable reinforcements from Sparta and Phocis, from Archomenus in Bœotia, and Epidauris in Argolis. While the armies were approaching to engage on the plains of Coronæa, Agesilaus was alarmed by very unwelcome intelligence from Asia.

After the engagement at Ægos Potamos, which terminated the Peloponnesian war, Conon, the Athenian admiral, made his escape with a few ships into the harbour of Salamis. Evagoras, a prince who counted his lineage from Teucer, reigned at that time in Salamis.

A Phœnician adventurer had usurped the throne, under whose reign Evagoras was born. This tyrant was dethroned and murdered by another usurper. When grown up to the age of maturity, Evagoras was obliged to fly to Cilicia, to avoid the attempts of the new tyrant against his life: returning soon after, with a small but devoted band, he deposed the usurper, and ascended the throne with the approbation of his fellow citizens.

From the commencement of his reign he confirmed the promise of his youth, and unfolded the valuable talents, and excellent dispositions, which render princes a blessing to their subjects. He soon raised his little kingdom to a flourishing condition; rendered his subjects active and industrious, and encouraged an emulation among them to excel in agriculture, commerce, and navigation. Conon, who deserved his esteem, and acquired his affection, encouraged and assisted him in these patriotic pursuits; and, in a short time, Salamis annexed to her dominion several of the neighbouring communities, and was able to raise a naval power that rendered her respectable at sea.

The

The attachment of Evagoras to the Athenians, in whose language and arts he had been instructed, was increased by his virtuous sensibility and grateful affection, when he beheld the fall of their republic, from power and renown, to depression and slavery, under the Spartan yoke. The suggestions of Conon concurred with the sentiments of his own mind; and they concerted a plan for weakening the power of Sparta, and restoring Athens to its pristine splendour. The conquests of Agesilaus in Asia forwarded the execution of their plan. Evagoras and Pharnabazus had already made the Persian monarch acquainted with the merits of Conon. In consequence of these testimonials of his merit, he had been formerly employed in the naval service against Pharax; and he embraced this opportunity of travelling to Babylon, and representing to Artaxerxes the necessity of opposing the Lacedæmonians on that element, in which they had acquired, and still preserved the command of the Ionian coast. A decisive victory at sea would shake the whole fabric of their power, and expel them from Asia. Under the auspicious conduct of Pharnabazus, nothing was necessary to accomplish this undertaking, but a body of seamen, equal to those in the service of the Spartans. If the Great King would furnish the necessary supplies, he would engage to collect such a number of Grecian sailors as would give Persia the decided superiority at sea, and compel Agesilaus to relinquish his conquests in the east.

Artaxerxes, delighted with the proposal, ordered the sum of money required to be paid from his treasury; and Conon returned to Cilicia, to carry his design into execution. From the Greek cities and seaports in Asia and Europe, he soon assembled a marine force, which when joined to the squadrons commanded by Pharnabazus, enabled him to engage the

the Spartan admiral with superior numbers. The combined armament set sail in quest of the enemy; and, as they advanced beyond the northern extremity of Rhodes, discovered the Lacedæmonian fleet, consisting of a hundred gallies, in the spacious bay which is formed by the group of scattered islands called Sporades, and the Dorian coast. Pisander did not decline the unequal engagement. He ordered his men to prepare for battle, and advance against the enemy. The greater number, however, despairing of success against such superior numbers, withdrew from the engagement, and retreated towards the shore of Cnidus. Pisander, who possessed the courage of a soldier, without the sagacity of a commander, after fighting bravely, died with honour in the cause of his country. The conquerors, after destroying vast numbers of the enemy, captured fifty gallies; a memorable and irreparable blow, which deprived the Lacedæmonians of their empire at sea, and of their dominions at land from Cnidus to Byzantium.

Agesilaus, dreading the impression that the news of so severe a blow might have upon his troops, gave out in the army, that the Lacedæmonians had gained a considerable victory at sea; and, appearing in public with a garland of flowers upon his head, offered a sacrifice of thanksgiving to the gods.

The two armies, nearly equal in numbers, now advanced towards each other on the plains of Coronæa. The Thebans, raising an universal shout, ran furiously to the charge, and soon put the left wing to flight, chiefly consisting of the Orchomenians; while Agesilaus repelled the Argives, who composed the left wing of the enemy. The Thebans having totally routed the Orchomenians, advanced to take possession of the baggage, and to reassemble their allies, who had fled towards Mount Helicon; but

but Agesilaus, by a masterly manœuvre, intercepted them. The Thebans observing this movement, formed a hollow square, and waited his approach. The Spartan king, guided rather by the impetuosity of a soldier, than the calm prudence of a general, attacked them in front, instead of allowing them to pass, that he might assail them in flank, or harass their rear. The shock was terrible, bloody, destructive; and of all the battles which happened in his time, Xenophon says, that this was fought with the most desperate fury. Finding it impossible to break the Thebans in front, the Spartans at last opened their phalanx to this unconquerable band, and permitted them to join their friends; but no persuasions of the Thebans could prevail on their allies to renew the engagement. The Spartans thus remained masters of the field, which was a scene of carnage, havoc and horror.

Agesilaus, though he had received several wounds in the engagement, would not retire to his tent, till he had seen the dead carried off on their shields. Being informed that about fourscore of the enemy had taken refuge in a temple of Minerva, he sent a guard to escort them to a place of safety. The day following the battle was employed in erecting a trophy, as a monument of this important victory; while the enemy sent heralds to demand permission to bury their dead. Notwithstanding his wounds, and weakness in consequence of them, Agesilaus travelled to Delphi, where the Pythian games were then celebrating, in order to dedicate the tenth of his Asiatic spoils, amounting to a hundred talents, in the celebrated temple of Apollo. Returning towards the Peloponnesus, he then disbanded his troops, and set sail for Sparta.

He was received by his country with every demonstration of joy and gratitude. They beheld with admiration

miration the same simplicity of manners, frugality of life, and attachment to Spartan customs, by which he had been formerly distinguished. In his Asiatic expedition he had shared the toils of the meanest soldier; nor was he to be distinguished from the rest of the army, by his dress, his food, or his accommodations, by day or night. He returned from Asia too uninfected with its corruptions; untainted with the love of pleasure, luxury, and pomp, which characterise the manners of the natives, and which former generals had introduced into Sparta. He made no alteration in his table, dress, equipage, or furniture. Instead of the pride and presumption of a victorious commander, he displayed the modesty of a private citizen; and was only to be distinguished from other Spartans by a greater submission to the laws, and attachment to the customs of his country.

The Theban or Corinthian war lasted eight years; but was not distinguished by any celebrated or important actions, except the engagement at sea between Conon and Pisander, and the battle of Coronæa.

In the partial and undecisive engagements which followed, the Athenians were generally successful by sea, and the Spartans by land. Teleutias, the brother of Agesilaus, it is true, surprised the Piræus with twelve gallies, and destroyed several ships of war; and Iphicrates, the Athenian, gained some advantages by land, which announced those great talents for war which rendered him afterwards so conspicuous: but, for the most part, superiority and success attended the operations of the Spartan army, and the Athenian fleet.

The Lacedæmonians reaped no real or lasting advantages from the victory of Coronæa; but serious and irretrievable calamities arose from their defeat at Cnidus. One day destroyed the fruit of many laborious

rious campaigns; deprived them of the command at sea, which devolved to Conon and Pharnabazus, who, in the space of three months, detached for ever from their dominions the whole western coast of Asia Minor. The important and meritorious services of these commanders were not overlooked or neglected by the Persian monarch, who, after loading Pharnabazus with wealth and honours, gave him his daughter in marriage.

The noble ambition of Conon neither desired or solicited rewards or honours for himself. To raise his fallen country from her ruins was the generous and patriotic motive, which was the source of all his actions. By his suggestion and persuasion, a naval armament had been fitted out, which retaliated the ravages, and revenged the conquests of Agesilaus. To depress still farther the pride of Sparta, he now proposed to the Persian king, and his viceroy, the re-establishment of Athens. The proposal was favourably received; liberal supplies of money were given; and Pharnabazus conferred on Conon the command of the naval armament; which immediately set sail, and after reducing the Cyclades and Cythera, and ravaging the coast of Laconia, assembled in the harbours of Phalerus, Munichia, and Piræus. No time was lost in the important work of rebuilding the harbours and fortifications of Athens. Besides artisans, who were allured by gain, the soldiers and sailors contributed their efforts; the voluntary exertions of the allies, particularly the Thebans, accelerated the progress of the undertaking; while the zealous labours of the natives were never intermitted, in restoring their celebrated capital to its antient strength and splendor. The work was completed with astonishing rapidity; and, by a singular combination of vicissitudes, the Athenian capital, after having been formerly reduced to ashes by the Persians, was now rebuilt

rebuilt by their own hands; and, after having been dismantled and demolished by the Lacedæmonians, was restored at their expence, and by the spoils taken from their fleet.

When these tidings were conveyed to Sparta, they were received with the deepest disappointment and vexation, and excited in their minds every invidious and malignant passion. They looked upon the restoration of that city as the overthrow of their own; and would rather have been swept from the face of Greece, than have allowed the Athenians to enjoy their antient independence and prosperity. From these base motives, they adopted the timid and treacherous resolution of avenging themselves upon their Athenian rivals, by making a disadvantageous and dishonourable peace with the king of Persia. They were ready to sacrifice every thing, provided the Great King would withdraw his fleet from co-operating to the re-establishment of the Athenian power. To accomplish this purpose, they sent Antalcidas to Teribazus, who had succeeded Tithraustes as satrap of the southern provinces, and afterwards to Babylon. The previous history of this ambassador is unknown; he appears, however, to have had nothing of a Spartan but the name; but to have possessed all the arts of complaisance and insinuation, and to have been versed in all the vices of dissimulation, flattery, and seduction, which qualify a man for such an employment, and facilitate his success. To please the Persian king and his satraps, he laid aside the dignity of office, and acted the buffoon; he publicly derided the institutions of Lycurgus, and in a mimic dance ridiculed the heroism of Leonidas at Thermopylæ.*

Such a character, at such a court, could hardly fail to accomplish his ends, though his success had not

* Athenæus, lib. ñ.

been

been precipitated by the imprudent patriotism of Conon. After rebuilding the fortifications of Athens, this illustrious commander requested Pharnabazus to permit him, for a few months, to employ the combined fleet in ravaging the territories of Sparta and her allies. The unsuspicious governor readily granted his desire. But Conon neglected his promise, and meditated only to promote the interest and glory of his country. He displayed at Chios, at Lesbos, and along the Eolian and Ionian coasts, the numbers and the strength of his naval armament, and, describing the happy revolution that had raised Athens to her former power and splendor, invited the Asiatics and islanders to recognise the authority of their antient sovereign, and share with her the government of Greece.

Such a visionary project could have no effects, but to bring ruin or disgrace on the head of the contriver. The sagacious and artful Antalcidas immediately represented him as guilty of the most aggravated treachery, ingratitude, and rebellion, in violating his engagements as soon as they were made; in forgetting the signal obligations received by himself and his country, and attempting to conquer the Persian dominions by the assistance of the Persian troops. Conon was now abandoned, even by his friend Pharnabazus, and Antalcidas carried on his intrigues, if not without opposition, at least with triumphant success. Neither the remonstrances of Conon, and the other Athenian ambassadors, nor those of the Theban and Argive deputies, were attended to, while the Spartan negociator obtained every thing he desired. Antalcidas proposed terms that seemed to have been dictated by the Persian monarch :—"The Spartans resign all pretensions to the sovereignty of the Greek cities in Asia, which they acknowledge is the right of the Great King. They are ready to declare all the cities

cities and islands reciprocally independent; which will henceforth prevent any one of them from acquiring sufficient power to dispute the supremacy of Persia."

These conditions, which the most insolent minister of the most insolent monarch could hardly have solicited or desired, awakened no jealousy or suspicion in the mind of Teribazus, who was lulled into profound security by the arts of the Spartan ambassador. The fate of the patriotic Conon must excite emotions of sorrow and regret in every mind of sensibility. After having sacrificed every thing, even justice and integrity, to the service of his country, he was condemned either to death or perpetual imprisonment.* The successful Antalcidas, on the contrary, was amply rewarded.

Although the conditions of the alliance between Persia and Sparta were in the highest degree advantageous and honourable to Artaxerxes, the negociation remained unaccomplished for several years. Teribazus incurred the displeasure of his lord, and was succeeded in his government by Struthas, who adopted, with warmth, the interest of the Athenians. The powerful efforts of the Argive and Bœotian deputies contributed likewise to this end, as they raised suspicions against the Spartans, by discovering the real object they had in view.

Meanwhile the military operations of the contending states were carried on by those sallies and incursions that irritate without enfeebling, and contribute to provoke, rather than to terminate hostilities. The Lacedæmonians ravaged the country, and plundered the villages of their enemies in Peloponnesus. The Thebans and Argives, on the other hand, laid waste the territories of Laconia; and the Athenians employ-

* Xenoph. Gr. Hist. l. 4.

ed

ed the renovated vigour of their republic in regaining the empire of the sea.

The death or captivity of Conon again called forth the abilities of Thrasybulus, whose vigour and patriotism had twice rescued his country from the yoke of tyranny. The Athenian fleet, consisting of forty gallies, was intrusted to this commander; who having sailed towards the Hellespont, induced the inhabitants of Byzantium, and several other cities of Thrace, to accede to the Athenian alliance. He next landed in the isle of Lesbos, and having engaged the enemy near Methymna, defeated the Lacedæmonian troops, and slew, with his own hand, Therimachus, the general. From this island he drew considerable reinforcements to his fleet, and with this accession of strength, proceeded towards Rhodes, to assist the Athenian party in that island. To provide himself with resources for this expedition, he raised supplies from the sea-ports of Asia; and, entering the mouth of the Eurymedon, exacted a heavy contribution from Aspendus, the capital of Pamphylia. This act of power would, perhaps, as usual, have been submitted to, but the unrestrained enormities of the sailors and soldiers provoked the Pamphylians to resistance. The Grecian camp was attacked in the night, a considerable slaughter ensued, and Thrasybulus himself fell a sacrifice to his unbounded rapacity and avarice.

These unjust and oppressive exactions on the capital of Pamphylia presented another opportunity for the vigilant Antalcidas to work on the passions of the Persian king, and inflame his resentment against the Athenians.

Artaxerxes at last determined to embrace the cause of the Spartans; and thus dictated the terms of a general pacification;—"It is the pleasure of Artaxerxes, the king, that the island of Cyprus, and Clazomene,

zomene, belong to him; that the other Grecian states be severally enfranchised and independent, with exception to Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros, which, as of old, shall be subject to the Athenians; and, whatever state accepts not these terms, I will go to war with it and its adherents, by sea and land."*

When the deputies of the Grecian cities were summoned by Teribazus to hear the conditions of peace, they were astonished to find, instead of an equitable treaty, the imperious mandate of the Great King, who, by their dissensions and hostilities, had become the sovereign arbiter of Greece.

The greater part of the Grecian states rejected with horror terms of pacification so humiliating and so infamous. But, as they were enfeebled and exhausted by their internal divisions and animosities, and were unable to support a war against a prince so opulent and powerful, it was expected that prudence, as well as necessity, would soon induce them to accept the conditions of peace. Thebes, Argos, and Athens, made the only vigorous opposition to a treaty that was equally destructive to the interest, and disgraceful to the fame of Greece. The Thebans were averse to resign their authority over the inferior communities of Bœotia: the Argives were reluctant to withdraw their forces from Corinth, and leave that capital in the power of the Lacedæmonian party: and the Athenians could not relinquish, without regret, the fruits of their late conquests, and their hopes of future prosperity and renown. The sagacious Antalcidas had foreseen and prevented the opposition of these states. A fleet of eighty sail, fitted out with Persian gold, was ready to awe them into compliance. Teribazus had collected a squadron, and was prepared to attack the isle of Cyprus, if Evagoras should

* Xenoph. p. 550.

revolt.

revolt. The Persian government had also raised an army, which was ready at the first summons to embark for Greece, and co-operate with the Lacedæmonians against all who might venture to refuse the terms of peace which had been dictated by Persia. These formidable preparations alarmed the fears of the confederates, and obliged them to submit, though with sullen reluctance, to the terms of accommodation. The resistance of the Thebans was the most obstinate; but, at length, yielded to the menaces of Sparta. Open hostilities ceased, the armies on both sides were disbanded, a sort of forced tranquillity was established, but it was like that gloomy stillness which precedes and announces a storm.

CHAP. XXII.

From the Peace of Antalcidas to the Fall of the Theban Empire.

THE famous and shameful treaty of Antalcidas, owed its origin and completion to the artifice and address of the Lacedæmonians. The success which attended the arms of Agesilaus, in Asia; the rapidity and the splendor of his victories, and his long-concerted plan of carrying the war into the heart of Persia, struck terror into the regions of despotism, and made the Great King tremble on his throne. The arrival of Conon, at the court of Babylon, at this critical conjuncture, relieved the fears of the monarch, and wrought a revolution in his councils. He solicited the command of a powerful fleet, and undertook to deprive the Spartans, at one blow, of

their empire at sea, and compel them to relinquish their conquests in Asia. In the celebrated sea-fight with Pisander, he fully accomplished his promise: when he crushed the strength of the Peloponnesian fleet, took fifty of their ships, and blasted in one day the fruit of all the victories that had been gained by Agesilaus.

Sparta, though subject to an aristocracy, was less governed by system, and discovered less political consistency, than any of the Grecian republics. The rival passions of jealousy, envy, imperious ambition, and revenge, with an inveterate and eternal antipathy against Athens, were the prime movers of all their actions. Hence, when they were informed of the assistance which the Great King had given to that republic, and in particular, when they heard that the Athenian walls and harbours had been rebuilt by Conon, they were torn by the cruellest conflict of contending passions. They were willing to solicit an accommodation with Artaxerxes, on the most mortifying conditions; they were ready to resign all the advantages they had gained, and to abandon all views of foreign conquest, provided the Persian king would cease to open his treasury, and to commission his fleets to raise and aggrandise the growing and dangerous power of their Athenian rivals.

They found too, that while they were endeavouring to extend their conquests abroad, their acquisitions at home were sliding from their possession. Athens had risen from its ruins with new lustre. Thebes and Argos had become formidable, and assumed political importance. Many of the Peloponnesian cities had shaken off their authority; their colonies in Thrace and Macedon no longer obeyed them; and they were deprived of all their Ionian acquisitions. During a war of twenty-seven years, they had fought and conquered both in Europe and in Asia, and were

now

now in a worse condition than at the commencement of hostilities.

They now began to abandon all thoughts of distant expeditions, and relinquished all concern with Asiatic affairs. In return, they obtained many substantial advantages from the Persian monarch. To them it was given in charge to see that the articles of the peace were strictly adhered to; and, for this purpose, they were supplied with money from the Persian treasury to raise troops in Greece. While, in consequence of the peace of Antalcidas, the Thebans had been compelled to permit the cities of Bœotia to enjoy their liberty, and the Argives to withdraw their garrison from Corinth, the Lacedæmonians, on their part, discovered no intention of complying with the articles of the treaty.

Having found their power already increased, they resolved to extend it farther by policy and arms. They employed their emissaries to encourage the aristocratical factions in the inferior cities; to enflame the reciprocal animosity of the citizens; and, under the semblance of protecting the injured and oppressed, decided every appeal to their senate in such a manner as turned to the advantage and aggrandisement of Sparta.

The republic of Mantinæa, situated in the center of Arcadia, which, from a few hamlets of shepherds, was now a powerful state, was the first object of their unjust ambition.

Hardly a year had elapsed since the peace of Antalcidas, when Spartan ambassadors were dispatched to Mantinæa, with one of the most unjust and imperious commissions that is recorded in history. The Mantinæans were commanded, by these emissaries of aristocratic despotism, to raze their fortifications, to forsake their city, and to descend again into the humble and dispersed state of villagers; because,

during the late war, they had supplied the Argives with corn, and, though apparently in friendship with Sparta, had rejoiced at her misfortunes.

This insolent request met with the answer it deserved; the ambassadors returned without success, and Sparta declared war. King Agesipolis, with a powerful army, ravaged the territory of the Mantinæans, and laid siege to the city. After an ineffectual siege for several months, he at last contrived a scheme which proved fatal to the brave Mantinæans. The river Ophis flowed through the city of Mantinæa. With much labour and difficulty the course of the stream was stopped below the city, and the foundation of the walls laid under water. The unburnt bricks, of which the fortifications were built, dissolved in the water by which they were overflowed, and the citizens beheld their crumbling walls with sorrow and despair. Perceiving that all farther defence was impossible, the inhabitants sent to capitulate on conditions; but the Spartan king would grant them no other terms than those which had been originally proposed. They were therefore obliged to destroy their city, to separate again into four distinct communities, and return to their original habitations in the villages and hamlets.

The Lacedæmonians next displayed their tyranny and severity against the republic of Phlius. This little community was not exempted from that state of ferment which prevailed throughout Greece: it was divided into factions, and the party opposite to Sparta had expelled their opponents. The authority of Agesilaus procured their return from exile; but new quarrels having arisen, commissioners were appointed to try and punish those who were termed the most obnoxious citizens. By condemning to death almost every man of eminence or abilities in the democratical party, these infamous executioners secured the

the permanent and invariable attachment of Philus to the interests of Sparta.

At this period the cities of Acanthus and Apollonia solicited the assistance of the Spartans, against the growing and dangerous power of Olynthus, which was inhabited by Greeks, originally from Chalcis in Eubœa. The Athenians, after their victories in the Persian war, had annexed to their dominion many cities in the Thracian territories and neighbourhood, which threw off the yoke at the close of the Peloponnesian war. Olynthus was of this number. To secure themselves against the encroaching tyranny of Sparta, no less dangerous than that of Athens, the Olynthians had raised troops, and fortified their city. The state of affairs in Greece, and the weakness of their neighbours, enabled the citizens of Olynthus, not only to establish their independence, but to extend their dominions by conquest, till, by their power and wealth, they became formidable, and objects of jealousy and alarm to the adjacent communities. On the southern shores of Macedon, they had made themselves masters of Chalcis and Pierea, which, blessed with a natural fertility, invited the operations of agriculture; and, at the same time, by its maritime situation, was favourable to the pursuits of trade: they grasped at still more valuable acquisitions, and would have extended their dominions on the side of Thrace and Macedon, if the ambassadors of Acanthus and Apollonia had not interested the Spartan ambition to break the strength of this new confederacy, and give an effectual check to their rising greatness.

When Cleigenes, the Acanthian, had delivered, in the name of his colleagues, their complaint and petition before the greater assembly at Sparta, the Lacedæmonians, with their usual affectation of impartiality, desired the opinion of the confederates; who,

knowing the inclinations of the assembly, unanimously resolved, that it was necessary to declare war against the Olynthians. War being determined on, it was agreed that the confederates should raise ten thousand troops, with liberty to such states as were unable to furnish the full complement of soldiers, to pay an equivalent in money, at the rate of half a drachma * a day for each foot soldier, and four times as much for the horse.

Cleigenes, the ambassador, informed the assembly, that the critical situation of Acanthus and Apollonia demanded immediate aid; and proposed that, with the troops they had in arms, they should instantly set out on the expedition. The Lacedæmonians consented, and ordered two thousand men to march to Macedon without delay, under the command of Eudamidas; and that his brother Phœbidas should follow him as soon as the remainder of the forces could be collected.

When Eudamidas arrived in Thrace, he placed garrisons in such cities as were most exposed to the enemy; but, as his forces were not yet assembled, he did not commence open hostilities. Potidæa, a city in alliance with the Olympians, and of considerable importance, in the isthmus of Pallenè, surrendered to him without making any defence.

Meanwhile Phœbidas began his march, at the head of eight thousand men, and encamped in the neighbourhood of Thebes, near the Gymnasium. Thebes, like all the cities of Greece, was at that time agitated by the contentions of a popular and an aristocratical or Spartan faction. Ismenias was at the head of the democratical party; Leontiades of the Spartan; both were polemarchs, that is, generals of the army, and chief magistrates in the common-

* Three-pence halfpenny.

wealth.

wealth. It is probable that Phœbidas had orders from the senate, or from king Agesilaus, to take a decided part in the Theban divisions, which made him listen with the greatest alacrity to the proposal of Leontiades, " to seize the citadel, to expel the adherents of Ismenias, and take possession of it with his troops in the name of the Lacedæmonians." He represented to him, " that nothing would be more easy, and at the same time more honourable, than to make himself master of Thebes, a greater and more important prize than the capital of the Olynthians."

Phœbidas received the proposal with transports of joy. The plan of operations was soon settled between the conspirators. The Thebans, confiding with perfect security in the late treaty of peace, were preparing to celebrate the feast of Ceres. It was in the midst of summer, and, during the intense heat of noon, few passengers were to be seen in the streets. Phœbidas, who, to conceal his intentions, had made preparations for continuing his march, was at the favourable moment called by his confederate to the scene of action. At this festival, the Theban matrons went in procession to the Cadmæa, or citadel, to acknowledge the past, and implore the future favours of the beneficent goddess who presides over the harvest. For them the gates of the Cadmæa were left open, and, as no male was admitted to this mystic solemnity, the place was without defence. Accordingly Phœbidas and his army, conducted by Leontiades, took possession of the citadel without opposition. The senate was then sitting in the market-place, Leontiades took his place among the senators, and avowed that the Lacedæmonians had acted by his authority, not as enemies, but to preserve the public tranquillity. He then seized Ismenias, with the leaders of the opposite party, and sent them to

the citadel. Many were thrown into prison, and about four hundred fled with precipitation to Athens.

When the Spartan senate received information of this atrocious enterprize, that one of their generals had, by open violence and force of arms, taken possession of a city in alliance with their republic, complaints and accusations against the conduct of Phœbidas resounded from all quarters. The opponents of Agesilaus, who suspected his being the contriver of this shameful transaction, demanded by whose authority a Spartan commander had committed such a flagrant violation of public faith, such a shocking act of perfidy as would have disgraced the rudest barbarians. Agesilaus found no difficulty in vindicating the conduct of Phœbidas, and publicly declared to the senate that the sole question was concerning the utility of the action. Whatever was beneficial and expedient for Sparta, a general was not only permitted but commanded to perform, by his own authority, and without waiting for orders. Such corrupted maxims of policy have been often adopted and pursued, but seldom avowed, except by the Lacedæmonians. The senate, after a long discussion, and mature deliberation, resolved, according to their usual hypocrisy, "That Phœbidas should be deprived of his command, and fined in a hundred thousand drachmas;* but that the citadel should be retained, and defended by a strong garrison." The Lacedæmonians, not satisfied with this act of injustice and perfidy, sent commissioners from the cities in their alliance to try, or rather to condemn Ismenias, who, upon their arrival, was immediately put to death.

Teleutias, the brother of Agesilaus, was appoint-

* Above two thousand pounds.

ed,

ed, in the place of Phœbidas, to command ten thousand troops destined against Olynthus. By the assistance of Amintas, king of Macedon, he compelled the Olynthians to retire within the inclosure and protection of their walls. Many sallies were made, with uncertain success; but Teleutias, beholding a party of his cavalry cut to pieces by the Olynthians, advanced against them at the head of his heavy-armed troops, with greater precipitation than prudence. The Olynthians never halted till they arrived under the fortifications. The townsmen then mounted the battlements, and assaulted the enemy with darts, arrows, and other missile weapons. At the same time the Olynthian army, which were in readiness within the walls, sallied forth with impetuosity; the Spartan general fell in the first attack; the army was repulsed with great slaughter, and fled to Acanthus and Apollonia.

This check served only to animate the ardour of the Lacedæmonians. In the third year of the war, king Agesipolis marched into Macedon with a strong reinforcement. After ravaging the Olynthian territories, he took by storm the strong city of Torona; but in the midst of his success he was seized with a calenture, and died in the seventh day of the disease. Cleombrotus, his brother, succeeded to the throne of Sparta; and Polybiades was appointed to command the forces against Olynthus.

This general surrounded the city by land, while a squadron of Lacedæmonian vessels blocked up the adjacent harbour of Mecyberna. The Olynthians were now cut off from all supplies both by sea and land; and were at last compelled by famine to capitulate. They relinquished all claim to the Chalcidicè, gave up the cities of Macedon to their former sovereign, and bound themselves to obey, on all occasions, the mandates of their Spartan allies. After

the submission of the Olynthians, Amintas re-established his court at Pella, which thenceforth continued to be the residence of the Macedonian kings.

The Spartans, after they had seized with a strong arm the Theban citadel, maintained possession of it during five years, with a garrison of fifteen hundred men. The partizans of aristocracy and Sparta now acquired an entire ascendancy in the government, and the Thebans experienced every species of oppression. Not satisfied with the exercise of despotism in Thebes, they persecuted the unhappy exiles from their country, till at last both those in the city, and those who had fled from it, driven to the last extremities, and deriving courage from despair, were determined to hazard every thing rather than to groan any longer under the Lacedæmonian yoke.

At this time the prosperity of Sparta appeared to be in its greatest splendor, and its power so firmly established as to bid defiance to accident or opposition. Thebes, and all the cities of Bœotia, had lately submitted to their authority. They had contrived measures to humble the pride of Argos, and to retain it in a state of dependence. Corinth acknowledged their jurisdiction, and was ready to obey their commands. The Athenians, deprived, by the late treaty, of their allies, and reduced to their individual strength, were not in a condition to contend for dominion with their powerful rival. If any state or city attempted to shake off their authority, immediate and severe punishment reduced them to obedience, and struck terror into the neighbouring communities. While thus they tyrannized over Greece, the Great King was their ally, and the wealth and power of Persia were pledged and prepared to give vigour and success to their measures.

But, notwithstanding this apparent tranquillity, a revolution

revolution was preparing in a quarter where they had inflicted the deepest injuries, but whence they neither expected nor apprehended any attempt towards retaliation. The four hundred Thebans, who had fled to Athens after Phœbidas had taken the citadel, were banished by a public decree of their country. The Lacedæmonians, to give a presumptuous proof of their tyrannical and domineering spirit, ordered the Athenians to withdraw their protection from these unhappy exiles, and to expel them from their city.

The humanity and generosity, natural and peculiar to the Athenians, as well as their gratitude towards the Thebans, for affording them an asylum when they were banished by the thirty tyrants, prompted them to reject the infamous proposal. At the same time, Leontiades sent some of his devoted creatures to assassinate the chief of the exiles; but Androclides alone fell a victim to his iniquitous machinations. Pelopidas, the son of Hippocles, who acted a distinguished part in the deliverance of Thebes, was among the exiles who had sought protection in Athens. Elevated with the native courage of his mind, and fired with resentment against the late instances of Spartan treachery and cruelty, he exhorted his fellow-exiles no longer to suffer in silence, but to take up arms at once to avenge their own cause, and assert the liberty of their country. "Let us, follow," continued he, "the example of Thrasybulus, who, with heroic magnanimity, set out from Thebes with a handful of brave men to crush the oppressors of Athens. So let us, by one blow, for glory and revenge, expel the tyrants of our country, and restore it to its antient freedom."

This discourse made a deep impression on the banished Thebans; and, while they deliberated by night on this important subject, Mello, one of their number, introduced Phyllidas, his friend, who had just

just arrived from Thebes; a man whose situation, boldness, and address, fitted him for the enterprize they meditated.

Though strongly attached to the republican cause, he followed the changes of government, and, by his complaisance, officiousness, and adulation, had insinuated himself into the good graces and the confidence of Leontiades, Archias, and the other Theban oppressors. He was secretary to the council, and no less subsidiary to the pleasures, than necessary to the business of his masters.

The exiled patriots having concerted the plan, and fixed the time of their enterprize, communicated it to their friends at Thebes. When they had assembled, on the confines of Attica, seven* of the youngest and most daring, with Pelopidas at their head, disguised themselves like huntsmen, and, arriving at the gates towards evening, passed unsuspected. They were concealed in the house of Charon that night and the following day.

On the eventful evening that summoned them to strike for Thebes and independence, the crafty Phyllidas had prepared a magnificent entertainment for two of the tyrants, Archias and Philip; and promised to render the repast more exquisite and alluring by the company of the most beautiful women in the city.

The banquet of Phyllidas contained the most luxurious viands to gratify the senses; and the richest wines to dissolve the soul in pleasure. But in the height of their festivity and voluptuous expectations, a messenger arrived from Athens, with letters that contained a circumstantial account of the whole conspiracy. The courier, with marks of haste and agitation, desired to see Archias, and, having delivered

* Xenoph. p. 566.

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the pacquet into his hand, informed him, that his Athenian friend desired he would read the letters immediately, for they related to *serious affairs*. Archias replied, smiling, "*Serious affairs to-morrow;*" and, putting them unopened under his pillow, continued the debauch. Phyllidas now retired to introduce the conspirators, disguised like women of pleasure. Their arms were concealed by their female vestments, and their faces overshadowed by wreaths of pine and poplar. At their arrival, the tyrants, intoxicated with voluptuousness and wine, sent up loud shouts of joy; when, at a given signal, the conspirators drew their daggers, and laid the tyrants at their feet. Charon and Mello had been the chief actors in this scene; but an important part of the work remained behind; to dispatch Leontiades, and the other supporters of the usurpation. Conducted by Phyllidas, who was still unsuspected, the conspirators found the houses of the magistrates open to receive them. Leontiades, who was asleep, awaked at the tumult, and, arming himself with his sword, boldly fought in his own defence; it was reserved to Pelopidas to rid the earth of this early contriver and chief abettor of the Theban calamities and disgrace. His associates fell by the hands of the other conspirators.

The tyrannicide being thus accomplished, with equal celerity and success, couriers were sent to the Thracian plain, to inform the Theban exiles, who immediately set out for the scene of action. The conspirators next opened the different prisons, which were filled with the unhappy victims of tyrannical oppression. Five hundred captives were released, who formed a considerable accession of strength to their deliverers. They furnished themselves with arms from the arsenals, which they broke open.

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The whole city was now in a state of agitation, uncertainty, and terror. The houses, though at midnight, were illuminated with torches; the streets were crowded with multitudes passing and repassing, without knowing whither they went; and all longed, with impatience and anxiety, for the return of the dawn, that they might learn the cause of these disorders, and know what destiny awaited them. In the midst of this tumult, a herald announced, with a loud voice, the death of the tyrants, and invited the friends of freedom to arm in the glorious cause. Among the first who obeyed this summons to liberty was the celebrated Epaminondas, the son of Polymnis. The philosophy of Pythagoras, which he had studied, forbade him to take an active part in the conspiracy, lest he might pollute his hands with the blood of his fellow-citizens. But, after the revolution in favour of liberty was accomplished, he armed with alacrity in the cause of his country; and his example gave new animation to the Theban youth, who, like him, had borne, with indignant reluctance, the oppressive yoke of the Spartan government.

Next morning the exiles arrived from the Thracian plain, and the people were summoned to assemble. Surrounded with a numerous band of adherents, which continued to increase from all quarters, Pelopidas and his friends went to the market-place; explained to the people the necessity of the revolution; and, with the unanimous consent of their fellow-citizens, restored the antient and republican form of government. At the same time, a solemn sacrifice was offered to the gods, by the sacred ministers of religion, for the restoration of the public liberty. At the close of the solemnity, the people rose up with loud acclamations, and received the confederated patriots

triots as the avengers and deliverers of their country. Pelopidas, Mello, and Charon, were then elected bœotarchs, or chief magistrates.

On the night of the conspiracy, the Lacedæmonian garrison, which held possession of the citadel, by unaccountable negligence, cowardice, or infatuation, beheld the scene of tumult and disorder, without interposing to prevent the revolution from taking place. Three thousand Thebans had taken refuge in the Cadmæa, which was garrisoned by fifteen hundred Lacedæmonians; yet they made no efforts to defend the Spartan governors or government; but only dispatched couriers to the capital, to relate the news of the conspiracy, and to demand an immediate reinforcement.

Very different was the conduct of Pelopidas and his associates, on the same memorable occasion; not blinded by success, they neglected no precaution that could ensure the accomplishment of their measures, and the re-establishment of the commonwealth. They ordered the messengers, whom they had sent to acquaint the Theban exiles with the destruction of their oppressors, to proceed with all expedition to Athens, to communicate the tidings of the revolution, and to implore the immediate aid of the Athenians. This request was instantly complied with; the Athenians embraced the precious opportunity of depressing their enemies and elevating their friends. A considerable army was ordered to the relief of the Thebans, which arrived at Thebes the day after Pelopidas had completed the revolution.

Animated by this reinforcement, the Thebans resolved to attack the Cadmæa with the combined army. According to Xenophon, whose narrative appears the most authentic, the garrison surrendered in the course of a few days, on condition of being permitted to retire in safety, and to retain their arms.

But,

But, while they provided for their own security, agreeably to that strong and unconquerable barbarity which marked the character of their countrymen, they totally abandoned to the resentment of the conquerors, those wretched Thebans who had devoted themselves to the interest of Sparta, and taken refuge in the citadel. Many of them fell victims to the vengeance of the opposite faction; a few only were saved by the intercession of the Athenians,* the only nation of antient Europe, except the Sicilians, who seem to have had any feelings of pity, or tincture of humanity.

When the garrison marched from the Cadmæa, and arrived at Megara, they found Cleombrotus coming to their assistance, at the head of a powerful army. If he had arrived a day earlier, he might have preserved the citadel; but the tardy measures of the Lacedæmonians frequently defeated their enterprizes. The three commanders who had surrendered the citadel were brought to trial; two of them were condemned to death, and so great a fine imposed upon the third, that, unable to pay it, he went into voluntary banishment.

Pelopidas obtained the honour of this revolution, which, for the wisdom and magnanimity with which it was concerted, the admirable, though simple address, by which it was conducted, and the intrepid courage by which it was accomplished, is scarcely to be paralleled in the annals of the Grecian republics. It gave a new political existence to the Thebans, led them to a train of heroic atchievements, and rendered their history as illustrious as it had formerly been obscure.

The rebellion of the Thebans, as it was called at Sparta, wounded the pride, and provoked the resent-

* Xenoph.

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ment of that tyrannical republic. The Ephori and the senate immediately resolved to punish their revolted subjects with exemplary severity. Agesilaus, under pretence of his great age, declined the command, which was conferred on Cleombrotus, who had lately succeeded to king Agesipolis. In the midst of winter he entered Bœotia, at the head of a strong army; but his operations were neither vigorous nor decisive. Nothing was performed worthy of the Spartan name. At the end of the campaign he returned to Sparta, having sent a considerable detachment of his army to the garrison at Thespiæ, which was commanded by Sphodrias.

Meanwhile, the Athenians, partly from their natural fickleness, partly from their dread of the Spartans, against whose forces they thought themselves unable to take the field, renounced their alliance with the Thebans, and punished, by imprisonment or exile, such of the citizens as had favoured their cause. The Theban chiefs, who foresaw the ruinous effects of this desertion, contrived, according to Xenophon, a singular stratagem to recover the Athenian alliance. They sent emissaries to Sphodrias, who commanded the garrison at Thespiæ, "to propose to him, as an exploit that would aggrandise his name, to seize the Piræus by surprize, the principal ornament and defence of Athens; an action which would transmit his memory to future times, and raise his fame above the glory of Phœbidas, who became so illustrious and renowned at Sparta, by surprizing, in a similar manner, the citadel of Thebes."

Sphodrias, whose vanity and ambition prompted him to wish for an opportunity of performing a splendid action, undertook the enterprize with alacrity and confidence. He set out from Thespiæ early in the morning, in expectation to reach the Piræus before the dawn of the next day. But, as the distance between

between Thespiæ and Athens exceeded forty miles, the morning overtook him in the Thracian plain near Eleusis, whose astonished inhabitants conveyed the intelligence to Athens. Finding his plan discovered, he made a shameful retreat, after having ravaged the country. This perfidious design, and the atrocious conduct of Sphodrias in plundering the peaceful villages, enraged the Athenians; who immediately sent ambassadors to Sparta, loudly complaining of the injustice and the insult. The Spartans, according to custom, disavowed the conduct of Sphodrias. He was summoned before the council, and tried; but was preserved from death by the influence of Agesilaus. A tender friendship, we are told, had long joined, in the most cordial union, Archidamus, the son of the Spartan king, and Cleonymus, the son of Sphodrias; and, that the intercession and tears of the former, for the father of his friend, induced Agesilaus to interpose with his authority in his behalf.

Such is the account of Xenophon, who has too often employed the artful and eloquent simplicity of his style to disguise and embellish some of the most criminal transactions of the Lacedæmonians. From the conduct of Agesilaus, it is evident, that the unjust and perfidious plan of Sphodrias proceeded upon his authority, or at least with his knowledge; and the absurdity of the tale, related by Xenophon, to account for the acquittal of the criminal commander, is so gross and glaring, that one is amazed to think how it could impose even on the credulity of the Greeks. The Athenians beheld it in its true light; and, considering the acquittal of Sphodrias as a participation of his crime, resolved immediately to renew their alliance with Thebes, and made the most vigorous preparations for war.

Agesilaus now assumed the command of the army against

against Thebes, which amounted to eighteen thousand foot, and fifteen hundred horse. He engaged in frequent skirmishes with the enemy, but performed nothing important, or adequate to his former reputation. By these frequent, undecisive hostilities, he instructed the Thebans in the art of war, and disciplined them for greater services. Chabrias, the celebrated Athenian general, offered him battle near Thebes; but such was the advantageous position of his troops, and the excellent order in which they were drawn up, that the Spartan king, notwithstanding his superiority of numbers, declined the combat, and retreated with his army from Thebes. After his retreat, the Thebans proved victorious in every encounter with the enemy. When he returned to Sparta to be cured of his wounds, Antalcidas said to him in raillery, "These are the rewards you have obtained for teaching the Thebans to conquer." The other Spartan generals were equally unfortunate: Phœbidas, who had succeeded to the command of Thespiæ, was totally defeated and slain; and the Lacedæmonian commander fell by the hand of Pelopidas, in the battle of Tanagra.

While hostilities were thus carried on successfully at land, the Athenians again proved victorious at sea. Chabrias, who was equally qualified to discharge the duties of admiral and general, attacked the Lacedæmonian fleet, commanded by Pollis, near the isle of Naxos, and, notwithstanding their superiority of numbers, gave them a total defeat. Timotheus, the son of Conon, and who sustained, by his valour and exploits, the fame of his illustrious father, commanded the largest division of the fleet in the Ionian sea. After having destroyed the chief naval armament of the Spartans, he ravaged the coasts of Laconia, and laid the islands of Corcyra, Zacinthus, and Leucadia, under heavy contributions. A general

ral desertion prevailed among the Lacedæmonian dependencies: Chios and Bizantium, with many other states, abandoned the Spartan connexion, and once more placed themselves under the protection of Athens.

Lycurgus, in one of the three laws which he called *Rhætræ*, forbade the Lacedæmonians to make war frequently on the same enemy, lest, by compelling them to defend themselves, they should teach them to be expert soldiers. It was by this war of skirmishes, in frequent, though undecisive campaigns, that Pelopidas trained his soldiers to the use of arms, and taught them to front the Spartans in the field without terror or dismay.

The action at Tegyra was of a more important nature, and served as a prelude to the battle at Leuctra. The Theban army were returning from Archomenos, they found the Lacedæmonians posted to intercept them near Tegyra. One of the soldiers ran with trepidation to Pelopidas, calling out, "We have fallen into the hands of the enemy." "Say, rather," replied the general, "that the enemy have fallen into ours." Immediately he ordered his cavalry to advance to the front, and begin the combat. He knew that the sacred battalion, which was all his infantry, would break through the enemy, though much superior in number. After a fierce and violent onset, the two generals of the Lacedæmonians were killed, and their troops were dispersed, and fled in disorder.

This little encounter was, in some measure, the source of the great events which followed. It had never been known in any former engagement, either against the Persians or Greeks, that the Lacedæmonians were defeated with the superiority of numbers on their side. They now lost that honourable distinction, and the Thebans, in their turn, struck terror into those who had intimidated all Greece.

Before

Before this period, the Thebans had been considered in an inferior and contemptible light, and were held in detestation by the Greeks on account of their former alliance with Xerxes. While the other states of Greece struggled for pre-eminence, or contended for glory, the Thebans devoted themselves to their interest. The appearance of two extraordinary men, Pelopidas and Epaminondas, is supposed to have given an elevation to their natural character, and to have rendered them as ambitious of conquest and renown as they had formerly been for quiet and preservation. But although the uncommon abilities and virtues of two great men, and the still more uncommon union and friendship which prevailed between those who were naturally rivals, might be of considerable consequence in rousing the spirit of their countrymen, yet it does not seem reasonable to concur with the general opinion in ascribing to this circumstance alone the ascendancy which Thebes had acquired over republics, which had formerly beheld her with contempt. An accidental cause seems inadequate to produce permanent effects. Victory in an engagement may be owing to the superior skill and activity of the commander; a system of public measures, highly beneficial to a nation, may be adopted and carried into execution by one illustrious man; but to ensure a continued course of success during a war which lasted for several years; to bestow resources on a people who were totally deprived of them; to elevate a republic above rivals as superior to her in courage as in power; are operations far beyond the abilities and influence of single men. If we examine philosophically the revolutions of Greece, other causes will appear to account for the elevation which Thebes now assumed above the neighbouring republics.

The calamities which the Athenians and Spartans occasioned

occasioned to one another, as well as to their neighbours, by their ambitious struggles for pre-eminence; the perpetual contests which, for more than half a century, had been exhausting the strength of these republics, augmented the relative importance of the surrounding states, some of whom, by a felicity rare in that age, were so fortunate as to enjoy long intervals of tranquillity.

Thebes, in particular, had, by sure but silent steps, arrived at power, and gradually extended her authority over the smaller communities in Bœotia.* Neither Athens nor Sparta had been alarmed by her progress, and, vigilant to check the encroachments of each other, they had neglected to prevent the increase of a republic, whose reputation and lustre long continued inferior to her real power. When the Spartans at length became sensible of their error, they acted with such injustice, violence, and oppression, as drove the Thebans to despair; and, having spurned an odious and ignominious yoke, they threw it off for ever.

The Thebans were more remarkable for strength of body than ingenuity of mind; and though, Pindar excepted, they were little addicted to the pursuit of intellectual excellence or literary fame, yet they cultivated with peculiar care, the gymnastic exercises, which gave the address and dexterity of art to the strength of their gigantic members. The tyranny and oppression of Sparta first roused their passions and their feelings, and the collision of opposing bodies kindled that spark which animated them with a new existence, and inspired them with the love of freedom and of fame. They pursued every method to render

* By the peace of Antalcidas, the Bœotian cities were declared independent; but in two campaigns after the war of the allies commenced, Pelopidas recovered them all to the dominion of Thebes.

their

their ambition successful. They had introduced a rigid system of military discipline; had made considerable improvements in the exercise of cavalry, and in the general arrangement and manœuvres of an army.

Personal friendship, emulation, and that spirit of association often inspired by the necessity of self-defence, produced a combination, where each came under the most sacred engagements to defend his companions to his last breath. This combination, which was called "the sacred band," consisted originally of three hundred men, in the prime of life, and of tried fidelity, and was long conspicuous in the annals of Greece.

At this critical time two illustrious men started up to improve the favourable incidents of the times, and give a direction to the affairs of their country.

These were Pelopidas and Epaminondas. A severe persecution, to which the disciples of Pythagoras had been exposed in Italy, compelled the few, who could escape from the barbarity of their enemies, to take shelter in Greece. In this native soil of science they found protection and respect, and were employed to instruct youth in the tenets of their philosophy. Hence the Theban pair, as these heroes have been called, found preceptors, who pointed out the path which leads to virtue and to glory. Pelopidas was descended from one of the chief families of Thebes, and educated in the greatest affluence; but even in early youth he applied his fortune to the noblest purposes, in raising the worthy, who were depressed, to their proper rank and station in life. He excelled in the gymnastic exercises, so much esteemed by the Greeks; and, from qualities more meritorious and more estimable, was early marked out by his country as the person most worthy of administering the affairs of the government. He was

six times elected to the first dignities in the republic, and always sustained the reputation which he early acquired for patriotism, courage, and good conduct.

Epaminondas was born and educated in that honourable poverty, which, in those ages, was associated with the ideas of integrity and virtue. He applied to the martial and manly exercises, which were held in such high reputation by his country, only so far as to prepare him for the labours and occasions of a military life. He studied the Pythagorean philosophy under Lysis; a philosophy which did not train its votaries to barren and abstracted speculation, but formed them to public life, and the service of their country. Placed at first in a subordinate station, he verified his own maxim, that the office derives dignity from the man, not the man from the office. A love of veracity and virtue, tenderness, humanity, and an exalted patriotism, were the genuine offspring of his nature or education; and to these qualities he added uncommon penetration and sagacity, a felicity in improving incidents, a consummate skill in the art of war, and unconquerable patience of toil and distress; a boldness in enterprize, vigour, and magnanimity. All these talents he adorned with that eloquence which was then the great engine of power, and which gave him the same ascendancy in council, which his valour and superior conduct did in the field. By these heroes, who, though rivals, were always friends, Thebes rose to power and dominion.

About this time Egypt revolted from the Persian yoke, and Artaxerxes made powerful preparations to reduce that province. Well acquainted with the martial fame of the Greeks, he sent his emissaries to raise soldiers in Greece; and neither Athenians nor Spartans disdained to become his mercenaries; driven from their country, either by necessity or the spirit of adventure, twenty thousand men forsook their families,

lies, and embarked in the expedition against Egypt. Iphicrates, at the request of Pharnabazus, the commander of that expedition, was placed at the head of the Greek troops. Besides the twenty thousand Greeks, Pharnabazus had two hundred thousand Persians, and five hundred ships; but this mighty armament effected nothing of importance. The kings of Persia, in those times, pretended to direct from their cabinet all the transactions of a distant campaign; and traced out to their generals plans of military operations, from which they were not to depart without new orders from court. Whatever abilities a commander might possess, his hands were bound; he was afraid to exceed his powers, for, by gaining a victory, he might lose his head. If the councils of Iphicrates had been followed, Memphis might have been taken by surprize, and all Egypt recovered; but, as Pharnabazus waited for the instructions of a distant court, his tardy measures prolonged the dominion of the Egyptian king. Iphicrates withdrew to Athens with disgust and disdain.

The Thebans, who refused to follow the standard of Artaxerxes, about this time totally destroyed Thespiæ and Platæa, and expelled the inhabitants. The Platæans implored the protection of the Athenians, though in alliance with Thebes. Their past services and present sufferings, their intreaties and their tears, prevailed on the humanity of the Athenians to grant them an asylum in their city.

All Greece now began to grow weary of a war, which had its origin in the injustice and oppression of Sparta, and which had no other tendency than to confirm the ascendancy of one state, whose tyranny and insolence had been long intolerable; or to elevate another to a pre-eminence which would be dangerous to her neighbours, and destructive to herself. The Athenians, disgusted with the insolence and cru-

elty of the Thebans, in destroying the cities of Thespiæ and Platæa, and in their recent attempt to commit depradations in Phocis, were disposed to renew their alliance with the Spartans. Acquainted with this state of the Grecian affairs, and needing new supplies to reduce his revolted subjects in Egypt, Artaxerxes sent a new embassy to the several states of Greece, desiring them to lay down their arms, and to accommodate all differences according to the treaty of Antalcidas.

A convention of deputies was held at Sparta. The orators, Callistratus and Antocles, were sent by the Athenians; Agesilaus appeared on the part of Sparta; while Epaminondas was appointed by the Thebans to support the dignity and the interests of their republic. After deploring those unhappy animosities, which had led to civil bloodshed, and the general degradation of Greece, it was proposed to renew the peace of Antalcidas, which was equally favourable to all the Grecian communities. To this proposal all parties concerned unanimously agreed. When Epaminondas offered to sign the treaty in the name of the Bœotian confederacy, Agesilaus asked, whether the Thebans intended to comply with the treaty, by granting independence to Bœotia? On the other side, Epaminondas demanded, whether Sparta had determined to grant independence to Laconia? "Shall the Bœotians be free?" said the Spartan king, rising in wrath; "Yes," replied Epaminondas, "whenever you restore liberty to the Lacedæmonians and Messenians."

Then, addressing the deputies of the confederates, he exposed, in its true light, the nature of the treaty they were about to sanction. "Convened to establish the general freedom of Greece, you are going to confirm the despotism of a tyrant. The treaty, in appearance, restores liberty to every community, small

small and great; but its real object is, that Thebes should diminish her own strength by giving freedom to the Bœotian states, while Sparta retained in subjection its numerous allies, whose services she would demand on the first occasion. If you now consent to the destruction of the Theban power, while that of Sparta remains unimpaired, you destroy your sole defence against Lacedæmonian tyranny, and place the yoke of subjection upon your own necks. But if any portion of Grecian spirit remains, if the memory of your ancestors still lives within you, you will protect rather than destroy this new temple to liberty, and will follow the auspicious example of its votaries, who have nobly asserted their freedom, and confirmed it by their swords."

This firm and animated discourse, founded on principles of truth and justice, sunk deep into the hearts of the deputies. Though they APPEARED to be convinced by the long and laboured reply* of Agesilaus, and were REALLY intimidated by the power of Sparta, yet they carried with them from the assembly the sentiments of the patriotic Epaminondas, and disseminated them in Greece.

Thebes, now excluded from the treaty of peace, was exposed to all the vengeance of the Spartans; and, without friend or ally, had, to all appearance, armed against itself the general confederacy of Greece. But Epaminondas and the Thebans well knew, that this confederacy was more nominal than real. The Spartan allies were by no means cordial in their cause; and the Athenians, although they might endeavour to depress the pre-eminence, would not desert the distresses of Thebes. The Spartans too had degenerated from their antient character; and

* It was on this occasion that Epaminondas said, "I have compelled the Spartans to lengthen their monosyllables."

the strength of the state was impaired by their frequent and almost uninterrupted hostilities. The laws of Lycurgus had, in a great measure, ceased to govern them; wealth and luxury had been introduced, and become general; and such of the antient institutions as still remained in force, tended, upon a change of circumstances, to produce pernicious instead of beneficial effects. While the Spartans remained satisfied with their simplicity of manners, poverty, and heroic virtue, the law which discouraged all intercourse with strangers, and prohibited them from being admitted to the rank of citizens, was in strict conformity to the peculiar spirit and character of the Lacedæmonian constitution. But when they departed from their antient maxims, became ambitious, opulent, victorious, almost always engaged in war, not for defence, but for conquest and dominion, the idea of preserving the citizens a body separate and detached from the rest of mankind, was absurd and impolitic. As they never thought of incorporating the conquered nations, or associating their allies with their citizens, it was impossible for them to continue constantly employed in war, without being at length exposed to inevitable destruction. Not only the defeat, but even the victory, which deprived them of their valuable citizens, was a public calamity; every loss was irreparable; and, notwithstanding their expedients to prevent this effect, the numbers of the Spartans gradually decreased.

A long course of hostilities had deprived them of the best half of their citizens; their antient renown was tarnished in the battle of Tegyra; and neither their allies, whom they oppressed, nor their subjects, whom they enslaved, were likely to be formidable antagonists in the field.

This great contest, which involved the fate of two powerful republics, was soon brought to the decision of

of the sword. It was determined in the Spartan senate to invade Bœotia without delay. Agesilaus was prevented by sickness from taking the command, which, by his advice, was entrusted to his colleague Cleombrotus, who marched without delay into the enemies country, with an army of twelve thousand men, levied chiefly from the Lacedæmonian allies, who followed him with reluctance. They penetrated into Bœotia, by the way of Phocis, and encamped near the village of Leuctra. Their numbers were greatly increased by the arrival of Archidamus with a strong reinforcement. The united forces now amounted to twenty-four thousand foot, and sixteen hundred horse. The Theban cavalry were nearly as numerous, and far superior in valour and in discipline; but their infantry, we are told, scarcely exceeded six thousand.

The Thebans, who were encamped on the mountains which overlooked the plain, were seized with terror when they beheld the prodigious extent of the Spartan camp. Of the six generals who shared with Epaminondas in the command, several strongly opposed engaging an enemy so superior in number, and endeavoured to intimidate the troops by the arts of superstition: all the omens, they declared, were inauspicious. The philosophical and high-minded commander replied by a verse of Homer:

> Without a sign, his sword the brave man draws,
> And asks no omen but his country's cause.

At the same time, to revive the courage of the soldiers, he opposed superstition to superstition. Messengers were said to have come from Thebes, reporting omens and auguries of a more fortunate kind: the former impression was effaced, and an ardour for battle, and the hopes of victory, succeeded to panic and despondency.

Before the engagement, Epaminondas gave permission to all those who preferred ignoble safety to the cause of Thebes, to retire from the field. The Thespians availed themselves of this permission, together with that herd of attendants which always follow an army. The Lacedæmonians, deceived by the appearance of an army, exhibited by these fugitives, opposed them with a numerous body of forces, and obliged them to return to the Thebans. Their return had at least the appearance of a reinforcement, and gave additional confidence to the Bœotian troops.

The Lacedæmonian army was disposed, as usual, in the form of a crescent. Cleombrotus placed himself at the head of the native troops of Sparta, in the right wing of the army, in the front of which he had posted his cavalry. The allies formed the left wing, led on by Archidamus. Epaminondas, having attentively considered the arrangement of the enemy, wisely determined to point his warmest attack against the Spartans and their king, knowing that success in that quarter would probably insure victory to the Thebans. As the event of the battle was therefore to be decided by the exertions of his left wing, he formed it into a battalion of fifty deep, that it might bear down all opposition by the weight of its charge, and placed in it the flower of his heavy-armed troops. The sacred battalion, commanded by Pelopidas, was upon his left, and flanked the whole. The cavalry were placed in the van, to oppose the Spartan horse. To prevent the Theban army from being surrounded by the enemy, he extended his right wing.

The cavalry on both sides first rushed to the engagement; but those of the Lacedæmonians were soon repulsed, and in their precipitate retreat disordered the foremost ranks of their own army. Thrown into confusion by their own cavalry, and at the same time attacked

tacked by the sacred band, a temporary route took place. In this critical moment the Theban general formed the division, which he commanded, into a wedge-like phalanx, for the purpose of piercing the Lacedæmonian battalions, as soon as they should charge, as he expected they would, his right wing, which, from its extension, and consequent thinness of the ranks, he imagined would invite their attack. The Lacedæmonians, as he had expected, attacked his right wing, and were, in their turn, charged in flank by the massy body under the command of Epaminondas, which pierced with irresistible impetuosity to the place where Cleombrotus fought in person with his Spartans. The occasion demanded the utmost exertions of their valour. Nor did they, in this instance, dishonour the Spartan name: they surrounded him on every side, and opposed their bucklers, their swords, their breasts in his defence. For awhile they resisted all the weight of the Theban phalanx, and at last fell with their king, covered with honourable wounds.

All that the Spartans could now do was to preserve the corse of their monarch from falling into the hands of the Thebans. After the utmost efforts of valour, they kept possession of the body; but were obliged to yield the glory of the day to the intrepid coolness and consummate skill of Epaminondas.

The allies, apprised of the defeat of the Lacedæmonians, and the death of the king, betook themselves to flight, were pursued with considerable slaughter, and the bravery of the Thebans, under the guidance of Epaminondas, obtained a complete victory.

Their loss in this battle amounted only to three hundred men. Of seven hundred Spartans who fought in the engagement, four hundred fell in the

field; the Lacedæmonians lost one thousand, and the allies two thousand six hundred men.

As soon as the Lacedæmonians had reached their camp, they began to be astonished at their overthrow. Sparta had never received such a blow. The defeat was disgrace, and the loss of the battle was the loss of all they held dear, of a character for pre-eminent bravery, which they had acquired, and hitherto supported. A council of war was called to deliberate whether they should permit the Thebans to erect a trophy, or, returning to the field, should venture a second engagement. Revolving the losses which they had sustained, and distrusting their allies, who followed them only through fear, and whose ill-concealed joy at the defeat gave them little confidence in their assistance, they at last reluctantly sent a herald to request leave to bury their dead, and to acknowledge the right of the Thebans to erect a trophy of their victory.

When the messenger of these unfortunate events reached Sparta, and had acquainted the Ephori with the unexpected public calamity, true to the iron institutes of Lycurgus, they ordered the public games, which the inhabitants were then celebrating, to go on without interruption; and the individuals, not to deviate from the Spartan character, received the news of the death of fathers, brothers, sons, and kinsmen, with every outward mark of joy and exultation, while the relations of those who had fled, either concealed themselves from public view, or appeared as the only real mourners.

The institutions of Lycurgus tended chiefly to inspire military courage. The Lacedæmonian who fled in battle was commanded either to retire into perpetual banishment, or, if he could bear the alternative, might remain despicable at home. There he was excluded for ever from the public assembles, was rendered

rendered incapable of all offices, was unprotected by the laws, disavowed by his country, being equally solitary and contemptible, and noticed only for his infamy. On occasion of the calamitous overthrow at Leuctra, the stern severity of Sparta yielded to expediency; Agesilaus was invested with full powers to carry the laws into execution; but the vast numbers of valuable citizens, who would thus be lost to the state, obliged him to sacrifice the letter of the laws to the benefit of the republic. "We must suppose," said he "our revered institutions to have slept for one day, henceforth to resume their former power and energy;" a sentence which appeared to secure the authority of the laws, while it preserved the lives of the citizens.

The overthrow at Leuctra instantly produced the most important consequences. The Eleans, Arcadians, and Argives, almost every state which had been oppressed by the tyranny of Sparta, rejoiced at the misfortune of their tyrant, and prepared to profit by the present weakness of the Lacedæmonians.

Athens alone displayed an unusual and unexpected example of moderation: but it was only an apparent moderation. The Athenians, indeed, publicly founded their conduct on the former merits of the Spartans; and asserted, that the noble defenders of Greece, against the Persian invasion, were not to be extirpated; but the real cause may be attributed to more selfish considerations. Sparta, in her present state of humiliation, was no longer an object of jealousy or dread; Thebes, now in the zenith of her power, and still more formidable by her vicinity to Athens, was considered as a most dangerous rival, against whom some balance was to be preserved. From these motives, the Theban herald, who came

to announce the victory at Leuctra, and to invite the Athenians to join in totally crushing the Lacedæmonians, was received with coolness, and even with disrespect. Perceiving that the defeat of the Spartans had placed the balance of power in their hands, they determined, if possible, to preserve it. For this purpose, the states of Peloponnesus were detached from the Lacedæmonian confederacy; and, to prevent any people from again acquiring a dangerous ascendancy in Greece, war was denounced against all who would not promise strictly to adhere to the peace of Antalcidas.

Two years had not elapsed since the defeat at Leuctra, till the Spartan confederacy in Peloponnesus was entirely dissolved; while the alliance of the Thebans extended on all sides. They were joined by the Eleans, Argives, and Arcadians, and even some of the inhabitants of Laconia: and their authority and influence were soon augmented by the accession of the Acarnanians, Locrians, Phocians, and the inhabitants of Eubœa. The Peloponnesians, after being emancipated from the Spartan yoke, seem not to have known how to enjoy or preserve their liberty. The most cruel and sanguinary factions prevailed in every city, that, alternately, as they obtained power, expelled or butchered each other. From this general censure we must except the Mantinæans, who, wisely profiting by the occasion, rebuilt their walls with all expedition, and unanimously concurred in re-establishing their republican form of government.

Several circumstances prevented the Thebans from immediately pursuing the blow which they had given to Sparta in the field of Leuctra; but, after some time, having collected the flower of their own forces and those of the allies, they entered Laconia at the head

head of sixty or seventy thousand men.* So great an army had never been assembled in Greece under one standard. Resentment against Sparta, and the high reputation of Pelopidas and Epaminondas, induced the allies, without any public order or decree, to obey their summons with alacrity, and follow their standard with confidence. Six hundred years had elapsed since the Dorians had taken possession of Lacedæmon, and, in all that time, no enemy had ever invaded their territories, nor attacked their city, which, though without walls or fortifications, had been defended by the valour of the citizens. But now they had to repel the enemy from the banks of the Eurotas, and to defend their capital from hostile assailants.

To oppose the numerous forces of Thebes, they employed the aged and infirm; and armed six thousand of their helots, promising to emancipate them at the close of the war. The factious adherents to aristocratical government, from Achaia, Argolis, and Arcadia, at this critical period, took refuge in Sparta, and afforded a powerful and seasonable reinforcement.

In approaching towards the Lacedæmonian territories, the Theban army marched in four divisions, which were to unite at Sellasia, and thence to proceed to Sparta. The Bœotians, Argives, and Elians, reached the place appointed without difficulty or opposition. But when the fourth division of the army, consisting of the Arcadians, attempted to traverse Sciritis, Ischolaus, who commanded at an important pass in that district, formed the resolution, in imitation of Leonidas, of devoting himself and his party for the good of his country. This heroic band, after

* The Greek historians, Xenophon, Diodorus, Plutarch, differ with regard to the numbers in the Theban army.

having

having made a dreadful slaughter of the enemy, at last yielded to superior numbers, but not till the last Spartan had expired.

The army having assembled at Sellasia, marched forward to Sparta, ravaging the country, and setting fire to the towns and villages as they advanced. A mixture of astonishment, alarm, and indignation, prevailed in that city, when they beheld, for the first time, an enemy before their walls. The women were terrified at the unusual spectacle, while the men glowed with rage and resentment at the sight; and desired to be led instantly against the invaders, in order to repulse them, or to die on the spot. It was with the utmost difficulty that their eager transports could be restrained, even by the authority of Agesilaus; who, amidst these calamities that threatened his country with ruin, resolved to avoid a general engagement, and confine his preparations to the defence of the capital. He acted, in this emergency, with that coolness and decision which distinguish the truly great man. He considered this irruption of the enemy as an impetuous torrent, which it was equally vain and dangerous to oppose; whose rapid course would be but of short duration; and after some ravages, subside of itself. He was determined not to quit the city, nor to hazard a battle; and persisted in that determination, notwithstanding the insults and menaces of the Thebans, who called upon him to come forth and defend his country, which he alone had involved in all the calamities of war. Epaminondas finding it impossible to draw Agesilaus from the city, retired with his army. It would have been difficult, if not impossible, for Sparta, unwalled and unfortified, to have defended itself long against his victorious arms: but the Theban general apprehended that he should arm against him the confederacy of Peloponnesus, and excite the jealousy

jealousy of the Greeks, if by destroying the Spartan capital, he was *to lop off one of the arms, and pluck out one of the eyes of Greece.* He was satisfied, therefore, with humbling the pride of the Spartans, by bidding them defiance in their capital, and ravaging their country before their eyes.

In this hour of her depression and distress, Sparta sent deputies to implore the aid of the Athenians. The ambassadors recalled to the attention of the assembly, the antient alliance and friendship between the two republics in a season of calamity and danger, and observed, that the most illustrious era of their history was that in which they united their councils and arms against the Persians, their common enemy. They took notice, that by the interposition of Sparta, the Athenians had been delivered from the oppression of the Pisistratidæ. They enlarged upon the insolent ambition of the upstart Thebans, who had concerted a plan for extending their dominion over all Greece. They concluded by urging, that the hereditary renown of Athens should induce her to protect the miserable; that gratitude for the merit of past services, called upon her to assist an antient friend and ally; and, that justice demanded that she should maintain the conditions of the recent treaty, which had been renewed by her authority, and which the Thebans, after accepting, had so grossly violated.

Although the Athenians had not forgotten the injuries and indignities which they had suffered from the Spartans on various occasions, especially after their defeat in Sicily, yet compassion for their present misfortunes prevailed over the sense of past offences; and they resolved unanimously to assist the Lacedæmonians. An army of twelve thousand men was raised, and the command given to Iphicrates. The usual sacrifices were offered, the omens were propitious,

tious, and the troops entered into the service with all the ardour of enthusiasm.

At the same time the Theban general, after having laid waste the Lacedæmonian territory, meditated a design, which, if carried into execution, would prove a more lasting detriment to Sparta. Messené was an antient city bordering on Laconia, and its inhabitants were, as the Spartans, of the Doric race. Mutual injuries, which arose between these neighbouring nations, gradually produced an inveterate antipathy; and hostilities were carried on with such barbarous fury, that the one people determined no longer to exist, unless they could exterminate the other. This fatal event happened to the Messenians; their city was demolished by the Spartans, and the inhabitants who escaped from the sword, were obliged to wander as fugitives over Peloponnesus. Some of them sought refuge in Sicily, where they founded the city Messina, which still retains the name of their antient metropolis. The remainder, who continued in Greece, had still kept themselves distinct from every other community, and after more than three centuries, spoke their antient Doric dialect; retained all the prejudices of their nation; detested the name of Sparta, and still expected to avenge themselves of her cruelties. It is probable that the scattered Messenians would flock spontaneously from every quarter to the standard of Epaminondas, and embrace the favourable opportunity of retaliating the cruelties of the Spartans, and inflicting the injuries which they had sustained. Epaminondas encouraged their ardour, rebuilt their city, and re-established them in their possessions. This act of humanity and liberal policy, inflicted a stroke equally unexpected and severe on the Spartans. They beheld their antient foe, whom they had considered as prostrate for ever, rise into consequence under the fostering

fostering protection of Thebes; and ready on every occasion to take vengeance for the numberless injuries she had received.

After having given this fatal blow to the power and ambition of Sparta, Epaminondas turned his attention towards the Athenian army. Their general, Iphicrates, from what motive cannot now be ascertained, instead of yielding to the ardour of his soldiers, who demanded to be led to action, avoided every occasion of encountering an enemy. Perhaps he thought, that every purpose of the expedition might be answered without an engagement; and that the news of the march of the Athenians into Arcadia, would recal the Thebans and their allies from the Lacedæmonian territories.

If such were his expectations, they were gratified. Epaminondas, abandoned by the Arcadians, who had returned to defend their own country, perceiving that the other allies wished also to retire, saw that he could no longer expect to make himself master of the Lacedæmonian capital. The conduct too of the Athenians, who, though the jealous rivals of the Spartans, yet had armed in their defence, taught him that Greece in general would never permit the total overthrow of Sparta. He therefore evacuated Laconia, after having made it feel to the uttermost all the horrors of war. The Athenian army at the same time quitted Arcadia, and both returned home without any hostile attempt, neither general seeming to wish for an engagement.

Pelopidas and Epaminondas, on their return to Thebes, instead of receiving the applauses and honours which they had merited from their country, were summoned to appear before the assembly of the people, for having retained the command of the army four months beyond the term limited by law. The vigilant and jealous spirit of freedom produced similar

similar regulations in all the larger republics, lest generals invested with authority might be tempted to employ it in subverting the liberties of their country. The Theban demagogues might represent, on this occasion, that though the violation of the law in the present instance had been the occasion of many memorable actions in Messenia, Arcadia, and Laconia, yet the example might prove pernicious, in authorising some future commander to retain his authority beyond the legal term, and turn his arms against the republic.

Pelopidas was first cited before the tribunal. He discovered none of that vigour and courage which might have been expected from the greatness of his mind, and which he had often displayed in the field. It was with difficulty that he was acquitted. The appearance of Epaminondas corresponded to the dignity of his character, and the splendor of his actions. He displayed that collected and philosophical fortitude which springs from mental excellence and conscious virtue. Without descending to a regular and minute vindication of his conduct, he recalled to the remembrance of his audience all the exploits he had performed for their sakes, all the services he had rendered to his country; and declared, that he would lay down his life with pleasure, provided his judges would express in their sentence, "that his having conquered in the cause of his country without their consent, was the crime for which he suffered." The boldness and the truth of this defence confounded the demagogues, and restored the Thebans to their senses: Epaminondas was unanimously acquitted, and acquired new glory from the ineffectual malice of his enemies.

The Spartans, apprehensive of an enemy, whom recent success had rendered bolder and more enterprising than ever, without delay dispatched supplicatory

catory deputies to Athens, to intreat the continuance of friendship and assistance. The humiliation of Sparta appeared strongly from the language which the ambassadors held at the conference, and from the concessions they made. All the boasted pre-eminence of Sparta was abandoned; they not only gave up the empire of the sea to the Athenians, but agreed, that the combined forces of the republics should be alternately commanded by a Spartan and Athenian general; a concession beyond all precedents of former times, and which strongly marked the fallen condition of the Lacedæmonian state.

Successful in their negociations at Athens, the Spartans next negociated with Dionysius, tyrant of Sicily, and with the Persian monarch. An application from the most renowned of the Dorians met a welcome reception from the former, who boasted of his Doric extraction; and Artaxerxes was easily prevailed upon to follow the Persian system, of exhausting the strength of Greece by perpetuating the civil wars of that country.

Supported by a new accession of strength from these important alliances, the Spartans were for some time in a situation to check the progress of the opposite confederacy.

This did not prevent the Arcadians from entering the territory of Pallenè, from ravaging the country, and taking the city by storm; nor their junction soon after with the Eleans, Argives, and Thebans, under the command of Epaminondas. To oppose this formidable army the Athenians sent Chabrias, their favourite general, whose troops, when joined with those of the Spartans and Sicilians, composed an army of twenty-two thousand men. Epaminondas attempting to penetrate into Peloponnesus, advanced to the isthmus, and found it defended and fortified by a strong wall, which the enemy had raised to prevent the

the junction of the Theban general with his southern allies. But that commander discerning a weak part in the wall, forced a passage through it, after a warm engagement; and having ravaged the country, and taken Sicyon, he laid siege to Corinth. Chabrias soon marched to its relief, and attacked the Thebans with so much vigour and effect, that Epaminondas withdrew his army from Peloponnesus, and retired to Thebes. He experienced once more that cruel and capricious ingratitude which characterises all popular governments; he was accused of partiality to the Lacedæmonians, and under that pretext deprived of the chief command.

The confederates were astonished and disgusted at the retreat of the Thebans, while the general dissatisfaction inspired Lycomedes, the leader of the Arcadians, with schemes of ambition. He represented to his countrymen, "That though they were the most antient and powerful community in Peloponnesus, yet they had hitherto acted only a secondary part. That by their assistance the Spartans had triumphed in the Peloponnesian war, and afterwards exercised the most intolerable tyranny in Greece; and that now they were assisting the Thebans to acquire the superiority over their countrymen, and to follow the example of Sparta." "Why," said he, "should the Arcadians march in the train of any other state? we are numerous, we are brave, and ought to be independent."

The speech met the applauses of his countrymen, and the resolution was instantly formed, not only to keep possession of the cities they had taken, but to extend their conquests in Elis, Achaia, and the adjacent provinces.

In the commencement of the following year, the Spartans being reinforced from Sicily, and having obtained a subsidy, with a body of Grecian mercenaries

ries from Persia, ventured to take the field to oppose the Arcadians. The advanced age of Agesilaus prevented him from assuming the command, which was conferred on his son Archidamus; a prince of whom Sparta formed the highest expectations. From the remarkable success which attended his arms, he seemed destined to restore the falling fortunes of his country. Having expelled the enemy from the Lacedæmonian territories, he entered the southern frontier of Arcadia, and was making preparations to attack the city of Parrhasia, when the Arcadians reinforced by the Argives, marched to oppose him. After an interval of some days, the hostile armies prepared to engage. On this occasion Archidamus exhorted his troops to emulate the glory of their fathers, and once more to re-establish the antient renown of Sparta.

In the midst of this exhortation, a peal of thunder burst from the right, and the soldiers at the same time discovered an altar and statue of Hercules, the illustrious ancestor of the Spartan kings. Elevated to an enthusiasm of courage by this assemblage of happy omens, they marched with ardour and confidence to the attack. The Arcadians, who had counted upon a bloodless victory, when they discerned the intrepidity and valour of their opponents, being seized with a panic before a sword was drawn, fled in confusion, and were slaughtered with impunity by the pursuers. This engagement is called by the antient historians, *the battle without tears*, as the Spartans, it is said, lost not a man.*

For some time past the Lacedæmonians had been so much accustomed to disasters and defeats, that when the tidings of this battle arrived, and they saw Archidamus return victorious from the field, they

* Xenoph. lib. vii. p. 620. Diodorous.

could

could not contain their joy, nor keep within the bounds of their city. His aged father and the senators went out to meet him, shedding tears of tenderness and joy; and the multitude lifting up their hands to heaven, joined in acclamations and praises to the gods, as if this event had cancelled the ignominy of years, and they had beheld the arrival of those happy days when Sparta gave law to Greece.*

The fame of the victory at Leuctra, and the rise of a new power in Greece, had, by this time, reached the extremities of Asia, and attracted the attention of Artaxerxes, the Persian monarch. The Lacedæmonians had sent deputies, among whom was Antalcidas, to the Great King, to accelerate the supplies which were expected from Persia. The Thebans too thought it necessary to appoint Pelopidas on their side, in order to counteract the hostile negociations of their enemies. Ambassadors were likewise sent from Argos, Arcadia, and Elis; nor did Athens herself disdain to appear, by deputy, at the foot of the Persian throne.

Upon their arrival, Artaxerxes and his court could not conceal their admiration of Pelopidas, who, in conjunction with Epaminondas, had deprived the Lacedæmonians of their empire in Greece, and had compelled that republic to confine itself between the Eurotas and the Taygetus, which, a few years before had threatened, under its king Agesilaus, to carry its conquering arms to Upper Asia, and besiege the capital of the Persian empire.

The Theban ambassador represented, that it was the interest of the Great King to protect an infant power which had never borne arms against Persia; that in all

* The defeat at Leuctra, we are told, had affected the Lacedæmonians so much, that the men were ashamed to look the women in the face.

the

the wars between the Greeks and Persians, the Thebans had uniformly supported the interests of the latter; that their patriotic opposition to Spartan tyranny had drawn upon them the present war: that the Lacedæmonians had attacked them with the grossest injustice, but that they had reaped the fruits of their perfidy; and that the field of Leuctra would be a permanent monument of Theban valour, and Spartan degeneracy. Timagoras the Athenian, next addressing the king, to the astonishment of his colleague Leon, and the other deputies, spoke with the utmost warmth in favour of the Thebans. Artaxerxes, without paying attention to the confusion and altercation that arose from this circumstance, desired the Theban deputy to communicate the propositions he had to offer as the ambassador from Thebes. Pelopidas then proposed, "that Messené should continue independent, and exempted from the yoke of Sparta; that the Athenian fleet which had sailed to infest the coast of Bœotia should be recalled, and if opposition was made to the treaty by these states or their allies, they should be compelled to submit to it by the united force of Persia and Thebes." The court of Persia appears to have been pre-determined in favour of the Thebans; their propositions met with the approbation of the king, and the treaty was sanctioned without delay by the royal signet. Leon, the Athenian ambassador, is said, on this occasion, to have exclaimed with the true spirit of his country, "Well, we must find another ally, for the king of Persia is no longer our friend."

On the return of Pelopidas to Thebes, the public assembly was convened, and his successful negociation was rewarded by the thanks and applause of his countrymen. A convention of the Grecian states*

* No representatives were sent either from Sparta or Athens.

met

met at Thebes, the articles of the treaty were read, and the representatives of the different states were required to ratify and confirm it with the usual solemnities.

The greater number of the deputies refused to ratify the treaty, till the different articles had been previously discussed in the assembly of each state. Lycomedes and Antiochus, the representatives from Arcadia, went still farther; they expressed their dislike to the treaty in the language of indignation and disdain. The latter, who had been ambassador at the court of Persia, blended, with his reprobation of the treaty, the highest contempt for the riches and power of the Great King, and the most galling sarcasms against Asiatic luxury and effeminacy.

Such being the general temper of the assembly, nothing propitious to the views of Thebes was to be expected, and she beheld the dissolution of the convention with disappointment and regret. But eagerly solicitous to accomplish a scheme which tended to her own aggrandisement, she next endeavoured by secret machinations in each particular state, to procure that compliance from them singly, which she had in vain attempted from the whole. Here too disappointment followed all her endeavours. Corinth, which she first attempted to influence, as one of the weakest and most corrupt of the Grecian confederacy, spurned at the Persian alliance, and the example was uniformly followed by the other states.

Meanwhile a formidable power started up in Thessaly, of which Alexander of Pheræ had made himself master, by assassinating Polyphron, the brother of Jason, who was commander of the Thessalians. Alexander, with an army of twenty thousand men, made war on the states around him with astonishing success, and subjected most of them to his dominion. The Thessalians took arms against their tyrant, and implored

implored the assistance of the Thebans, who sent them an army under the conduct of Pelopidas, as Epaminondas was employed in Peloponnesus. The arrival of the Theban forces struck terror into the breast of the tyrant; Pelopidas soon made himself master of Larissa, and compelled Alexander to sue for peace. The Theban general attempted to inspire this ferocious prince with sentiments of justice and humanity; but finding him incorrigible, and hearing every day new complaints of his cruelty, avarice, and debauchery, he threatened him with his resentment. The tyrant alarmed, withdrew in secret; and Pelopidas, leaving the Thessalians in security from his future attempts, set out by invitation for Macedon, where Ptolemy, the natural son of Amintas II. had usurped the regal power, in defiance of the rights of his legitimate children. Alexander, the eldest of these children, dying, after a short reign of one year, Ptolemy assumed at first the government of the country under the modest title of guardian to Perdiccas, the second son, but soon after, tired of subordinate authority, he threw off all disguise, and seized the throne. The supporters of the legal heir implored the assistance of Pelopidas, who, entering Macedon with an army, replaced the sceptre in the hands of Perdiccas, and restored the tranquillity of the kingdom. On his return to Thebes, he carried with him thirty children, sprung from the noblest families of Macedon, to shew the Greeks how far the authority of the Thebans extended, from their reputation for justice and fidelity, as well as valour. Among these was Philip, the younger brother of Perdiccas, who afterwards succeeded to the throne of Macedon, and laid the foundation of a new empire in Greece, which his son Alexander the Great extended to the remote regions of Asia.

In his march homewards, Pelopidas imprudently

divided his army. The Macedonian hostages were escorted by a strong detachment, which was sent on before the division he led in person. While he was pursuing his route through Thessaly with this remainder of his forces, he received information, that Alexander of Pheræ was at hand to oppose him. Notwithstanding every hostile appearance, Pelopidas could not be persuaded that the tyrant had any intentions but to apologize for his conduct, to reply before him as a judge to the numerous complaints which were brought against him from every quarter. Under this impression, he went to meet the tyrant, accompanied only by Ismenias; both were immediately seized, and carried prisoners to Pheræ.

When the Thebans were informed of this perfidious transaction, incensed at such an indignity offered to one of their generals, they immediately sent an army into Thessaly. The command was not given to Epaminondas, as the Thebans had not yet forgiven him for his retreat from Chabrias the Athenian. But the love of his country, and affection to his friend, the two noblest passions that belong to human nature, extinguished all resentment in the heart of that great man; and Epaminondas, though excluded from the chief command, served in the ranks as a private soldier.

The new generals from Thebes, who had entered Thessaly, did nothing but discover their ignorance of military affairs, and their incapacity for command. The victorious army of Alexander soon discerned that their enemies were no longer conducted by Epaminondas or Pelopidas. The Theban soldiers, beholding themselves robbed of all their former military glory by an enemy which they despised, openly accused the conduct of their commanders, and, with one consent, elected Epaminondas their general. No sooner had he assumed the command, than the Thebans were every where victorious, the tyrant was defeated

feated in every engagement, and was obliged at last to purchase a short truce, by delivering up Pelopidas and Ismenias.

But the restless ambition of Alexander would not suffer him to remain long at peace; for soon after, with a numerous body of mercenaries, he broke into Thessaly, and made almost a total conquest of the country. Under the yoke of oppression, the Thessalians again implored the protection of Thebes. The Thebans, whose interest they had always pursued with fidelity and alacrity, resolved to assist them with a powerful army, and invested Pelopidas with the command. On the day appointed for his march, there happened a sudden eclipse of the sun, when the city of Thebes was darkened at noon-day. Among a people ignorant and superstitious, the dread and consternation were general. Unwilling to exact the reluctant obedience of men dispirited by religious terrors, Pelopidas departed with three hundred horse, and such Thebans and strangers as chose to follow him. He was incited to this enterprize by personal resentment against Alexander, who had perfidiously seized his person, and cruelly detained him in captivity. But he was chiefly influenced by a superior motive, the propriety and dignity of the action itself. He was prompted by a laudable ambition to display to all Greece, that while the Lacedæmonians were paying court to Dionysius the tyrant, and the Athenians were in the pay of Alexander, to whom they had erected a statue of brass, the Thebans were the only people who asserted the general liberty of the Greeks, and declared open war against tyranny and tyrants.

Pelopidas and his Theban detachment being joined by seven thousand Thessalians, marched to Cynocephalus, a place surrounded with high hills, and there pitched his camp. The tyrant advanced with an army

of twenty thousand men, and trusting to his numbers, courted an engagement. The impetuous attack of the Theban cavalry was irresistible at the first onset; but the infantry of Alexander, which were posted upon the heights, pouring down upon the Thebans and Thessalians, compelled them to give ground. Pelopidas than advanced with a detachment of his cavalry, and rallying the troops, so animated them by his voice and example, that the enemy, believing they were attacked by fresh forces, were intimidated, and retreated in disorder. In this engagement Pelopidas seems to have sacrificed his life to the blind pursuit of personal vengeance. Enraged by the remembrance of indignities offered to him by the tyrant, he sought for Alexander in every quarter of the field. Having at last descried his adversary, he called aloud to him by name, now to meet bravely with his sword the man he had basely injured. But Alexander prudently withdrew behind the ranks of his guards. Thither, burning with all the fury of revenge, did Pelopidas, at the head of a small party of horse, pursue him, and fell, oppressed by number, rather like a brave soldier, than a prudent commander. The Thessalian horsemen rushed to the assistance of their expiring general, and dispersed the guards of the tyrant: the Thebans, rouzed to fury, fell with impetuosity on the main body of the enemy, put them to flight, and pursued them with great slaughter. The plain was covered with carcases, and more than three thousand of Alexander's mercenaries fell on the field of battle, or in the pursuit.

No general ever met with more sincere and universal lamentation and regret than Pelopidas. The victory seemed to be turned into a defeat; a deep silence and general grief prevailed through the army. According to the expressions of sorrow in antient times, the soldiers cut off their locks, the manes of their

their horses, and shut themselves up in their tents, abstaining from every kind of nourishment. When his body was carried to Thebes, it was attended by a train of real mourners; and in every town through which it passed, the magistrates and priests came to meet the procession, bringing crowns and trophies. The Thessalians and Thebans contended for the honour of celebrating his funeral; but at last, the zealous gratitude of the former was indulged with the mournful office of performing the obsequies of a commander who had devoted himself to their protection from danger, and preservation from slavery. The people, recollecting the eclipse which took place on the day which was appointed for his departure, and which, according to their superstitious creed, predicted his calamities, exclaimed "that the sun of Thebes was set."

The Thebans were not satisfied with lamenting the death of their hero, but determined to revenge it. An army, consisting of seven thousand foot, and seven hundred horse, was sent to Thessaly, under the command of Malcitas and Diogeston. Alexander, who had not recovered from the terror of his defeat, was stripped of all his conquests, compelled to restore to the Thessalians the cities he had taken from them, to give liberty to the Magnesians, Achæans, and Phthians, and to bind himself by a solemn oath to follow the standard of the Thebans against all their enemies.

While the Thebans were employed in these foreign expeditions, or in civil dissensions, the Arcadians, confident in their strength and numbers, as well as in their new allies the Athenians, formed the most ambitious projects. They began by attacking their neighbours the Elians, who were repeatedly defeated, though assisted by the Spartans and Achæans; and were at last obliged to yield the sacred city of

Olympia to the rapacious invaders. The time for the celebration of the hundred and fourth olympiad now drew near; and, notwithstanding the late revolution in Elis, Greece assembled from every quarter. A suspension of animosities took place, and all parties united in celebrating the religious ceremonies, and the accustomed games. During the celebration of the games, the Elians attempted to recover possession of the city, but were repulsed by the Arcadians and Argives, and forced to leave their enemies still masters of the place.

The Arcadians, finding themselves in possession of the temple of the Olympian Jove, and of the accumulated treasures of past ages, were not deterred, either by religion or justice, from employing the sacred deposit to pay their mercenary troops. The Mantinæans alone remonstrated against the sacrilegious robbery, and raised a tax upon themselves to defray their proportion of the expences of the war. This event gave rise to much internal commotion. The ten thousand, or general assembly of Arcadia, highly disapproved of the seizure; while the Archons, and all who had shared in the Olympic spoils, dreading the being obliged to refund, formed a strong party in defence of the measure. The ten thousand restored Olympia to the Elians, and concluded a peace with that state. The deputies from Elis and the cities of Arcadia, being assembled at Tegea, for the ratification of this treaty, were seized and imprisoned by the opposite faction, assisted by the Bœotian garrison; and, though afterwards released, yet the violation of their representatives by the Theban soldiery, highly irritated the minds of the Arcadians, already sufficiently disposed to suspect and counteract the ambitious views of Thebes. Epaminondas having declared to their ambassadors, that the Thebans were determined to march into Arcadia, to the assist-

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ance of their friends and allies, they prepared with the utmost expedition for a vigorous resistance, and besought the Athenians and Spartans to hasten to their aid, that with their united forces they might at once crush the oppressors of Greece.

So formidable a combination against a single state, seemed to threaten its immediate destruction; but the Thebans met the gathering storm with intrepidity, and marched, under the conduct of Epaminondas, into the Peloponnesus. In this concluding scene of his life, the Theban hero displayed all the address of the most consummate general; and, though a combination of circumstances equally unexpected, and impossible to have been foreseen, robbed him, in some measure, of the fruits of his skill; yet his masterly arrangements, his numerous expedients, his bravery and unwearied perseverance, appear to have deserved the most brilliant success.

His first object was to prevent the junction of the Athenian forces with the Spartans and Arcadians; for this purpose he pitched his camp near Nemea, situated on the road from Attica to Arcadia; but the Athenians wisely avoided an engagement with a superior enemy, by embarking their troops, and landing in the territory of Lacedæmon.

Having failed in this, he next formed the design of surprising Sparta a second time. He knew that Agesilaus, with the Lacedæmonians, had already reached the frontiers of Arcadia, and that the city was not in a state to resist an unexpected attack; he therefore made a forced march of thirty miles in the night, and the capital of Lacedæmon would probably have fallen into his hands, had not Agesilaus been apprized of the design by the treachery of a deserter. By this means a detachment, under the command of Archidamus, entered the city before the arrival of the Thebans; and Epaminondas beheld, with surprize

prize and disappointment, instead of the confusion, alarm, and terror of a defenceless city, every preparation for a vigorous resistance. Yet, trusting to the superior number and tried bravery of his troops, he still hoped to carry the place by storm. But in this too his expectations were frustrated; the Thebans, who had so often before foiled the Spartans, did not on this critical occasion support their former martial fame; they permitted themselves to be shamefully repulsed by Archidamus, at the head of only one hundred Spartans.

The fertile mind of the Theban general next projected the surprisal of Mantinæa; rightly supposing that the general alarm for Sparta, and not expecting him in Arcadia, would draw the whole strength of the enemy towards the Lacedæmonian territories. He therefore made a rapid march to Tegea, and from thence detached his cavalry to take possession of the town. The unexpected arrival of the Athenian horse, under the command of Hegelochus, defeated this well concerted measure; the Thebans were repulsed, and Mantinæa saved.

Baffled in every attempt to make an impression on the confederates by superior address, nothing now remained to Epaminondas but to decide the fate of the war by a general engagement. Marching his troops from Tegea along the range of hills which run from that city to Mantinæa, he so perplexed the enemy by his various evolutions, that they found themselves forced to engage, at the time they least expected an attack. He charged the Spartans and Mantinæans at the head of his left wing, which he had arranged as at Leuctra, in the form of a wedge, and which was composed of chosen veterans. The conflict was obstinate and bloody; the Spartans were determined to regain the honour they had lost in their late defeats, and the Thebans to preserve their superiority.

riority. The weight and impetuosity of the Theban battalion, under the command of Epaminondas, at length bore down all resistance, and the enemy's cavalry being at the same time dispersed, victory declared for the Thebans. In this important moment, Epaminondas was mortally wounded by a javelin, and removed from the field. An universal consternation seized the Bœotians; it appeared as if all had depended upon the general. Having lost their animating and directing mind, they stopped short in the career of conquest; they knew not what to do; they looked on with a stupid languor and imbecility, while the enemy was rallying in different quarters, and routing in detail their broken forces. After some time this tumultuary engagement ceased, each party retreated, claiming the victory, and each acting as if it had been conquered.

The last moments of the Theban general did not obscure the splendor of a life which had been spent in the acquisition of knowledge, in acts of beneficence, and in the aggrandisement of his country. Amidst the agonies of dissolution, his only solicitude was for his own military glory, and the prosperity of Thebes. "Is my shield safe? Are the Thebans victorious?" were questions he repeated with the utmost anxiety. Viewing his shield, which was brought to him, and being informed that the Lacedæmonians were defeated, a gleam of joy prevailed for a moment over the languor of death: "Mine," said he, "is a glorious departure; I die in the arms of victory; tell me not that I am childless, for Leuctra and Mantinæa are immortal children." He then commanded the javelin to be extracted, which he knew was to occasion immediate death, and expired in the arms, and amidst the groans of his surrounding friends. His body was deposited in the field

field of battle, where a monument to his memory remained to the time of Pausanias.

With Epaminondas expired the splendor of the Theban name. To him, and to Pelopidas, the Thebans owed that pre-eminence they had acquired in Greece; and for a time they did not entirely lose the consequence they enjoyed while their affairs were directed by these great men; but it was a consequence derived from their former exploits, rather than from their after exertions. The vital spark was gone which had roused their latent energy, and an universal languor seems henceforward to have pervaded all their transactions.

After the battle of Mantinæa, the exhausted state of all the hostile powers produced a temporary peace, under the mediation of Artaxerxes. Sparta would not accede to this treaty, because it was stipulated that each state should retain its possessions and independence; and the Spartans wanted to recover the sovereignty of Messenia. But, unable to succeed without the assistance of their allies, who had signed the treaty, they did not venture to disturb the peace of Greece; yet, irritated against the Persian king, they embarked a large force under the conduct of Agesilaus, to assist his rebellious subjects in Egypt. That aged monarch, now on the verge of the grave, scrupled not to become the mercenary of rebels, and placed first Taches, and then Nectanebus on the Egyptian throne. He did not live to revisit his native land: after a life of eighty-four years, and a reign of forty-one, he died on the coast of Africa, whither he had been driven by a storm; leaving Sparta, which he had found powerful and triumphant, in a state of weakness and degradation, notwithstanding all his talents, and indefatigable activity.

At this period, the states of Greece, debilitated by their

their civil wars, corrupted by riches, and enervated by luxury, exhibited a melancholy reverse of what they were in the age of Thermopylæ and Marathon. Disunited, without public spirit, without sound political views, without virtue, the good of the whole was totally neglected: each state beheld its neighbour with eyes of envy or rapacity; the bosom of each, from Athens, Sparta and Thebes, to the most insignificant republic, was torn by dissension and cabal, where the contending parties, as they triumphed in their turn, expelled or murdered their opponents.

In the meanwhile, Philip of Macedon was rising into consequence, and watching every opportunity to avail himself of their weakness and disunion; while Greece slumbered in security, while it entered not into the mind of an Athenian or a Spartan, that the conquerors of the Great King could ever wear the chains of one whom they considered as only the petty chief of a barbarian tribe.

FINIS.

Printed by C. Roworth, Bell Yard, Temple Bar, London.

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